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Summary
The financialisation literature is an invaluable resource to explore the expansion
of finance in modern capitalism. However, the debate focuses on the US and the UK
extensively, whilst being too general with regard to other contexts. This inattention
hinders a proper understanding of financialisation in its di↵erential nature across
societies. To rectify such limitation, this thesis advances a theoretically controlled
and historically informed study about a striking instance of financial excess outside
the Anglo-American scenario: derivatives in Italy.
The work argues that scholars are inattentive to the heterogeneous nature of
financialisation because they conceptualise the power of finance as entrenched in
socio-economic structures. As a result, they underplay the actors who adopt finan-
cialised practices di↵erentially. Premised on this critique, the thesis advances an
agency-centred approach that analyses power from the perspective of agents. In so
doing, it examines the diverse traits of financialisation in relation to the specific
power struggles in which actors are involved.
Drawing on this method, the work shows that financialisation studies fail to ap-
preciate how key social forces deployed derivatives for political-strategic purposes in
the Italian context. During the 1990s, a neoliberal-reformist alliance of pro-market
technocrats and centre-left politicians got to power and pushed for Italy to join EMU.
This project functioned as an external limit on the domestic political-economic es-
tablishment which relied on high public debt, the vast state-owned enterprise and the
opaque corporate-governance regime. In brief, citing a slogan widely used in those
days, the neoliberal-reformist coalition attempted to make Italy a ‘normal country’
in Europe. Derivatives were crucial in this regard because they helped the Italian
government comply with the EMU admission criteria. First, reformists encouraged
hedge funds to arbitrage the interest-rate convergence between Italian and German
bonds via OTC derivatives markets. Second, they arranged a currency swap that
window-dressed the 1997 deficit.
The thesis concludes by examining how other actors adopted derivatives to deal
with the neoliberal-driven modernisation of Italy. It studies how the Agnelli family
used equity swaps to secure ownership over FIAT and how municipalities manipu-
lated budget restrictions through interest rate swaps.
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1Introduction
Derivatives reached the Italian popular perception in the early autumn of 2007. As
the American subprime crisis increased the fear of contagion across the globe, a story
of rather local dimensions captured the attention of Italian people: the predatory
selling of interest rate swaps to local authorities.1 This episode gave the impression
that Anglo-American finance and its speculative exuberance were taking over Italy.
Local authorities – in particular, municipalities – used swaps extensively since
the early 2000s.2 These instruments were supposed to help administrators manage
their debt structures more actively – for instance, by taking advantage of declining
interest rates (Saccomanni, 2007, 17-18). However, swaps turned sour once interest
rates rose and it became obvious that the market did not favour the positions of
municipalities (Sanderson, Dinmore and Tett, 2010). At this point the controversy
exploded. Media attention focused on Anglo-American finance with the accusation
of deceiving Italian local governments through complex contracts the implications of
which were impossible to grasp. As a popular television documentary about deriva-
tives frauds in Italy explicitly narrated:
[...] all these losses come from the same products: derivatives. London
is the motherland of these instruments. Here, the most sophisticated
products are engineered to be then sold on the fragile Italian market.
Young bankers – aged between 25 and 40 – work in the City of London.
They come from the most prestigious American courses on finance. Those
1In those months, it was not entirely clear to which extent Italian banks were exposed to the sub-
prime excess (Livini, 2007). Later, it emerged that the domestic banking system had a low degree
of exposure (Bankitalia, 2008; Quaglia, 2009). For a general timeline about the 2007 financial cri-
sis and its global repercussions, see http://www.cfr.org/economics/timeline-global-economy-crisis/
p18709 [accessed on December 30, 2012].
2In Italy, local authorities refer to municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities and regions.
See Constitution (1947, article 114). This thesis focuses particularly on the case of municipalities
(see section 4.4).
2who succeed in closing swaps contracts with Italian local authorities
receive big bonuses.3 (my translation)
In the following years, this popular perception about Anglo-American finance
corrupting Italy became widespread. In the early 2010, a short stop in an Apulian
cafe´ was enough to capture the common sentiment about derivatives. People in
this Southern region – which covers the heel of the boot-shaped Italian peninsula
– realised that their communities were exposed to great losses on global financial
markets. Coloured by gestures and intense jargon, locals condemned derivatives
sellers for swindling money out of honest taxpayers. “It is all about speculation!”,
they said whilst commenting on the news regarding a former budget assessore for
the Apulia region who was tricked by Merrill Lynch in signing a contract he could
not understand.4 This happened because he neither spoke English nor understood
economics and law (Repubblica, 2010). Thus, it seems that, although domestic actors
played a facilitating – sometimes naive, often collusive – role in these derivatives
frauds, the popular discourse was more inclined to put the blame on the City and
Wall Street.
Interestingly, moving from the Apulian cafe´ to the world of critical academic
research, the current debate on financialisation contributes to creating – at least
indirectly – this image according to which Anglo-American finance causes disarray
elsewhere. To be sure, this literature provides insightful resources to explore the
theme of derivatives as one the most remarkable facets of financialisation (Bryan
and Ra↵erty, 2006a; LiPuma and Lee, 2005; Maurer, 2002; Wigan, 2009).5 Yet, the
3See Il Banco Vince Sempre (bank always wins) at http://www.report.rai.it/dl/Report/
puntata/ContentItem-2a15c777-fc79-424d-b44a-7ca6e51541dd.html [2’04”; accessed on December
30, 2012]. The state television RAI broadcast this documentary on October 14, 2007.
4Italian regional governments are administered by a president (presidente), the regional exec-
utive (giunta regionale) and the regional council (consiglio regionale) as the legislative body. See
Constitution (1947, article 121). Members of the executive are called assessori regionali. Each as-
sessore has responsibility for a specific department such as budget, health, environment and so on.
Members of the council are known as consiglieri regionali.
5For instance, the work by Duncan Wigan (2008, 2009) is particularly relevant to appreciate
how derivatives uphold financialisation in its proceeding semi-autonomously from tangible wealth
production. Echoing the groundbreaking research by Dick Bryan and Michael Ra↵erty (2006a)
– see section 1.1.2 – Wigan argues that derivatives perform the role of ‘artifices of indi↵erence’
through an unprecedented transformation of ownership flexibility that transcends the joint-stock
form. Derivatives further abstract ownership away from any direct (partnership) or legal ownership
(joint-stock) of tangible assets. For instance, the owner of an equity derivative does not own the
actual underlying shares and has no voting rights on the board of the company that issued those
shares. She owns only the exposure to an attribute of these shares: price volatility. According to
3debate reveals a weak spot. It tends to focus extensively on the institutions and
discourses of the United States of America (US) and the United Kingdom (UK),
whilst being too general when it comes to examine other societies (Engelen, Konings
and Fernandez, 2010, 57). This is problematic because, due to such inattention, the
financialisation debate falls short of providing the analytical space where to explore
how and why people outside the Anglo-American heartland experience financialised
practices through modalities that are institutionally and discursively diverse.6 As
a consequence of this, the debate underplays the actors who had a decisive role
in pushing for financialised reforms in societies other than the US and the UK.
Ultimately, by disregarding this dimension, the financialisation literature cannot
challenge the Italian popular discourse which underrates the significance of domestic
a↵airs relatively to the perils of an external threat.
The argument
Considering the events above, this thesis explores the political economy of finan-
cial derivatives in Italy.7 It does so by engaging with a proble´matique that currently
animates the debate on financialisation: the distinct trajectories of financialised phe-
nomena across societies.
In recent years, encouraged by the subprime crisis and its di↵erential impact
throughout the globe, several scholars have begun to map how financialisation af-
fects societies and areas outside the US and the UK.8 This line of research aims at
improving the analytical resources of a ‘first generation’ of works which has focused
Wigan (2009, 160-163, 167), it is on the basis of this flexible ownership that derivatives crucially
support finance-based accumulation. In fact, derivatives ownership disengages investors from the
competitive requirements at the level of real wealth production. In the case of the joint-stock
form, competition still gravitated at the interstice of production and circulation. On the contrary,
derivatives emphasise instead the circulative dimension, constructing a system in which investors
have a diversity of exposures to price volatility and the risk which the latter entails.
6The terms ‘institution’ and ‘discourse’ – alternatively, institutional and discursive – are used
together to denote the intertwined material and ideal nature of human practices.
7For an overview about the origins and evolution of political economy, its various approaches,
their ontological and epistemological foundations, see Van der Pijl (2009).
8For some interesting studies about financialisation outside the Anglo-American economies,
see: Daniela Gabor (2010) on Eastern Europe; Annina Kaltenbrunner (2010) on Brasil; Thomas
Marois (2011) about Mexico and Turkey; Juan Pablo Painceira (2010) on Brasil and Korea; Ewald
Engelen, Martijn Konings and Rodrigo Fernandez (2010) on the Netherlands; Stockhammer (2008)
on Western Europe; Orsi and Solari (2010) on Southern-Europe including Greece, Italy, Spain and
Portugal.
4exclusively on the Anglo-American space. Taking into account these current studies
on the heterogeneous nature of financialised developments, this thesis advances the
following central argument: the financialisation literature underplays how and why
financial expansion di↵ers across societies because it tends to view finance from the
vantage point of structural power. What does this argument entail?
Many critical scholars articulate the power of finance as entrenched and repli-
cated in the structures of society. Through this exercise, they theorise the general
dynamics of a finance-driven reality that produces dramatic inequalities and, for this
reason, should be transformed. In this regard, they conceptualise agency – either
explicitly or implicitly – as an act of resistance against the powerful structures of
finance.9 However, in spite of acknowledging agency, scholars eventually relegate it
to a stand-by status and reactivate it only in moments of crisis – when actors can
fulfil the objective of changing society for the better. Thus, agents are never properly
explored in their ability to adapt the practices of financialisation in a di↵erential
manner and for historically specific reasons. This leads to an idea of financialisation
which expands as a quasi-homogeneous entity.
Against this view on finance through the lenses of structural power, this thesis
presents an agency-centred approach as a methodological turn in the financialisation
debate. This perspective accounts for a social reality where agents are not passive
bystanders against the power of finance. On the contrary, actors interact with each
other through the mediation of constantly renegotiated institutional and discursive
architectures. In this context, power is not entrenched in the structures of society,
but generated by agents when they manipulate extant institutions and discourses
in search for a leverage to exert power over others (Knafo, 2010; Konings, 2010b).
As this thesis claims, the agency-centred approach provides the historically sensitive
scenario where to appreciate how and why Italian agents – through their conflicts as
well as their institutional and discursive manipulation – produce di↵erent traits of
financialisation across social spaces.10
In fact, once applied to the case of derivatives in Italy, the study shows that
these practices always acquire di↵erent contours depending on the power struggles
9The critique of the view on agency as an act of resistance against structural power is based on
Knafo (2010). Chapter one examines this aspect more in depth.
10This thesis adapts the term ‘social space’ from Lefebvre (1974). It shows that the heterogeneous
character of financialisation does not necessarily reflect nation-state boundaries, but rather the
spaces in which social forces unfold their conflictual relations.
5in which they are deployed. Over the course of the 1990s, Italian neoliberal-minded
technocrats and centre-left politicians (henceforth neoliberal reformists) attempted
to challenge the country’s old political and business elites by implementing a market-
oriented modernisation of Italian capitalism.11 This process was undertaken in line
with the objective of joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999.
Participating in the EMU from the very start was a chance not to be missed due
to the fact that Europe functioned as an external constraint on those conservative
forces who depended heavily on: high public expenditure, the enlargement of the
state-owned enterprise and a blockholder-oriented regime of corporate governance.12
In other words, neoliberal reformists adhered to the dynamics of European economic
and monetary integration in order to – citing a slogan which centre-left leaders used
extensively – make Italy a ‘normal country’.13 This process of normalising Italy
implied an attempt by reformist forces to replace old political-economic practices
– which had become systemically clientelistic and corrupt by the late 1980s and
early 1990s – with the institutions and discourses of a modern liberal democracy
(Favretto, 2002, 403).
Derivatives played a crucial role in these tactics. Indeed, as chapter four ex-
plains, neoliberal reformists tailored these innovative instruments to their strategic
requirements vis-a`-vis conservative forces. In so doing, derivatives-based techniques
acquired distinct traits in relation to the nature of the Italian power struggle and the
agents who were involved in it. Initially, technocrats introduced derivatives whilst
renovating the practices and technology of public-debt management. After this, as
the struggle to conform with the EMU criteria intensified, derivatives practices be-
11The terms ‘neoliberal-minded’, ‘neoliberal’ or ‘neoliberalism’ denote the ideology according to
which “human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free
markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005, 2). Of course, the emphasis on the free market and the
retreat of the state is a rhetorical matter. In reality, neoliberal forces capture state institutions and
exploit them to secure their discipline over society (Konings, 2010a).
12About Europe as an external constraint on Italy, see Dyson and Featherstone (1996) and
Sbragia (2001). About the market-oriented transformation of Italian finance and its impact on
corporate blockholders, see Deeg (2005b), Cio  and Hopner (2006) and Culpepper (2007).
13The Italian translation is un paese normale. This rather vague slogan was the title of a
book by Massimo D’Alema (1995), a leading centre-left politician and President of the Council
of Ministers (1998-2000). See http://www.governo.it/Governo/Governi/dalema1.html and http:
//www.governo.it/Governo/Governi/dalema2.html [both accessed on December 30, 2012]. As
chapter four shows, the slogan reflected the shift of post-communist leaders towards neoliberalism
(Ginsborg, 2001, 302-303).
6came a quintessential element of reformists’ agential power. In particular, these
actors stroke a ‘devil’s bargain’ with the most aggressive hedge funds in the attempt
to arbitrage the interest-rate convergence between Italian and German bonds via
the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets (Dunbar, 2000, 153). In addition to
this, reformists arranged also a controversial currency swap which window-dressed
the 1997 budget deficit only to disburse a larger amount of money later on (Piga,
2001, 122-129).14 These highly financialised operations did not simply reflect a degree
of subordination to Anglo-American finance and its crisis-prone practices. From an
‘inside-out’ perspective (Panitch, 1996), they reveal instead how Italian reformists
set in motion finance-led strategies in order to achieve their political priorities in
the context of domestic power relations.
It is important to note that the agential process of constructing institutional
and discursive structures does not lead to the consolidation of an objectified reality.
On the contrary, it allows people to use those structures for their own strategic
purposes (Konings, 2010b, 65-72). In other words, whilst neoliberal reformists in
Italy exerted power by building market-oriented institutions and discourses, other
agents lived such constraints in their own terms – eventually transforming the very
same restrictive rules they were initially subjected to (Knafo, 2010, 503). As chapter
four shows, this aspect is fundamental to appreciate how and why actors other than
neoliberal reformists – such as corporations or municipalities – adopted derivatives
techniques to develop their own tactics.
General contours of the work
This thesis is structured in six main parts. It begins with a technical excursus on
derivatives markets, instruments and actors. This primer aims at facilitating the
reader’s comprehension of this complex topic in preparation for the study provided in
the work. The analysis explains primarily the mainstream ‘textbook’ understanding
of derivatives.
Successively, chapter one interrogates the theoretical insights of the financial-
isation literature by looking at four main approaches: Re´gulation school together
14As chapter four shows, European member states decided which country could have joined the
first round of EMU on the basis of the macroeconomic data for the year 1997. The level of budget
deficit came to play a pivotal role amongst all the Maastricht convergence criteria.
7with post-Keynesian economics, Marxist political economy and Foucauldian polit-
ical economy. The study claims that the structural bias of these approaches limits
their ability to examine how and why societies outside the Anglo-American heart-
land adopt financialised practices. For this reason, scholars fall short of capturing
many institutional and discursive specificities of the Italian case. Hence, the chapter
reconsiders financialisation from the vantage point of the agency-centred approach.
This is an alternative method which accounts for the di↵erential trajectories of fi-
nancialised phenomena (e.g. derivatives) across social spaces.
Premised on this, chapter two explores the origins and evolution of derivatives-
based risk management in the United States. Before examining the specificities of
the Italian case, it is necessary to detour our analysis around Italy to focus instead
on the American context. This is because – as the chapter claims – derivatives-like
instruments existed for millennia (Swan, 1999), but only in the US did these con-
tracts assume their modern features and were then projected across the globe as
part and parcel of American financial power. It is shown how derivatives were sys-
tematically disconnected from the final delivery of the underlying asset during the
late nineteenth century. This innovation generated dramatic speculative trading and
attracted the opposition of the rising populist movement. In a scenario of intense
power struggle, representatives of commodity markets recast their speculative activ-
ities as essential instruments of business-risk management. As a result, speculation
on futures markets was gradually institutionalised in such terms (Levy, 2006).
At the turn of the 1970s, power relations in the American society increasingly
favoured finance. This was due to the fact that the US establishment began to sup-
port the expansion of financial innovation at home and abroad as a mechanism of
‘pure dollar’ hegemony. In a word, the practices of American finance turned into an
e↵ective instrument of state power in the global order (Gowan, 1999; Konings, 2009;
Panitch and Gindin, 2008). Under these circumstances, representatives of commod-
ity exchanges successfully lobbied for the creation of organised markets where to
trade financial derivatives (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; MacKenzie, 2006). In this
regard, the discipline of financial economics was crucial in providing scientific le-
gitimacy to derivatives as useful instruments that protect investors from the risk
of market volatility (Wigan, 2009). Over the course of the 1970s, derivatives grew
in trading volumes and types – although these developments were to some extent
8hindered by regulatory uncertainties. Finally, from the early 1980s onwards, these
instruments became essential constituents of American financial power in a dollar-
centred world economy. Accordingly, other societies began to adopt themselves the
practices of derivatives-based risk management.
How and why did the Italian society import derivatives-based risk management?
Why and to what extent do this innovation reveal distinct features in Italy? The
third chapter moves from the United States to the Italian case. It provides the his-
torical background to capture the domestic actors and the power struggles which
gave derivatives its specific traits in the Italian context. The chapter claims that
capitalism in Italy evolved through an ownership liaison between private business
oligarchies and the expanding public enterprise (Segreto, 1998). This equilibrium
secured ownership in the hands of the state and the oligarchs, a scenario which
reached its most collusive and corrupt traits during the 1980s. It is at this point
that technocrats – based primarily at the Bank of Italy and the Ministry of Trea-
sury (Deeg, 2005a) – launched a critique of the Italian political economy which
exalted the benefits of reducing public debt, privatising the state-owned sector and,
a few years later, modernising the domestic financial system in favour of dispersed
shareholding. Through their pro-market critique, technocrats aimed at undermining
the foundations upholding conservative politics-cum-business a↵airs. In fact, whilst
the political establishment depended on the enlargement of public debt (Pasquino,
2000, 79) and the clientelistic exploitation of the state enterprise (Bianchi, 1987),
private capital benefited from cross-shareholding alliances and pyramidal schemes
to the detriment of minority shareholders (Amatori and Colli, 2001; Bianchi, Bianco
and Enriques, 2001).
The ideas put forward by technocrats became influential in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, when the process of European integration revealed a new impetus with
the launch of the single market and the project of monetary union. In a context where
the political-economic establishment and the popular discourse were supportive of
Europe in a general sense (Quaglia, 2011), crucial reforms were introduced such as
the removal of capital controls, the transformation of public banks into joint-stock
companies and the independence of the central bank. Above all, technocrats gained
considerable power over the policy contents during the intergovernmental conference
(IGC) on EMU. In February 1992, by adhering to the convergence criteria for joining
9EMU, they imposed an external discipline on the country’s vested interests and their
reproductive capacities (Dyson and Featherstone, 1996). At this point, the stage
was ready for neoliberal reforms to be implemented in a systematic manner over the
course of the 1990s. Derivatives practices emerged and consolidated in Italy under
such circumstances.
Having explored the power relations in which technocrats advanced their pro-
market critique of Italian capitalism, chapter four examines instead the distinct
traits of derivatives-based risk management in Italy. The study claims that this in-
novation acquired specific contours in relation to the uniqueness of Italian power
dynamics – in particular, the strategies that neoliberal reformists launched against
conservative political-economic forces. The analysis begins by showing how tech-
nocrats became increasingly impatient towards the inability of political elites to rein
in the budget deficit. In this context, they marketised the practices of public-debt
management. Derivatives were introduced as part and parcel of this transformation.
These instruments were deemed to make government bond markets more attractive
to investors.
After this, the chapter enters the core of the story by examining the period
1992-1999. During these years, technocrats and centre-left politicians implemented
draconian austerity measures and market-oriented reforms in line with the strate-
gic objective of joining EMU. As the fight for Europe heated up, these actors de-
ployed derivatives as their most strategic element. In particular, they encouraged
the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) – and indirectly other
financial actors – to narrow the interest-rate spread between Italian and German
bonds via arbitrage operations on the OTC derivatives markets (Dunbar, 2000, 149-
162). More controversially, reformists entered also into a fraudulent currency swap
through which they window-dressed the 1997 budget deficit (Piga, 2001, 122-129).
Finally, chapter four looks also at how other agents experienced the market-
oriented institutions and discourses which neoliberal reformists advanced. The anal-
ysis shows that the ‘enabling’ (Konings, 2010b) character of these structures allowed
the Agnelli family (FIAT) and Italian municipalities to adopt derivatives strategi-
cally. Indeed, whilst the Agnellis used equity swaps to secure ownership over their
corporate empire, municipalities ‘got high’ on interest rate swaps in order to circum-
vent the budget restrictions imposed by the European stability and growth pact.
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Last but not least, the concluding chapter highlights the main findings of the
thesis and the implications for future research. Moreover, it presents also a brief
overview about the general dynamics of financialisation in Italy.
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Technical excursus: a primer on
derivatives
What are derivatives? How do they work? Who are the actors using them and for
what purpose? This technical excursus addresses these questions by examining the
fundamentals of derivatives markets, instruments and actors. After a brief outline of
the main types of derivatives, their respective underlying referents and the markets
where these instruments are traded, the analysis proceeds by studying the basic
logic of forwards and futures. Successively, the second section explains the orthodox
rationale behind the use of futures – and, more generally, derivatives – as well as
who uses these instruments. After this, the primer examines the other basic types of
derivatives such as options/warrants and swaps. Finally, the last section concludes
with a simple example of asset-backed securities (ABSs). This shows the important
linkage between derivatives-based techniques and the practices of securitisation.15
Definition, types of instruments and markets
A conventional definition sees a derivative contract “as a financial instrument whose
value depends on (or derives from) the values of other, more basic, underlying vari-
ables” (Hull, 2009, 1). In other words, the value of the derivative stems from the
15Unless otherwise referenced, this technical excursus is based on Kolb and Overdahl (2006,
2007) and Hull (2009). For what concerns instead the subsection on securitisation and asset-backed
securities, the analysis primarily refers to Fabozzi and Kothari (2008). It is important to note
that, although these core textbooks clearly illustrate the complex mechanics of derivatives, their
understanding of these instruments is mostly ahistorical. In particular, their view on derivatives as
tools of risk management – via hedging practices and liquidity-enhancing speculation (see below) –
hardly captures the infinite strategies through which actors might adopt these instruments on the
ground. For this reason, this primer is only meant to facilitate the reader’s comprehension about
the mainstream conceptualisation of derivatives markets, instruments and participants.
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price volatility of the underlying asset. There are four basic types of derivatives:
• forwards;
• futures;
• options and warrants;
• swaps.
These four ‘plain vanilla’ instruments are the standard versions of derivatives. Other
‘exotic’ types alter their features to combine di↵erent profiles, creating more complex
and synthetic products. To simplify the analysis, this section deals only with plain
vanilla derivatives.
For a long time in history, contracts similar to forwards, futures and options were
traded primarily on agricultural products and commodities (Swan, 1999). Today,
particularly after the emergence of swaps in the early 1980s, derivatives on financial
assets represent instead the most widely traded instruments. Listed in descending
order according to market size (BIS, 2008, 2011), modern derivatives refer to five
di↵erent categories of underlying assets:
• interest rate – e.g. interest rate swaps, interest rate futures, forward rate agree-
ments;
• foreign exchange – e.g. currency swaps, currency futures, currency options,
currency forwards;
• credit – e.g. credit default swaps, total return swaps, collateralised debt obli-
gations;
• equity – e.g. stock options, warrants, index futures;
• commodity – e.g. commodity futures, commodity options, commodity swaps.
Other contracts are also traded on underlying referents such as: property index;
macroeconomic indicators; freight rates; weather forecast; Co2 emissions and so
on. This indicates the possibility for derivative-based techniques to be applied to
13
many aspects of our social reality, a question which complicates the above-mentioned
conventional definition of derivatives (Bryan and Ra↵erty, 2006a, 64).16
Derivatives are bought and sold on two types of markets which di↵er in terms of
trading arrangements, procedures and levels of risk. These two markets are:
• organised exchanges;
• OTC markets.
An organised exchange is a centralised marketplace for buyers and sellers of deriva-
tives contracts, regulated by government agencies such as the US Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission (CFTC). Bids and o↵ers can be based on an open out-
cry system or on electronic trading. Today, most of the exchanges trade through
computer-based platforms (Gorham and Singh, 2009). Organised exchanges o↵er in-
struments which are standardised in terms of quantity, quality, expiration months,
delivery terms, delivery di↵erentials, delivery dates, minimum price fluctuations,
daily price limits, trading days and hours. For this reason, contracts can be easily
transferable to third parties through the market. The major benefit of organised
exchanges is the use of the central counterparty system of clearing and settlements.
The clearing house is the counterpart in each trade, e↵ectively intermediating
between the seller and the buyer. In other words, it is the clearing house which
sells the contract to the buyer and buys it from the seller, clearing and settling
the contract (Loader, 2005). This method dramatically reduces the risk of default
through the system of so-called margins. Indeed, market participants are required to
register an account with the exchange from which money is withdrawn or credited
according to the daily profits and losses. In so doing, they adhere to the margins
system. Contrary to securities markets where ‘trading on margins’ means buying
stocks through borrowed money, in derivatives markets margins include: the initial
deposit of ‘good faith’ made into the account in order to enter the market; the
maintenance margin, which is the lowest amount an account can reach before being
topped up; the margin call as that sum which needs to be deposited in order to
bring the margin back to the initial amount. These margins are usually very low
16On property derivatives, see Smith and Searle (2010). On macroeconomic derivatives, see
Gurkaynak and Wolfers (2006). On freight derivatives, see Alizadeh and Nomikos (2012). On
weather derivatives, see Jewson and Brix (2005). On carbon emission derivatives, see Sandor (2012).
About the role of financial innovation in society, see Shiller (2003) and Bryan and Ra↵erty (2011)
for a critique.
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compared to the control over large cash amounts of commodities an individual can
exert. This means that with a relatively small amount of cash, investors can enter
into derivatives worth much more than the required initial margin deposits – a
characteristic known as leverage.
Contrary to organised exchanges – where derivatives are standardised in terms of
quantity, quality, delivery date and place – OTC markets are instead decentralised
networks where financial institutions tailor instruments to fit certain requirements
of their clients. Due to the benefits of trading customised products, OTC markets
expanded overwhelmingly compared to formal exchanges (see figure 1). However,
OTC markets have no central clearing house which intermediates between buyers
and sellers. Here, derivatives are privately negotiated between the two parties. In
this regard, these markets imply a considerably higher exposure to credit risk. For
this reason, initiatives were developed to minimise risk on OTC markets.17 To begin
with, contract details are subject to market standard documentation such as the
Master Agreement by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).
Furthermore, similar to the central counterparty model, LCH.Clearnet operates a
clearing system for interest rate swaps known as SwapClear (Loader, 2005). In spite
of this, it is evident that OTC markets simply function by linking various trading
floors amongst the major financial institutions. There is “no central mechanism
to limit individual or aggregate risk taking, leverage, and credit extension, and risk
management is completely decentralized.” At the level of transparency, besides semi-
annual surveys by central banks, “information about market concentration and who
owns which risks is generally unavailable; at best, a trading desk might know that
some institutions are building up positions” (Schinasi et al., 2000, 19).
Table 1 presents a schematic view of the four basic types of derivatives in relation
to the respective markets in which they are traded. As it is clear, options are the
only instruments traded on both exchanges and OTC markets. Forwards and swaps
are instead a prerogative of OTC markets, whilst futures are exclusively traded on
organised exchanges. Let us now move to examine each basic instrument in turn.
17In this regard, the growing market for credit default swaps can be seen as a way to minimise
credit risk on OTC markets.
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Instruments Exchange traded Over the counter
Forwards No Yes
Futures Yes No
Options Yes Yes
Swaps No Yes
Table 1: Types of derivatives instruments and their respective markets.
Types of derivatives instruments and their respective markets.
Forwards and futures
The use of contracts with forwards-like features goes back to ancient Babylon (Swan,
1999). The objective was to set the price today for a sale of an asset in the future.
Until the Mercantile era, the assets in question were commodities, but shares of
the Dutch East India company and the Dutch West India Company began to be
traded on a deferred basis during the period of the Dutch Republic (1581-1795)
(Gelderblom and Jonker, 2005). These were early antecedents of modern financial
derivatives. In order to explain the rationale behind a forward contract, let us take
the classical example of a wheat farmer and a flour miller.18
Instead of awaiting the crop to be ready and then trade wheat at the prevailing
market price, the farmer and the miller agree in advance on a specific price, quantity
and date of delivery of the wheat in the future. Once the crop is harvested and ready
to be sold, the market-prevailing price at harvesting time could be either above or
below the price previously agreed on in the contract. The first case favours the
miller. In fact, because of the contract, she pays less for the wheat than what she
would pay if buying the commodity at the market-prevailing price. The second case
favours instead the farmer who, due to the contract, is being paid more that what
others pay on the market. In spite of this seemingly one-sided bet against the future
price of wheat, both parties gain in business certainty and price stability.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, merchants in Chicago revolutionised
the modalities of forwards-like contracts which at that time were called to-arrive.
As chapter two shows, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) established the first
market for standardised to-arrive contracts known as futures. These were contracts
18The example is based on Bryan and Ra↵erty (2006a, 41).
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in which details such as the quantity and quality of the commodity, the price per
unit, the date and delivery arrangements were all specified. After the CBOT, other
markets for futures soon flourished across the United States. Grains, and particularly
wheat, were the most traded commodities on these markets. Today, organised futures
markets exist across the world. They expanded their range of products to include
options and, as already mentioned, financial assets as the underlying referents. How
does a futures market function?
An organised futures exchange is a centralised marketplace for buyers and sellers
of futures contracts. Referring again to the above-mentioned example of the miller
and the farmer, let us imagine that on March 5th the miller gives instruction to a
broker to enter into a future which requires to buy 5,000 bushels of wheat in July.
In the same period, the farmer instructs another broker to enter into a contract to
deliver 5,000 bushels of wheat in July. As the party who agrees to buy the commodity,
the miller is in the long position (going long). The farmer is instead in the short
position (going short) as she agrees to receive the commodity. Each contract always
involves both positions. Under an open outcry system, floor traders would meet up
to agree on a price. On an electronic platform instead, brokers would match bids and
o↵ers via computer-trading networks. The price agreed – let us say $4 per bushel –
is the current futures price for July wheat, which is subject to fluctuations in supply
and demand.
Conceptually, futures are very similar to forwards since both contracts involve
the future delivery of an asset at a price agreed today. However, there are three
key di↵erences. First, the two instruments are traded on di↵erent markets. Being
standardised products, futures are bought and sold on organised exchanges. On the
contrary, forwards are traded on OTC markets. Second, the miller and the farmer
do not meet up personally, but refer to their brokers which in turn relate to the
exchange’s clearing house as their counterpart. In other words, it is the clearing house
which sells the wheat to the miller’s broker and buys it from the farmer’s broker,
clearing and settling the contract. As already mentioned, this system dramatically
reduces the risk of default through margins requirements. Indeed, the farmer’s and
the miller’s respective brokers are required to register an account with the exchange,
from which money is withdrawn or credited according to the daily profits and losses,
as well as to conform to margins. Third, and this is a fundamental innovation in
18
derivatives trading, the two parties are not bound to exchange the actual commodity
at the expiration of a contract. The majority of futures position are closed out
before being exercised at expiration, making the market for futures work practically
through a process of cash settlement. Profits and losses are calculated on the basis
of the daily price movements of futures, whilst the accounts of both long and short
positions are therefore adjusted for gains and losses at the end of each trading day.19
Since futures can be easily closed out before expiration, exercising the contract
for delivery is very unusual and traders often forget how the actual delivery process
works. Closing out a position means entering into a contract which is the opposite of
the original one. For example, the miller – who bought a July wheat futures contract
on March 5th – can close out the position by instructing the broker to sell one July
wheat futures contract on, say, May 6th. The farmer who is in a short position would
do the opposite. In both cases, total gain or loss are determined by the di↵erence in
the futures prices between the day in which they entered the first contract (March
5th for the miller) and the day when the contract is closed out.
What is the reason for futures and other types of derivatives to exist? The next
section presents a practical case of futures trading that shows the rationale behind
the use of derivatives and who uses them. Successively, the analysis focuses on other
types of derivatives and their specifics.
Why do derivatives exist? Who are the actors using
them?
The orthodox argument is that futures markets and their speculative mechanisms
provide a fundamental function of risk management. Chapter two shows that this
idea emerged out of specific social relations of power in the United States during the
late nineteenth century, at a time when the country experienced a dramatic transfor-
mation of its agricultural and urban landscapes. Against populist attacks, advocates
of futures markets advanced the powerful argument that these organisations – as
19For instance, a week after the miller and the farmer entered into their contract of $4 per bushel,
the price of wheat futures increases to $5 per bushel. In this case, the farmer has lost $1 per bushel,
whilst the miller has profited by $1. Accordingly, the farmer’s account is debited $5,000 ($1 per
bushel x 5,000 bushels) and vice versa for the miller. This is very di↵erent from the stock market.
Here, gains and losses deriving from price movements are realised only when the investor decides
to sell the stock or cover the short position.
19
well as the speculation which characterised them – helped businessmen hedge their
risks. In this regard, commodity traders were not gamblers but professionals who
managed such risk in scientific terms. This reinterpretation of speculative activities
shaped extant institutions and discourses in the United States at the turn of the
twentieth century. As a powerful idea, it legitimised futures trading as an e cient di-
mension of the American economy. What is more, it was rhetorically adopted across
the world. To appreciate what derivatives-based risk management entails, let us refer
to a historical example which chapter two further examines in its significance.
Andrew J. Sawyer, an important market participant, testified before the House
Committee on Agriculture in February 1892, during the hearings about the Hatch
bill.20 Residing in Minneapolis, Sawyer had been president of the Duluth Board of
Trade in 1881 and was also a member of the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce as
well as the CBOT. He owned a 5,000-acre wheat farm in Minnesota and one of the
leading grain elevator businesses in the Midwest. He dealt exclusively in wheat, the
harvest season of which began in July. After purchasing the wheat from the farmers,
he stored it in the elevators and then shipped to both Minneapolis and Duluth. In
the latter case, the wheat was mostly destined for foreign markets. Sawyer testified
in front of the Committee that he used the futures markets for hedging purposes.
How did this work practically? Imagine that “we are handling 100,000 bushels a
day and we can sell in Minneapolis, Bu↵alo, Montreal, or New York only 75,000
bushels a day [...] We have then 25,000 bushels left on our hands which we can not
sell, there being no market for it” (Levy, 2006, 312). Sawyer decided to hold these
25,000 bushels until the market would turn in his favour. But, what would have
happened if after six months the price for wheat had declined even further? In this
sense, he needed to protect his business from such possibility. It is at this point that
futures trading entered Sawyer’s operations. He shorted wheat futures to traders in
the CBOT pits. If two days after entered into the contract, the current market price
was below the contract price, Sawyer had profited. He would close out his position,
obtaining the capital necessary to keep storing the 25,000 bushels. On the contrary,
if the futures market price had turned against him, Sawyer would have incurred
losses on his futures position. However, in this case, he would have at least delivered
the 25,000 bushels of wheat on the cash market, where the actual commodity is
20The example is based on Levy (2006, 312-313). On the Hatch bill hearings, see section 2.1.
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bought on the spot.
Sawyer represented a typical example of hedger, a market participant who used
futures contracts as a form of insurance against the risk involved in his business
operations. In other words, he speculated on futures markets, but only with the in-
tention of either closing out his position before expiration – therefore making a profit
to be reinvested in his business – or e↵ectively delivering the actual commodity at
the end of the contract. However, futures markets attracted many traders who were
hardly interested in the actual exchange of wheat. In fact, contracts were only rarely
exercised at expiration. How did futures markets advocates justify the presence of
speculators in the pits? Although compared to gamblers by the people outside the
exchanges, speculators nonetheless appeared to other market participants as essen-
tial providers of liquidity. By buying and selling contracts in search for a profitable
trend, they went long or short when they anticipated prices to respectively increase
or decrease. In so doing, whilst satisfying their thirst for quick profits, speculators
made sure that hedgers like Sawyer always found counterparts to their actual trading
needs (Levy, 2006, 325).
The distinction between hedgers and speculators is widely acknowledged by the
contemporary literature on derivatives. The two broad categories circumscribe a
myriad of market participants such as banks, institutional investors, central banks,
government agencies, supranational institutions, companies, wealthy individuals and
retail investors. These actors, either directly or indirectly, enter into futures and
other derivatives contracts to hedge risk or take risk. Paradoxically, the two facets
are intertwined and support each other e ciently. Besides hedgers and speculators,
a third type of market participant is the arbitrageur, who identifies price discrepan-
cies and profit from them.21 Investors adopt many strategies involving derivatives
instruments, the name of which are often very odd – e.g. spreads, butterfly, straddle,
strangle and so on (Cboe, 1995). These names may confuse the reader. But, all these
and other names represent sub-specific practices which are broadly conceived with
the intentions to hedge, speculate or arbitrage.
21The concept of arbitrage plays an important role in options pricing theory (see chapter two). A
discussion of the numerous arbitrage techniques is beyond the scope of this work. For two studies
on arbitrage both at the theoretical and practical level, see MacKenzie (2003) and Dunbar (2000,
34-37, 60-66).
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Options and warrants
Besides forwards and futures, options and warrants are the other basic instruments.
Options existed for a long time and with various names, notably privileges in eigh-
teenth and nineteenth-century England. However, their use on both commodities
and stocks was always controversial and often restricted (Swan, 1999). Options and
warrants were eventually legitimised in the United States during the 1970s and, af-
ter this, their use soon began to expand across the globe (see chapter two). What
are options and warrants? Before addressing this question, a caveat is necessary to
specify the slight di↵erences between the two instruments. Options and warrants are
very similar in their logic. But, warrants are guaranteed by the very same company
issuing the underlying stock rather than by the exchange – as it is the case for stock
options. Apart for this aspect, the rationale of the two instruments is the same.
Hence, except for specific cases, this thesis will refer primarily to options.22
An option is a contract which gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation,
to buy (call option) or sell (put option) an underlying asset at a specified price on or
before a certain date. Call and put options which can be exercised before expiration
are called American options. On the contrary, those instruments which can only be
exercised at maturity date are instead known as European options.23 As it might
be clear, there are four participants in the market for options: buyers and sellers
of call options; similarly, buyers and sellers of put options. Buyers of both types
of options are often known as holders, whereas the sellers are called writers. To
keep the option open until expiration, holders are required to pay a premium to the
option brokers (writers). Let us focus on how options work through the example of a
stock option.24 The historical and theoretical importance of options will be further
22However, it is important to notice that, compared to warrants, options are issued on many
other underlying referents than just corporate stocks. For this reason, more complex warrants
products exist which are known as covered warrants. These are an evolution of warrants in four
respects. First, covered warrants can be issued on a wide range of underlying assets. Second,
covered warrants are issued by financial institutes and not by the underlying company. Third,
covered warrants have di↵erent exercise prices depending on the conditions stated by each issuance.
Fourth, whilst warrants allow the holder only to buy the underlying, covered warrants allow the
holder to buy (call) or sell (put) the underlying. This makes covered warrants more similar to
options. But, contrary to the latter, covered warrants do not normally involve the actual delivery
of the underlying asset.
23Note that both adjectives have nothing to do with their geographic meaning.
24The example is adapted from http://www.investopedia.com/university/options [accessed on
December 30, 2012]. The web site is a major provider of information on financial literacy and
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specified in chapter two.
Let us imagine that Sarah wants to buy a call option (the right to buy) on
XYZ Inc. shares. In this case, Sarah is a holder of a call option, therefore in a long
position. At the moment in which she decides to enter the contract, the share price
of XYZ Inc. is 67 dollars, whereas the premium (the price to pay) for a ‘July 70
Call’ is $3.15. In this case, ‘July 70’ means that the expiration of the contract will
occur on the third Friday of July, whilst the strike price is $70. The strike price is
the price the XYZ shares has to reach before the call option can be exercised before
expiration. As long as the share price is below 70 dollars, the option is said to be out
of the money. If the share price goes up 70 dollars is instead in the money. Between
70 dollars and 73.15 dollars (3.15 being the premium paid to buy the call option),
the option is technically considered to be at the money. The di↵erence between the
amount by which the option is in the money and the strike price is known as the
intrinsic value of the call options. If the price of XYZ shares remains below the
strike price, Sarah is entitled not to exercise the option. But, in this case, she would
lose the premium.
Let us notice that a stock option gives the right to control 100 shares with a
single contract. As already mentioned, this benefit is known as leverage. Doing the
simple maths, the premium is $3.15 multiplied by 100 equals $315. As we have seen,
the strike price is 70 dollars, which means that the stock price must go above the
break-even price of $73.15 – the strike price is $70 plus $3.15 which is the premium
per share – in order for the call option to have some intrinsic value. Hence, as far
as the XYZ Inc. share is quoted at 67, Sarah is down by $315. Finally, after three
weeks the share price is $78 – an option intrinsic value of $8 above the strike price of
70. Similarly, the option premium has gone up in parallel to the share and it is now
worth $8.25 multiplied by 100 shares equals $825.25 Once Sarah subtracts the $315
she has initially paid for the contract, she has profited of $510. Hence, she decides
to close out the position and take the gains.26
stock-market simulation. Financial literacy is a growing economic sector that aims at educating
the investing public. For a critique of financial literacy, see Martin (2002) and also Erturk et al.
(2007). For more data on financial literacy, see also the OECD-sponsored International Gateway
for Financial Education at http://www.financial-education.org [accessed on December 30, 2012].
25The intrinsic value is $8 plus an hypothetical 0.25 of time value, which is the probability of
the option to increase in value.
26From being an option holder, Sarah turns into a writer of options at the moment in which she
trades out the option. The opposite happens to the broker/market maker.
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What is the rationale behind Sarah’s actions? In similar ways to futures, investors
use options either to speculate or hedge. In this regard, options present even more
trading strategies compared to futures. Sarah is obviously a speculator who assumes
a high risk in return for high profit potentials. She correctly anticipated the direction
of the stock’s movement, its magnitude and the timing. She speculated with options
to benefit from these instruments’ great leverage. In fact, by controlling one hundred
shares with one single option contract, a minor price movement in the underlying is
enough to generate substantial profits.
For what concerns hedging instead, options allow to insure against stock-price
volatility. The classical example of protective put strategy involves the opposite of
a call option: put option. Let us imagine that Sarah invested in XYZ Inc. shares
but she is worried about a decline in price. Hence, to protect herself, she buys a
put option on XYZ shares which gives the right to sell such shares at a specific
strike price. In other words, the put option increases its intrinsic value the more the
underlying shares fall below the strike price. This strategy allows Sarah to o↵set the
losses in the underlying shares with the gains in the put option. There is a risk in
this strategy which is called basis risk. This is the possibility that the two o↵setting
investments are not perfectly correlated. In this case, Sarah’s strategy presents risk
in terms of both potential losses or gains in excess.
Swaps
Swaps are by far the largest traded derivatives. Such instruments involve two parts
owning two di↵erent financial assets and exchanging the cash flows deriving from
them. Most notably, one of the first swaps was introduced in 1981 with an agree-
ment between IBM and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank Group). The latter ‘swapped’ its US dollar-denominated payments with
IBM, in exchange for assuming IBM’s obligations which were denominated in Swiss
francs and Deutsche marks (Kapur, Lewis and Webb, 1997, 1035). Since then, the
use of swaps grew dramatically in particular on two assets: interest rates (interest
rate swaps) and foreign exchange (currency swaps). Other important types of swaps
refer instead to credit events (credit default swaps, or CDSs) and corporate shares
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(equity swaps).27 In order to explain the basic mechanics of swaps, let us focus on a
general example of fixed-for-floating interest rate swap with the same currency.28
In a fixed-for-floating interest rate swap, a company agrees to pay cash flows
equal to a pre-determined fixed interest rate on a notional principal amount for
a given period of time. In return, it receives a floating interest rate on the same
notional principal amount and for the same time period. The notional principal
amount is not actually exchanged, but only the cash flows which derive from it. In
most cases, the floating interest rate is based either on the London Interbank O↵ered
Rate (LIBOR) or the Euro Interbank O↵ered Rate (EURIBOR), the rates at which
banks are prepared to borrow funds from other banks in the London interbank
market and in the Euro area.29 Why would two companies enter into such a swap?
The conventional argument is based on the theory of comparative advantages.
For instance, AAA company and BBB company have commercial needs which
lead both to borrow funds. AAA is able to borrow cheaply than BBB at either
fixed or floating interest rate, but has a greater comparative advantage in fixed
interest rate. However, AAA would prefer borrowing at a floating interest rate. On
the contrary, BBB prefers fixed interest rate but, due to circumstances such as the
company’s lower credit rating, such fixed rate is not as attractive as the floating
one. To sum up the hypothetical scenario:
• AAA can raise fixed-rate funds at 7% or floating at the LIBOR rate. AAA
prefers floating interest rate, but has a comparative advantage on fixed interest
rate borrowing.
• BBB has to pay a fixed interest rate of 10%, whilst can borrow floating at the
27Chapter four explains the logic of equity swaps in relation to the case of FIAT. For what
concerns CDSs instead, these are contracts in which the seller agrees to compensate the buyer in
case of a loan default or other credit events. The buyer pays the CDS spread to the seller and
receives a pay-o↵ when credit events occur.
28Swaps are OTC instruments the nature of which is highly customisable. For this reason, there
are several variations of interest rate swaps (e.g. fixed-for floating, floating-for-fixed, and so on.
The example is based on Hull (2009, chapter 7) and Valdez (2007, chapter 14).
29LIBOR is an average measure of the interest rates (one-month, two-months, six-months, one-
year, etc.) charged by leading banks in London when lending to other banks. It is set by the British
Bankers’ Association at 11am and represents a benchmark for global finance. In fact, financial
institutions, mortgage lenders and credit card issuers track the LIBOR rate to fix their own interest
rates a notch higher than the LIBOR. About LIBOR, see http://www.bbalibor.com [accessed on
December 30, 2012]. Similar to LIBOR, EURIBOR is based on the average interest rates at which
banks lend to each other in the Eurozone. See http://www.euribor-ebf.eu/euribor-ebf-eu/about-us.
html [accessed on December 30, 2012].
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LIBOR rate + 1%. BBB company prefers fixed interest rate, but the floating
rate is cheaper than the fixed one.
Hence, AAA raises funds from its lender at 7% fixed interest rate, whilst BBB
borrows from its lender at a floating rate equals to the LIBOR rate + 1 %.
However, both companies decide to enter into an interest rate swap on a given
notional principal amount – which will not be exchanged – and for a given period
of time.30 The terms of such swap agreement are the following:
• AAA agrees to pay BBB the floating rate which equals to the LIBOR rate.
• BBB agrees to pay, let us suppose, 8% fixed interest rate to AAA.
In other words, the swap allows:
• AAA to pay 7% fixed interest rate to its lender, but the company receives
8% fixed interest rate from BBB. This is a profit of 1% which in actual terms
makes AAA pay BBB the LIBOR rate - 1% – even less that what AAA would
pay if the company borrowed funds directly with at a floating interest rate.
• BBB pays LIBOR rate + 1% to its lender, but receives the LIBOR rate from
AAA. This is a cost of 1% which adds up to the 8% fixed interest rate BBB
pays to AAA, for a total of 9% fixed interest rate. This last rate is still less
than the 10% fixed interest rate BBB was required to pay if the company had
borrowed funds directly at a fixed rate.
The example above is simplified to the extent that it does not take into account
of di↵erences in interest rates which are in reality of a few basis points. More im-
portantly, this simplified case does not consider the fundamental role of financial
intermediaries. In reality, two non-financial companies such as AAA and BBB do
not contact each other directly to arrange the swap, but each deal with a swap
dealer (banks or other financial institutions). The swap dealer has two distinct legal
agreements – one with AAA and the other one with BBB – and charges a fee on the
two o↵setting transactions. This fee partly compensates the financial intermediary
for the risk that one of the two companies could default on the swap payments.
30It is important to note that the swap contract is distinct from the respective contracts in which
the two companies previously enter into. In other words, AAA still pays its fixed interest rate of
7% and BBB pays LIBOR + 1%.
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Furthermore, since it is unlikely that two companies would contact the financial in-
termediary at the same time and with opposite needs on the same asset type, many
large intermediaries act as market makers. In other words, they post bids and o↵ers
at which they are willing to enter into a swap without having another o↵setting
swap. In so doing, market makers are not only exposed to counterparty risk but also
interest rate risk. In this regard, swap dealers have to correctly quantify and hedge
the risk accordingly.
In conclusions, as the mainstream narrative suggests, the swap market makes
possible for both parties to borrow and repay at the globally lowest costs in inter-
est rate structure and currency. Swaps arguably represent potential positive-sum
transactions due to the fact that both parties gain by trading.
Securitisation and asset-backed securities
Forwards, futures, options and swaps are the four basic derivatives instruments.
Before concluding this introduction, it is important to look at the practice of securi-
tisation. The latter is not a derivative instrument per se, but indicates the process of
transforming illiquid assets such as bank loans into securities that can be traded on
financial markets.31 The synergies between securitisation and derivatives emerged
for the first time in the 1970, when the Government National Mortgage Association
(Ginnie Mae) created asset-backed securities that referred specifically to mortgages
(Markham, 2002c, 50). Known as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), these instru-
ments revealed a derivative component. In fact, once the income streams – such as
the payments that the home-owner gives to the mortgage originator – are repack-
aged into a security and then sold to third parties on secondary markets, the value
of such security partly derives from the repayments made by the home-owner on its
mortgage. Let us see how ABSs work in practice in order to appreciate the complex
dynamics of securitisation and derivatives.32
Like ordinary bonds, ABSs pay the holder a series of coupons at set maturities for
an amount calculated on the basis of either fixed or variable interest rates. However,
31American banks pioneered the securitisation of both asset and liabilities in their balance sheets
through the creation of the call loans market and the introduction of certificates of deposits. See
Konings (2006).
32The following example concerning asset-backed securities is based on http://www.
borsaitaliana.it/notizie/sotto-la-lente/assetbackedsecurities.htm [accessed on December 30, 2012].
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contrary to ordinary bonds, ABSs are securitised products. What does it entail?
Imagine that a bank holds in its balance sheet a series of loans given to clients in
various forms – mortgages, automobile purchase loans, student loans, credit card
payments, and so on – and needs more liquidity. In order to increase liquidity, the
bank converts the receivable on these loans – which are the instalments paid by
clients on their loans opened with the bank – through securitisation. The latter is
the process through which the bank sets up a company known as special purpose
vehicle (SPV) that buys from the bank the receivables and the respective collaterals
– for instance, the rights over the mortgaged houses, cars, etc. Then, the SPV
company pools the various types of receivables into ABSs and sells them with a
nominal value lower than the receivables. In so doing, the SPV company uses the
di↵erence to pay the ABS coupons.
In other words, the creation of ABSs through securitisation is the process through
which the bank removes a series of loans from its balance sheet, pools these tranches
in appropriate products and assigns them – together with the income streams they
generate – to the market via the SPV company. This is done in order to increase
liquidity and advancing more loans. However, as the case of the recent subprime crisis
showed, this process contains several elements of risk. For instance, the coupons on
ABSs might not be repaid in the event of inability to collect the receivables from
the borrowers. For this reason, regulation usually imposes minimum requirements
that ABSs must satisfy before being listed on the market. These requirements are
for instance an adequate market circulation or a minimum rating between AAA
and BBB from credit-rating agencies – itself a very controversial aspect of the 2007
subprime crisis.
The ABS dimension is vast and includes many sub-categories and payment com-
plexities. Residential MBSs are by far the largest-traded type of ABSs. Since the
mid-1980s, a particular type of MBSs was introduced that came to be known as col-
lateralised mortgage obligations or, more simply, CMOs (Markham, 2002c, 143-144).
These instruments split payments to holders into di↵erent ‘tranches’ according to
maturity and risk. The well-known collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) are similar
to CMOs but pool together also wholesale or corporate loans.
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Conclusions
This technical excursus into derivatives markets, instruments and actors has pro-
vided a primer on this complex topic. To begin with, the analysis has outlined the
main types of derivatives, their underlying referents and the markets where these
instruments are traded. Successively, it has studied the basic logic of forwards an
particularly futures. After this, the third section has explained the rationale behind
the use of futures and derivatives, identifying the broad categories of market par-
ticipants. Then, the primer has examined the other basic types of derivatives such
as options and swaps. Finally, the last section has concluded with an example of
asset-backed securities, showing the important connection between derivatives-based
techniques and securitisation.
It is now time to start our enquiry into the political economy of financial deriva-
tives and their significance in the Italian context. The next chapter reviews the in-
sights of the financialisation literature and their inability to capture the institutional
and discursive specificities of finance-driven capitalism across di↵erent societies. In
this regard, the analysis rethinks the financialisation debate from the vantage point
of the agency-centred approach.
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Chapter 1
Accounting for the distinct traits
of financialisation
The financialisation debate provides an important intellectual terrain for scholars of
diverse theoretical and disciplinary backgrounds. By exploring the growing signifi-
cance of finance in modern societies, it represents an invaluable resource to examine
derivatives markets and instruments from a critical stand point. However, whilst
the literature is particularly attentive to the institutions and discourses of Anglo-
American economies, its insights are too general for what concerns financialisation
elsewhere (Engelen, Konings and Fernandez, 2010, 57). As a result, it finds itself
in an uneasy position when it comes to explore the modalities through which other
societies experience financialisation, as well as to what extent they reveal features
which are context-specific.
This chapter reviews the main contributions to the financialisation debate and
presents the following central claim: the literature underplays the di↵erential trajec-
tories of financialisation due to a view on financial phenomena from the perspective
of structural power. Scholars tend to describe the institutions and discourses of fi-
nancialisation as structures which are permeated by the power of finance. In other
words, power is entrenched and perpetuated in the structures of society, producing
an analytical scenario where it is di cult to articulate agency in an active sense.
Except for moments of crisis, agents simply conform to semi-systemic requirements
and relinquish their political-economic resources. This impasse prevents the liter-
ature from appreciating the actors who adapt the institutions and discourses of
30
financialisation di↵erentially and why they construct them through power struggles.
In the end, without an enquiry into the dimension of agency, financialisation appears
as a process which di↵uses homogeneously.
Considering this, the chapter puts forward an agency-centred approach to ac-
count for financialisation and its di↵erential projections outside the Anglo-American
heartland. This means rethinking power from the vantage point of agency in order
to appreciate how our social reality does not entail an agent-structure dualism, but
an agent-agent interaction which is mediated by continuously renegotiated insti-
tutions and discourses. In this context, actors exert power when they strategically
manipulate institutional and discursive architectures in the attempt to leverage their
actions vis-a`-vis other actors. Whilst some agents wield power by establishing new
structures, others make sense of the latter in their own terms, often innovating the
very same imperatives they were initially constrained by (Knafo, 2010, 503-504).
These dynamics of agential interaction, agential power, institutional and discursive
mediation provide the historically sensitive scenario where to appreciate how and
why derivatives-based risk management emerged in Italy and in which sense this
innovation shows distinct traits.
The analysis is outlined in two main sections. First, the financialisation debate
is introduced according to four theoretical streams: Re´gulation school together with
post-Keynesian economics; Marxist political economy; Foucauldian political econ-
omy. As it is shown, this literature thoroughly explores the formal and informal in-
stitutions in the US and the UK, but draws at most general conclusions about finan-
cialisation elsewhere. This inattention to the di↵erential trajectories of financialised
phenomena prevents the four approaches from accurately analysing the specificities
of derivatives – and other practices of financialisation – outside the Anglo-American
scenario. The second section shows that the problem concerning the distinct traits
of financialisation results from the literature’s reading of finance through the lenses
of structural power. Against this, the section introduces the conceptual apparatus
of the agency-centred approach.
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1.1 The debate on financialisation
The literature on financialisation has two merits. First, it challenges the assumptions
of mainstream economics concerning the informational e ciency of financial mar-
kets (Fama, 1970). Against this, financialisation studies emphasise instead the crisis-
prone and exploitative nature of modern finance. Second, and this is a fundamental
aspect for critical scholarship, the financialisation literature avoids conceptualising
financial phenomena as market forces which ‘disembed’ from the socio-political insti-
tutions of the Bretton Woods period.33 The practices of financialisation are instead
seen as created through dense institutional and discursive architectures permeating
the fabric of society (Konings, 2008b, 256). At this point, however, it is logic to ask
a preliminary question: what is financialisation?
Admittedly, this is an ill-defined concept through which scholars sum up a di-
versity of research themes and theoretical stances.34 Two definitions of financiali-
sation are commonly adopted. First, Greta R. Krippner (2005, 174-175) builds on
the seminal study The Long Twentieth Century by Giovanni Arrighi (1994) and
describes financialisation as “a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue pri-
marily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity pro-
duction.” The adjective ‘financial’ refers to those operations transferring capital in
33The idea of market ‘(dis-)embeddedness’ is widely adopted in political economy. Karl Polanyi
(1944) used this concept to describe the biological tension existing between the market economy
and the necessity to embed land, labour and money within mechanisms of socio-cultural and
political protection. According to Polanyi, land, labour and money are fundamental to human
reproduction and cannot be traded on the market as any other commodity. If this occurs, then the
market would be disembedded and humanity could face decay. This narrative gives a clear-cut story
about the complex interaction between state, market and community in modern capitalism. Yet,
it is often misinterpreted as if market forces – once fully disembedded – were no longer upheld by
political and socio-cultural institutions (Konings, 2007). See Krippner (2002) for a similar critique
of embeddedness in economic sociology (Granovetter, 1985).
34It is possible to summarise some of the theoretical contributions to the financialisation debate
in the following way: post-Keynesian economics (Stockhammer, 2008; Palley, 2010); Miskyian in-
stitutionalism (Nesvetailova, 2007; Toporowski, 2000); re´gulation school (Boyer, 2000; Aglietta and
Breton, 2001); social structure of accumulation (Dume´nil and Le´vy, 2005; Kotz, 2011); Foucauldian
political economy (De Goede, 2004; Langley, 2009); critical management and accounting studies
(Erturk et al., 2008; Froud et al., 2000); economic geography (Aalbers, 2008; Leyshon and Thrift,
2007); economic sociology (Krippner, 2005); social studies of finance (Knorr-Cetina and Preda,
2006; MacKenzie and Millo, 2003); neo-Gramscianism (Macartney, 2011); world-systems theory
(Arrighi, 1994); Marxist political economy (Bryan and Ra↵erty, 2006a; Lapavitsas, 2009b). For an
overview on financialisation, see also the special issues of: Economy and Society, Vol. 29, No. 1,
February 2000; Competition and Change, Vol. 12, No. 2, June 2008; Competition and Change, Vol.
13, No. 2, June 2009.
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the expectation of future interest, dividends, or capital increase. Hence, Krippner
advances an ‘accumulation-centred’ interpretation of financialisation by focusing on
how and where profits are generated. In so doing, she shows that the American econ-
omy has grown primarily through financial activities since the 1970s. Most notably,
she demonstrates that manufacturing definitely declined as of the mid-1990s, whilst
the FIRE sectors (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate) became the primary source of
total corporate profits. What is more, Krippner shows that the sources of revenue
for non-financial companies shifted dramatically in favour of portfolio income – that
is interest payments, dividends, and capital gains on investment (Krippner, 2005,
179, 185).
In spite of such thorough empirics, Krippner’s definition excludes any other eco-
nomic, social, political and cultural facets of financialisation. For this reason, a
second most cited definition was advanced by Gerald A. Epstein (2005, 3) who de-
scribes financialisation as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets,
financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and inter-
national economies.” Certainly, this definition is general enough to include not only
the dimension of corporate profit, but also the infinite complexities in which modern
societies experience the phenomena in question. Premised on this, the next three
subsections review some amongst the main contributions which shed light on the
multi-faceted character of financialisation. First, Re´gulationists and post-Keynesian
economists present accurate studies about the impact of financialisation on the com-
ponents of the aggregate demand. Second, Marxist political economists investigate
the modalities of financial expropriation from labour. Finally, Foucauldian political
economists reconstruct how a veil of scientific technicalities depoliticise the prac-
tices of financialisation.35 As it is shown, these three approaches focus extensively
35Two aspects brought this thesis to focus on the above-mentioned approaches. First, they rep-
resent the most consolidated research traditions in the financialisation debate. Second, including
other works would have exceeded the scope of this project. In any case, it is important to specify
that other studies – except the most recent stream of research on the di↵erential trajectories of
financialisation (see introduction and section 1.2) – have been similarly inattentive to financial
expansion outside the Anglo-American space. Of course, this thesis does not claim that this inat-
tention is always due to an excessive reliance on structural power. For instance, this is not the case
for several works in social studies of finance – see e.g. Beunza and Stark (2004), MacKenzie (2006),
Zaloom (2006) or Preda (2009). In fact, these works are not primarily concerned with showing
how the power of finance is entrenched and replicated in socio-economic structures. Their aim
is rather to observe the micro-level functioning of financial markets to uncover the socio-cultural
embeddedness of models and technologies. Building bridges between the agency-centred approach
and social studies of finance would provide opportunities for productive research.
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on the Anglo-American economies as the most advanced spaces of financialisation.
Yet, scholars do not give su cient attention to other societies, implicitly assuming
that the phenomena they describe unfold across the Western world more or less
homogeneously.
1.1.1 The macroeconomics of financialisation
In recent years, Re´gulation school’s exponents Michel Aglietta and Robert Boyer
have placed great emphasis on financialisation as an unstable regime of growth after
the crisis of Fordism.36 This research overlaps with post-Keynesian studies advanced
by Engelbert Stockhammer (2008) and Thomas I. Palley (2010). In fact, both schools
focus on the return of rentier finance as an unstable solution to an aggregate demand
drastically weakened by wage deflation.37 The rentier sector is the main driver of fi-
nancialisation in the United States and other advanced economies, the consequences
of which dramatically impact on less developed countries (Dume´nil and Le´vy, 2005).
Rentier policies distort the well-regulated form of capitalism which Western societies
experienced during the Bretton Woods period. How did this scenario come about?
In the 1960s, growing labour militancy unravelled the capital-labour compromise
which formed the core of Fordism (Glyn and Sutcli↵e, 1972).38 From the 1970s
36Fordism was a mode of development emerged in the American industrialisation (Aglietta,
2002). It entailed an organisation of business which – on the basis of Taylor’s scientific manage-
ment – pushed even further the division of labour into separate tasks, dramatically mechanised
the production processes, and separated the managerial functions from shopfloor operations. This
system of mass production based on the intense use of specialised machinery led to high produc-
tivity growth and economies of scale. Accordingly, employees obtained shares of productivity gains
through the indexation of their salaries. The latter defined the essence of the fordist capital-labour
agreement, a dimension which was supported by compatible institutional forms such as oligopolis-
tic inter-firm competition, welfare state and demand management policies, as well as the Bretton
Woods international monetary system with its mechanisms of capital controls (Boyer and Sail-
lard, 2002, 338). After World War II, many countries in the Western emisphere emulated Fordism,
although maintaining substantial degrees of diversity in terms of growth and welfare provisions
(Lipietz, 1987, 40).
37Keynes (1936) used the notion of rentier to describe finance as a parasitical group which profits
on the scarcity of capital, often subtracting fundamental productive resources. Keynes argued in
favour of the ‘euthanasia of the rentier ’ through policies of low interest rates (Lapavitsas, 2010,
11).
38The crisis of Fordism is subject to a controversial debate after the publication of The Eco-
nomics of Global Turbulence by Robert Brenner (2006). Against the above-mentioned ‘supply-side’
interpretation, which emphasises labour militancy, Brenner argues that it was the uneven devel-
opment amongst Western political economies which eventually generated a cut-throat competition
amongst the US, Germany and Japan. This historical conjuncture overfilled global markets with
too many producers and goods (overcapacity), leading to an inexorable decline in the rate of
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onwards, capital counteracted this tendency by attacking labour protections and
public services. As a result, the social product began to be redistributed in favour of
the upper-income managers and profit-recipients. However, this process had a limit:
subtracting purchasing power from the vast majority of people implied the erosion
of the mass-consumption society. For this reason, the rentier sector was empowered
and advanced financialisation as the alternative solution. In fact, finance began
sustaining the aggregate demand – both in terms of consumption and investment
– through substantial household borrowing and the inflation of asset prices. In so
doing, the reproduction of an otherwise stagnating regime was guaranteed, although
in a manner which is prone to financial instability (Palley, 2010).
In the light of this historical transformation of capitalism, Re´gulationists have ex-
amined the macroeconomics of financialisation. Aglietta together with Re´gis Breton
(2001, 434) emblematically describe the essential role of finance in modern capitalism
in the following manner:
[...] critical to the emerging pattern of business cycles is asset price in-
flation, rather than inflation in the goods markets. Likewise, downturns
can now result from deterioration of confidence in the equity market,
rather than being necessarily triggered by a recessive shift in monetary
policy. In these new dynamics, the interaction between speculative bub-
bles in asset markets, rapid credit growth, over-investment and financial
imbalances become all-important.
Boyer (2000) has taken the issue one step forward by modelling the functioning of
a regime of growth and a mode of regulation driven by financial imperatives.39 In
an influential article entitled ‘Is a Finance-led Growth Regime a Viable Alternative
to Fordism? A Preliminary Analysis’, he argues that giant mergers, global capital
mobility, shareholder pressures on corporate governance, as well as the expansion
of equity culture amongst vast segments of the population strongly suggest the
emergence of such a new mode of development.
profit. Furthermore, Western governments have thus far been unable to solve the global economic
overcapacity, opting instead for palliative policies – such as exchange-rate manipulation – which
have kept uncompetitive high-cost producers in business. See the ‘Symposium on Brenner and the
Global Economic Crisis’, Historical Materialism, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1999; Vol. 5, No. 1, 1999; and also
Arrighi (2003), Konings (2005) and Brenner (2005).
39Stockhammer (2008) has also developed a similar study, comparing American and European
data on consumption, investments, government spending and net exports.
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The overall macroeconomic model is centred around an expanding stock mar-
ket which sustains both firms’ investment (supply-side) and consumption patterns
(demand-side). On the one hand, production undergoes a general reorientation of
management techniques, degree of specialisation and industrial relations in line with
the primacy of shareholder profit. On the other hand, wage earners have access to
financial gains – direct equity holdings, pension funds, or credit consumption – to
compensate the decline in wage levels due to job market flexibility.40 The prospect
of gains on the financial markets has a direct influence on the decision to save or
consume, a behaviour identified as ‘patrimonial equity-based’ household. Finally,
this model implies a redefinition of fiscal and monetary policies. Governments ren-
der the national economy more competitive by restraining public borrowing and
expenditure. Central bank intervention should instead target price stability to regu-
late financial speculation, rather than aiming at the best mix between inflation and
growth as it was the case during Fordism.
Is there any preliminary evidence about this finance-led macroeconomy? Let us
start from the production side of the model, that is the maximisation of shareholder
value. As Robert Guttmann (2008, 3-4) shows, institutional investors such as pension
funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, private equity funds are the primary corporate
shareholders in Western markets. These actors advocate a rationale based on the
necessity to improve the quarterly earnings per share, instead of preferring long-term
productive activities and investment in capital goods.41 In this context, the share
price and the capacity to inflate it – hence, demonstrating the market ‘confidence’ for
that particular company – is the central concern for corporate governance. Indeed,
a company is evaluated on the basis of its share price and its ability to generate
higher dividends in the short-term. But, in the absence of long-term investment
which could secure bigger market shares through higher productivity and lower
prices, it is fundamental to find di↵erent growth channels to boost share prices.
40Under Fordism, employees obtained shares of productivity gains through the indexation of
their salaries. According to the formula, wages increased with productivity plus the change in
the consumer price index (inflation rate). Such a wage indexation bound together the increase in
national productivity and the consumers’ purchasing power, avoiding a crisis of overproduction.
On the 1948 and 1950 agreements between General Motors and United Auto Workers, see Harbison
(1950).
41Stockhammer (2006) describes this aspect as the ‘decoupling’ of productive investment and
corporate profits. Whilst the latter was relatively restored since the crisis of 1970s, the former
steadily declined in favour of financial investment.
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Such necessity would explain the phenomenon of mergers and acquisitions amongst
corporations as particularly experienced from the 1980s onwards.
For what concerns instead private consumption behaviours, these were charac-
terised by spectacular dynamics of ‘wealth e↵ect’ during the 1990s (Onaran, Stock-
hammer and Grafl, 2011). Particularly, top income and middle income groups in-
creased their consumption patterns due to a greater financial wealth accumulated
during the dot-com bubble – conversely, saving rates declined substantially. Once
this ended in 2000, consumption surprisingly maintained the same levels. This time,
booming house prices rather than financial assets supported the marginal propensity
to consume, with residential ownership being considered as an excellent collateral
for debts.42 In general terms, households had more access to credit not only through
mortgages, but especially consumer credit, credit cards and overdraft bank accounts
(Stockhammer, 2008, 188).
In sum, the decline of Fordism led to the empowerment of rentier finance and
the financialisation of Anglo-American economies. This generated fragile patterns
of production, distribution and consumption. Against this unstable macroeconomic
system, Re´gulationists and post-Keynesian economists put their empirically sound
research at the service of a laudable policy agenda. They suggest that policies should
aim at redistributing national income more equally (Palley, 2010). Furthermore,
investments should be channelled towards sustainable technologies (Courvisanos,
2012). Last but not least, the financial sector should be segmented in two distinct
commercial and investment spheres, whilst the international financial architecture
should be reorganised on the basis of capital controls and equilibrium in the balance
of payments (Crotty, 2000; Crotty and Epstein, 2008).
However, in spite of this important research, Re´gulationists and post-Keynesian
economists fall short of properly accounting for why di↵erential trajectories of fi-
nancialisation exist. To be sure, Boyer opens up to further studies on the varieties
of finance-led growth regime across di↵erent national economies.43 Yet, this e↵ort
necessitates of important corrections in order to capture the historical reasons up-
holding these regimes. Without such modifications, the analysis would merely map
42Of course, other aspects sustained the economic cycle such as: low interest rate by the Federal
Reserve and China’s buying up American debt; the Bush administration’s military expenditure for
the war on terror (Bellofiore, Garibaldo and Halevi, 2011, 125-126).
43Similarly, Stockhammer (2008) provides an interesting study about the functioning of finance-
dominated accumulation in Europe.
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how they di↵er on the basis of macroeconomic performances and locked-in institu-
tional configurations. Let us elaborate more on this point.
Re´gulationists and post-Keynesian economists emphasise systemic regularities.
This implies that the finance-led regime is created at a critical juncture in the past
and breaks up at a new one in the future. Their macroeconomic analysis focuses
on the period between the two extremes, when institutions are consolidated in their
structural form and the system can be analysed in its general laws. This search
for regularities is problematic because it obscures the agents who constantly cre-
ate, reflect upon and innovate institutions in any given historical moment. These
political-economic dynamics are temporarily suspended and then brought back in
the analytical picture during moments of systemic crisis. At this point, the regular
motion of the system may be transformed into something di↵erent.
Boyer (2000, 142) himself recognises that his model provides only “a cognitive
map and a simple representation of a highly complex process.” In fact, in order
to make sense of real-world complexities, he switches from an axiomatic to a de-
scriptive register.44 However, in spite of this descriptive turn, Boyer does not move
beyond the methodological nationalism which characterises Re´gulation school and
post-Keynesian economics alike. Indeed, by remaining within the boundaries of the
national economy as the analytical unit, he suggests that decision-makers outside
the US and the UK could be enticed to import the core institutions of an ‘equity-
based economy’ on the assumptions that their countries would gain greater economic
returns.45 In this regard, Boyer (2000, 143) concludes that the finance-led growth
regime would be adapted through phenomena of ‘hybridisation’. This means that
di↵erent hybrid forms would emerge according to national path dependencies and
the ability of policy-makers to implement the best institutional configuration at the
domestic level.
44In an interesting study about the European case, Stockhammer (2008, 186) also switches from
a macroeconomic analysis (regime of accumulation) to a descriptive study about the institutional
environment upholding the macroeconomics (neoliberal mode of regulation). In this regard, Stock-
hammer points out that “financialization [...] is the outcome of policies [...] In particular, financial
deregulation in European countries [...] is strongly shaped by the particular (neo-liberal) path of
European integration.”
45Boyer (2000, 143) considers this idea as fallacious for two intertwined reasons. First, due
to their market-based nature, Anglo-American economies are able to benefit the most from the
finance-led growth. Second, the institutions of the finance-led regime are path-dependent, meaning
that policy-makers outside the US and the UK would find di cult to adopt them in the same way
as they function in their native context.
38
Implicitly, in the attempt to explain the global implications of the finance-led
regime, Boyer cross-fertilises his analysis with the rational-choice stream of research
on varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001).46 Here, national policy-makers
calibrate domestic institutions – such as industrial relations, corporate governance,
inter-firm relations and vocational training – to reach an equilibrium point which
maximises the country’s competitive stance in the global economy. The end result
would be that all national models of finance-led regime would di↵er on the basis
of their respective path-dependent institutional configurations. However, this cross-
fertilisation is an uneasy route. To begin with, it assumes a priori the intentions of
policy-makers whose rational actions aim exclusively at enhancing the institutional
competitive advantages of their nations. In so doing, it ignores the accidental, un-
planned and unrepeatable circumstances which lead elites to develop, adapt and
renegotiate the institutions of financialisation.47 Furthermore, articulating the dif-
ferential trajectories of finance-led regime through the lenses of path-dependency
is an exercise of ‘comparative statics’ that captures institutional diversity as fixed
structures (Streeck, 2010, 660-662). However, the analysis disregards the continuous
modalities through which actors construct distinct institutions and discourses and
why they do so.48
To conclude, although Re´gulation school and post-Keynesian economics open up
46The literature on varieties of capitalism questions orthodox assumptions concerning market
universality and the convergence of all societies towards the Anglo-American model. Scholars em-
pirically demonstrate a reality of international divergence, in which the di↵erent patterns of na-
tional growth remain anchored to path-dependent trajectories. Such divergence is due to di↵erent
institutional configurations through which national models were historically constructed. In other
words, echoing Polanyi (1944), each national model reflects a variety of combinations amongst
market-exchange, state authority and communal ties in specific institutional domains. The liter-
ature presents also a theory of institutional comparative advantages together with the empirical
research on the diversity of capitalist societies. The latter identifies the perfect configuration for
policy-makers to render national models of capitalism competitive in the international scenario.
For an overview on varieties of capitalism – from the rational choice-based studies to the histori-
cally oriented ones – see Hall and Soskice (2001), Coates (2002), Streeck and Thelen (2005). For a
comparison between Re´gulation school and the research programme on varieties of capitalism, see
Boyer (2005).
47In fact, as chapter three and four show, Italian neoliberal-minded actors barely considered
greater economic returns and national competitive advantages in formulating the actions which
financialised important segments of Italian capitalism. These decisions were instead taken to hy-
bridise the country’s institutional environment and eradicate conservative political-economic forces
(Dyson and Featherstone, 1996; Deeg, 2005a,b).
48The tendency to understand institutional diversity in static terms is a problem which a✏icts
also the research advanced by Engelen, Konings and Fernandez (2010). See introduction and section
1.2.
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to the possibility of researching on the di↵erential trajectories of finance-led growth,
they fall short of properly accounting for the historical reasons why diversity exists.
The approach is limited to mapping how national economies di↵er on the basis of
fixed institutional configurations and macroeconomic regularities. In so doing, it fails
to develop a historically sensitive enquiry into the specific origins and unintended
evolution of institutions and discourses.
The next subsection reviews two important contributions on financialisation from
the vantage point of Marxist political economy. First, Costas Lapavitsas shows how
a new historical configuration between finance and industrial capital created new
forms of financial expropriation from workers. Second, Bryan and Ra↵erty – in
collaboration with Randy Martin – focus the attention on how the expansion of
financial derivatives rethinks the two dimensions of capital and labour. As it is
shown, Marxists go beyond themes such as income inequality and weak investment
growth, emphasising instead financialisation as a new form of labour exploitation.
1.1.2 Financialisation and the exploitation of labour
Lapavitsas (2009b,a, 2010) examines financialisation as a growing sphere of circula-
tion over production. However, he moves away from the unilateral causality which
pervades Marxist studies and also post-Keynesian accounts. Indeed, both schools
see financialisation as being caused by either stagnating production or, vice versa,
by how rentier finance hinders use-vale production and income equality. These ap-
proaches are problematic since they both fall short of capturing the complex inter-
action between finance and industrial capital. In reality, causality between these two
dimensions occurs both ways simultaneously. As Lapavitsas (2010, 17) explains:
[...] real accumulation shapes the financial system through the trade
credit customs and practices of industrial corporations, the replacement
of trade by banking credit, the availability of reserves and liquidity for
banks, the informational environment of inter-bank lending and so on.
Finance, on the other hand, impacts on real accumulation through credit
accelerating the turnover of capital, lower money reserves improving en-
terprise profitability, loans and information opening up new areas of
profitability, and so on.
40
What is more, the relationship between industrial capital and finance capital does
not assume an explicit form. It is instead mediated by complex historical, insti-
tutional, political, customary and cultural structures. For this reason, Lapavitsas
directs his attention to this mediation in order to appreciate financialisation as a
broad systemic transformation of capitalism during the last four decades. Let us
follow his analysis.49
During the post-war period, industrial capital relied extensively on retained prof-
its rather than access to banking credit. Furthermore, particularly from the 1960s
onwards, corporations increasingly side-stepped banks by resorting to external forms
of financing such as bond and equity trading. In other words, industrial capital be-
came at the same time more independent from banks but also more ‘financialised’,
to the extent that corporations started to trade financial assets on their own ac-
counts. Considering this process, banks restructured their activities in search for
profit towards two main directions: workers’ income and investment banking. These
two dimensions explain the dramatic expansion of banking operations during the
last three decades.
The attention of banks towards workers is a central dimension of modern finance,
as clearly shown by the recent subprime crisis. On the one hand, workers’ borrowing
such as mortgages or credit consumption increased dramatically in the face of stag-
nant real wages. On the other hand, banks and other intermediaries were able to
securitise the receivables on such loans, creating new financial markets and products.
In so doing, these institutions extracted profit directly from wages and their ability
to repay loans, rather than indirectly via the surplus value created by industrial
capital. For what concerns investment banking, this entails borrowing in wholesale
money markets and investing in securities, earning profits through fees and pro-
prietary trading. Investment banking was boosted by several phenomena since the
1980s, such as waves of mergers and acquisitions, the expansion and deepening of fi-
nancial markets, as well as the new regulation which reintroduced universal banking
in advanced economies. The latter allowed former commercial banks to become huge
conglomerates involved in a vast range of financial services. Their operations were
accompanied by new practices in information gathering and risk management, itself
the result of innovative computational techniques. These replaced the old ‘relational’
49The following review is based on Lapavitsas (2010, 21-24).
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model – based on personal visits and bank fiduciaries – with statistically intensive
methods of evaluating clients’ creditworthiness. In many instances, such processes
of evaluation were subcontracted to other actors such as credit rating agencies.
Lapavitsas concludes that financialisation is a systemic transformation of mod-
ern capitalism, one which renews the mediating structures between real accumu-
lation and finance. This occurs along three specific lines. First, industrial capital
increasingly relied on financialised forms of external finance. Second, in response to
this, banks shifted their activities towards workers’ income and investment banking.
Third, as a result of this, workers became entrenched in the financial system as
consumers, savers and pensioners. In the context of stagnant real wages and declin-
ing public welfare provisions, finance was able to expropriate profit directly from
people’s income by means of securitised lending.
Another important work in Marxist political economy is the research advanced
by Bryan and Ra↵erty (2006a) who focus on the unique role of financial derivatives in
present-day capitalism.50 In ‘Financialization and Marx: Giving Labour and Capital
a Financial Makeover’ (2009) – an article co-edited with Martin – they deal with the
concept of financialisation by arguing that the latter is a↵ecting both labour and
capital in new terms. First, finance reinvents labour as a ‘form of capital’ in itself.
Second, capital acquires more fluidity through derivatives, an aspect which intensifies
its competitive character. In order to address these two dimensions, Bryan, Martin
and Ra↵erty study the issue from two di↵erent angles, namely the labour-related
categories of ‘commodity capital’ and ‘variable capital’. The former refers to workers
selling their labour power as a commodity in the context of circuits of capital (Marx,
1885, part 1). The latter is instead labour as that component of capital which – in
opposition to ‘constant capital’ – “both reproduces the equivalent of its own value,
50Bryan and Ra↵erty have looked at derivatives from di↵erent angles. First, they have argued
that derivatives represent a ‘third degree’ of separation in the ownership of capital after the joint-
stock form. For instance, the holder of a stock option is entitled only to the price movements
of the underlying share but not to the company shares themselves (Bryan and Ra↵erty, 2006a).
Second, they have contended that derivatives function as floating anchors for a global monetary
system which restrains labour’s standards of living (Bryan and Ra↵erty, 2006b). Third, as discussed
in the review above, Bryan, Martin and Ra↵erty (2009) – see also Bryan and Ra↵erty (2006a) –
have shown that derivatives and securitisation expand the logic of corporate competition by making
possible to value and trade the myriad of corporate micro-assets on the basis of their risk exposures.
This process implies growing constraints on labour. Finally, Bryan and Ra↵erty (2011) have put
forward the idea that derivatives expand capital accumulation by deconstructing the surrounding
political, socio-economic and environmental reality into smaller elements. These constituents are
then commodified and traded on financial markets.
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and also produces an excess, a surplus-value” (Marx, 1867, 317). Let us see them in
turn.
In terms of labour as commodity entering the circuits of capital, Bryan, Martin
and Ra↵erty (2009, 460-464) argue that financialisation a↵ects this dimension by
increasingly enclosing the household as a unit of financial calculation. This phe-
nomenon requires households to identify the types of exposure to financial risk and
how to manage them.51 Indeed, there are many realms of everyday life – such as
health insurance, housing, education, portfolio investments, retirement and so on
– which, once privatised and marketised, become increasingly exposed to financial
risk. In this regard, households would be required to familiarise with the function-
ing of derivatives as these allow them to hedge their risk exposures.52 This financial
incursion in the daily lives of people has the e↵ect of reconstituting labour as a form
of capital, to the extent that the circuit of individual capital finds validity also for
the reproduction of labour itself. How does this transformation unfold?
In the well-known circuit of capital which Marx (1885, part 1) described as:
M   C...P...C1  M1
money (M) is invested by the capitalist in commodities (C) such as labour power
and means of production, the purpose of which is to deploy them in production
(P). The result of the production process is a commodity (C1) which – once sold on
the market for a price higher than what paid to the worker as a wage – allows the
capitalist to realise surplus value (M1). The latter returns to the production process
in the form of productive investments, as well as to finance capital as money with
interest. In spite of describing the circuit of an individual capital, Bryan, Martin
and Ra↵erty (2009, 463-464) show that under financialisation such steps come to
depict the very same reproduction of labour power. Indeed, this is dependent on
credit – used to buy commodities for the household’s subsistence – in the same way
as industrial capital depends on money capital to buy labour force and machineries.
Once the wage has been paid to workers, a part of this accrues as interest payments
51Martin (2002) defines this aspect as ‘the financialisation of daily life’.
52Here, Bryan, Martin and Ra↵erty refer particularly to the idea of risk management utopia
advanced by the behavioural economist Robert Shiller (2003). His company Macromarkets LLC.
focuses on the creation of innovative financial instruments to facilitate investment and risk man-
agement.
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on the money capital initially advanced to households. Hence, what remains of the
wage after such interests have been repaid appears as labour’s surplus, therefore
becoming subject to ‘competitive calculations’ about what part of the wage is used
for subsistence and what part goes to repay the debt.
For what concerns labour as variable capital, the implications brought by finan-
cialisation need to be contextualised within capital as the social relation of value in
movement. In this regard, Bryan, Martin and Ra↵erty (2009, 464-468) contend that
financialised practices such as securitisation and derivatives expand the logic of cor-
porate competition to the myriad of micro-assets in a given company – those ‘bits’ of
capital such as machinery leasing, mortgages, loans and so on – which can be valued
on the basis of their risk exposures; then their performances can be repackaged in
derivatives products; and eventually traded on financial markets, where their prices
fluctuate according to the performance of the underlying referents as well as the
general market sentiment. This expansion of the competitive logic to all the possible
corporate micro-assets that can be securitised implies growing constraints on labour
as variable capital. The latter is inserted into performance calculations made by
companies and remunerated on the basis of real-time market valuations.
Hence, Bryan, Martin and Ra↵erty conclude that financialisation presents dra-
matic implications for labour. The everyday-life reproduction of workers is increas-
ingly commodified into a circuit of capital in itself. What is more, within the sphere
of production, the growing competitive imperatives amongst corporations – stem-
ming from securitisation and derivatives – reveal a profoundly exploitative attack
on labour as variable capital.
To sum up, Marxist political economists present insightful studies concerning the
new forms of labour exploitation under financialisation. These works advance new
concerns for political resistance, far more radical than the policies put forward by
Re´gulationists and post-Keynesians. In fact, according to Marxists, politics should
aim at resisting workers’ participation in financial markets and, at the same time,
de-commodifying social relations through the provision of collective services such as
housing, education, health and pensions (Bryan and Ra↵erty, 2011, 23). In other
words, these services should represent fundamental rights for all human beings.
More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, Marxist studies problematise
derivatives in a new light. These instruments are fundamental to financialised cap-
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italism in two respects. First, they allow finance capital to extract profit directly
from workers’ mortgages, credit cards and other forms of loans. Second, derivatives
are not only exploitative from the consumption side but also from the vantage point
of production. In fact, derivatives intensify capitalist competition – therefore the
rate of labour exploitation – by exposing corporate micro-assets to new methods of
evaluation on derivatives markets. In so doing, Marxists conceptualise derivatives
as more than just tools for hedging e ciency or speculative disarray. In a word,
derivatives are productive to the extent that they commodify our social reality in a
financialised guise and expand the frontiers of global capital accumulation (Bryan
and Ra↵erty, 2011, 3).
However, in spite of such an innovative view on derivatives and financialisation,
Marxist political economists disregard the distinct institutional and discursive de-
velopments in di↵erent societies. Both studies above abstract the inner dynamics
of financialised capitalism from the numerous layers of historical specificity. And
they do it for a very good reason: to show that the capitalist system is ultimately
coherent in oppressing labour emancipation. Marxist scholars may well ask whether
it is really necessary to pay attention to the di↵erent trajectories of financialisation,
when in the end it is still about capitalism unfolding in a highly exploitative man-
ner. This is an important consideration that directly challenges the recent trend to
merge financialisation studies with the research on varieties of capitalism (Engelen,
Konings and Fernandez, 2010). Yet, it is crucial to recognise that Marxist schol-
ars disregard the di↵erential traits of financialisation across the world for the very
same methodological inadequacy which empties agency of its political-economic re-
sources. To say the least, this is problematic for a tradition the aims of which are
revolutionary (Kouvelakis, 2003). What does active agency mean?
Section 1.2 examines this issue more in depth. For the time being, su ce it to
say that Marxist political economy tends to reify the structures of financialisation
as having a life of their own, a seemingly objective character which exert power over
labour.53 In spite of acknowledging their capitalist-biased nature, these structures
are immobilised by opposing the concepts of power and agency (Knafo, 2010, 494).
53As Petrovic´ (1995, 463, my italic) puts it, reification is “the act (or result of the act) of
transforming human properties, relations and actions into properties, relations and actions of
man-produced things which have become independent (and which are imagined as originally inde-
pendent) of man and govern his life.” For a classical meaning of reification, see Luka´cs (1972).
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The power of capital is structurally entrenched in society, therefore leaving no con-
crete space of action for agency. In this unrealistic and politically inactive context,
those who have structural power (e.g. finance capital) exert no other agency but
reproducing the status quo. Those who could exert concrete agency in the form of
resistance (e.g. counter-hegemonic movements) are instead on a powerless ground,
awaiting a juncture of capitalist crisis when to finally subvert the pre-constituted
order. Against this inactive scenario, this thesis aims at re-empowering agency with
its political-economic resources. In this sense, agency should not represent a mere
act of resistance which is temporarily left on stand-by until the next crisis of capital-
ism. It should be instead interpreted as the ability to relate to other agents and the
surrounding reality; experiencing institutional and discursive structures; innovating
such institutions and discourses in the attempt to leverage one’s own strategies. This
conceptualisation of agency accounts for circumstances which are specific – such as
derivatives-based risk management in Italy or, more generally, the di↵erential tra-
jectories of financialisation – whilst at the same time capturing the exploitative and
uneven character of capitalist relations.
In the next subsection, this work leaves the material and quantitative world
of Re´gulation school, Post-Keynesian economics and Marxist political economy, to
explore instead the discursive world of Foucauldian political economy. This approach
does not identify structures prior to investigation, but explores instead how human
agency reconstructs and interprets these structural constructions (Amoore et al.,
2000, 62-63).
1.1.3 The everyday life of financialisation
Foucauldian-inspired political economists such as Marieke De Goede (2004, 2005)
and Paul Langley (2009) redefine the study of finance from the vantage point of
the collective production of discourses, identities and cultures.54 This scholarship
presents a fascinating enquiry into those cultural transformations which normalise
finance as a technically rational and politically unchallenged domain. This subsection
focuses first on De Goede’s ‘genealogy of finance’ and successively on Langley’s
54These themes are central to a ‘post-structuralist’ understanding of the social reality. Post-
structuralism denotes a heterogeneous corpus of research developed by French scholars such as
Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze during the 1960s and 1970s. About post-
structuralism and political economy, see De Goede (2006).
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enquiry into the ‘everyday life’ of saving and borrowing.
Modern finance represents today a legitimate business activity that is supported
by the technical achievements of financial economics. This status strikingly contrasts
with the opinions that influential personalities as well as common citizens expressed
in the mid-nineteenth century. At that time, stock markets were condemned as gam-
bling arenas, repeatedly subjecting finance to heated political debates. How did this
cultural transformation occur? How did finance become a legitimate business sec-
tor? De Goede (2005, ix-x, 1-8) aims at ‘disturbing’ the appearance of contemporary
financial practices as a normalised and depoliticised dimension by reconstructing
those historical struggles, debates, controversies, insecurities, and ambiguities that
produced this status. In this regard, ‘genealogy’ is necessary to deconstruct the
power of the financial discourse that is deemed to be ‘scientific’.55
Genealogy is deployed as a method that accounts for the contingent and unsta-
ble emergence of a general discourse. In other words, whereas conventional history
confers a sense of linear and inevitable unfolding of the events, genealogy reveals
how the development of financial practices occurred in a non-linear manner, through
historical insecurities that were written o↵ to maintain a sense of depoliticised ra-
tionality in the events. On such intellectual grounds, De Goede proceeds in reading
those moments when financial practices were most heavily subject to cultural strug-
gles.56 In so doing, she pays attention to those alternative arguments than were then
marginalised once people began to ‘perform’ the dominant discourse.57 Let us focus
55This expression is based on Michel Foucault (1980, 84), whose ideas on genealogy constitute
the core of De Goede’s analysis.
56De Goede (2005) refers to the birth of public credit in seventeenth-century England; the
conceptual separation between gambling and finance in the nineteenth century; the emergence and
growth of financial statistics in the United States from the early twentieth-century onwards; the
commodification of risk.
57The notion of ‘performativity’ plays a central role in Foucauldian political economy. It implies
that actors perform the dominant discourse through repetition and the permeation of their own
identities (Butler, 1997). The concept is prone to an ambiguity between two similar interpretations
(Brassett and Clarke, 2012, 4). In fact, whilst Foucauldians adopt the above-mentioned view on
performativity, other scholars involved in social studies of finance deploy a narrower understanding
of the notion (MacKenzie, 2006). By examining the micro foundations of markets, these scholars
explore how economic models do not describe an external reality but perform the economy. In
other words, models create the phenomena they describe (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie and Millo,
2003, 108). This narrower perspective on performativity traces back to John L. Austin (1962, 4-7)
and his research on language philosophy. Austin described performativity as those ‘self-actualising’
statements that do not simply state facts, but enact what they name in the first place. For instance,
the typical example of performativity is the priest who enacts the marriage by proclaiming ‘with
this ring I thee wed’.
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specifically on her study of the hedge fund LTCM and the contemporary dominant
discourse: the commercialisation and regulation of global risk.58
Established in 1993 by John Meriweather, former head of the Arbitrage group at
Salomon Brothers, LTCM included in its board also Myron Scholes and Robert C.
Merton, the two 1997 winners of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences
in Memory of Alfred Nobel (see chapter two).59 The hedge fund’s business model
represented the emblem of scientific finance, with both Scholes and Merton being
at the forefront of the research on options pricing. Yet, in spite of its great use of
sophisticated techniques and computers, LTCM started incurring losses in the early
1998, reaching $500 million daily as a result of the Russian financial crisis in the
August of the same year. The Federal Reserve System (FED), at that time chaired
by Alan Greenspan, soon set up a recapitalisation of the hedge fund by pressuring
its creditors to bail it out for the stability of global capital markets. Eventually, the
managers were dismissed and LTCM shut down in 2000.
As a result of the fund’s bail-out, a hearing opened in front of the US House of
Representatives, where Members of Congress questioned the legitimacy of specula-
tive profits, its unproductive character, and the unequal distribution of wealth at
the basis of such activities. On the other side, Greenspan and William McDonough,
then President of the New York Federal Reserve, justified the FED’s intervention in
the bail-out by blaming the extraordinary circumstances of global capital markets at
the moment when LTCM started to incur its enormous losses. The two argued that,
in any case, such rare disturbances should not be a reason for dismissing the achieve-
ments of the hedge fund in creating an e cient market. According to Greenspan (in
De Goede 2005, 135):
[m]any of the things which [hedge funds] do in order to obtain profit are
largely arbitrage type of activities which tend to refine the pricing system
in the United States and elsewhere, and it is that really exceptionally and
increasingly sophisticated pricing system which is one of the reasons why
58Unless otherwise referenced, the following analysis is based on De Goede (2005, chapter 5).
59Other partners were: David W. Mullins Jr. who was Vice chairman of the Federal Reserve
(1991-1994); Eric Rosenfeld andWilliam Krasker, two former professors at Harvard Business School
who then joined the Arbitrage group at Salomon; Gregory Hawkins, Larry Hilibrand and Victor
Haghani, who all came from the Arbitrage group at Salomon; Dick Leahy, an executive at Salomon;
James McEntee, bond trader at Carroll McEntee & McGinley. For a history of LTCM, see Dunbar
(2000) and Lowenstein (2002).
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the use of capital in this country is so e cient. It is why productivity is
the highest in the world, why our standards of living, without question,
are the highest in the world.
The outcome of the hearings was the 2000 Hedge Fund Disclosure Act, which reg-
ulated hedge fund activities according to quarterly reporting requirements on their
portfolios, leverage and risk evaluations. According to De Goede, this regulatory
framework did not represent a ban on hedge funds, but rather a depoliticisation and
normalisation of their operations. In other words, authorities created a legitimate
discursive environment for hedge funds to operate. Regulatory e↵orts stabilised the
cultural struggle by removing those critical elements concerning wealth distribu-
tion and productive benefits that some Members of Congress advanced during the
hearings. Furthermore, the philosophy behind LTCM – the assumptions of finan-
cial trading as an e cient risk-management practice – still represents the major
contemporary discourse that legitimises finance as a highly profitable business.
In sum, De Goede’s genealogy disturbs the apparently depoliticised character
of modern finance and its claims of scientific rigour. In order to ‘re-politicise’ the
practices of financialisation, it is necessary to reconstruct those cultural struggles
that purified them throughout history. Resistance to the dominant discourse is to be
encouraged in the present and emanated from multiple sources such as the Jubilee
debt campaign, local currency schemes, political art, as well as alternative concep-
tions of financial security through a communitarian morality (De Goede, 2004, 2005,
chapter 6).
Similarly to De Goede, Langley (2009, 1-5, 11-14, 20-40) explores the normalisa-
tion and depoliticisation of contemporary finance under the heading of shareholder
democracy. For this reason, he focuses on saving and borrowing practices in the
Anglo-American everyday life. Both dimensions are conceptualised as constituted
by a myriad of interconnected networks that are disciplined by the power of seem-
ingly scientific finance.60 In these networks, individuals routinely perform neoliberal
60Langley adopts the concept of ‘network’ in the sense given by actor-network theory. Scholars
such as Michel Callon (1998) and Bruno Latour (2005) – two major exponents of actor-network
theory – see networks as entities that are made of human participants and also technical devices.
Networks give meaning to both human and non-human actions, reinforcing relatively stable be-
havioural patterns. These constructions change over time and extend across di↵erent spaces. By
focusing on networks, Langley aims at decentralising global finance into separate but interlinked
organisms.
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self-discipline as a process of subjective identification that is nonetheless open to
contradictions and dissent. The latter presents opportunities to repoliticise finance
and dissolve the assumptions of scientific precision. Let us follow Langley’s investi-
gation into saving and borrowing routines.61
Langley argues that contemporary financial markets are not subject to mass
irrationality as behavioural economics made us believe by presenting the notion of
‘irrational exuberance’ (Shiller, 2000).62 Today, stock-market bubbles – or the simple
act of investing in financial securities – are instead possible precisely because they
appear as a rational form of saving that partially displaced thrift institutions and
insurance companies. Three intertwined aspects underpin the rationality of investing
as a form of saving. First, everyday investment networks are extensive and increas-
ingly interconnected with capital markets. They extend across di↵erent spaces, from
daily life environments (household, workplace, high street) to the trading floors of
Wall Street and the City. This allows people to trade stocks from their comfort-
able homes via for instance internet brokerage firms. Second, investment networks
assume both direct and indirect ownership of many financial instruments. In this
regard, a paradox exists: whilst the prevalence of investment as a form of saving
incorporates growing strata of the population, the share of stock-market owner-
ship by individuals has actually declined. This is because mutual funds and pension
funds mediate the relationship between the investing public and the stock market.
Third, new technologies associated with the calculation of risk are central to the
consolidation of everyday investment as a legitimate form of saving. Too often, risk
concerning future uncertainties is calculated by the investor as an opportunity to
embrace. On the basis of a risk-reward trade o↵, risk entails benefits in terms of
higher returns on investment. This conceptualisation of risk is radically di↵erent
from thrift and insurance networks, whereby risk is a danger to be minimised and
shared collectively.
For what concerns instead the high and unprecedented levels of everyday bor-
rowing in Anglo-American societies, Langley argues that in order to understand this
phenomenon it is necessary to address the qualitative transformations occurred in
61Unless otherwise referenced, the following review of Langley’s analysis about saving practices
is based on Langley (2009, chapter 2, 3, 4).
62‘Irrational exuberance’ was an expression that Alan Greenspan coined in 1996 as a warning
about assets being excessively overvalued during the dot-com bubble.
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two principal market networks: consumer credit and mortgages. Let us see them in
turn.63
Credit cards represent the most emblematic form of consumer credit. These tools
do not displace traditional networks of consumer credit such as loans and instalment
plans, but they significantly expand people’s purchasing power. Three calculative
tools legitimised the use of credit card, namely: revolving credit; payment and au-
thorisation systems; credit reporting and scoring. First, retailers or oil companies
provided antecedents of modern credit cards since the early twentieth century. These
cards were based on monthly instalment repayments. Universal third-party credit
cards only emerged in the 1950s. For instance, cards like Diners Club and Amer-
ican Express were conceived as instruments to be used by travelling salesmen. In
any case these were still settled on a monthly basis, and their circuits were very
limited. It was only when Chase Manhattan and Bank of America introduced the
innovation of ‘revolving credit’ to the credit card business in 1958 that an expand-
ing network between credit card users, issuers and the financial markets emerged.64
The use of revolving credit cards particularly consolidated during the 1980s, with
their profitability being dependent on extending the period during which interest
is charged. Hence, marketing campaigns and rewarding schemes aimed at pushing
people to revolve on their credit, rather than paying o↵ their account in full at the
end of each month. Second, the business of revolving credit could not exist without
the development of sophisticated payment and authorisation systems such as Visa
and MasterCard. These technologies were both developed in the late 1960s, bring-
ing together the buyer, the seller, their respective banks, and the card issuer in a
calculative instance which lasts only those few seconds in which any transaction is
executed in everyday buying and selling. Third, credit and reporting scoring provide
card issuers with the necessary tools to evaluate credit worthiness and default risk.
The specificities of credit evaluation transformed uncertainty into a calculable risk,
making possible for revolving credit to become a mass phenomenon.
Besides credit cards, mortgages represent another fundamental ensemble of ev-
eryday borrowing networks. The latter are connected to capital markets and the
63Unless otherwise referenced, the following review of Langley’s study on borrowing practices is
based on Langley (2009, chapter 6, 7, 8).
64In the credit card business, revolving credit is an agreement by an issuer to give credit to a
credit-card user (borrower) up to a maximum amount. For this privilege, the borrower is required
to pay a commitment fee on the unused portion of credit and an interest on any loaned amount.
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inflow of funds from export-led economies and oil-exporting countries. How do these
linkages come about? Langley focuses the attention particularly on the o↵-balance-
sheet management of borrowers’ future repayments, since this practice radically
transforms and extends everyday borrowing opportunities. For instance, during the
post-war period banks managed the default risks of mortgages and other loans by
matching the assets and liabilities of the balance sheet. Lenders would issue the
mortgage and hold it in their assets, whilst collecting and monitoring the payments.
On the contrary, contemporary securitisation techniques allow lenders to transfer
these assets o↵ the balance sheet. As a result, opportunities to provide more mort-
gages and other loans increase, whilst risk is supposedly di↵used through e cient
financial markets. In the last decade, an interesting linkage emerged between the
world of high finance and everyday borrowing. In fact, foreign investors increasingly
diversified their portfolios by including asset-backed securities instead of relying on
the traditional market for Treasury bills. Thus, the inflow of funds from surplus
economies contributes to the Anglo-American borrowing boom, connecting house-
holds to global capital flows via markets for securitised assets.
To sum up, Langley presents an insightful study about the everyday life of finan-
cialisation in Anglo-American societies, by focusing particularly on the myriad of
saving and borrowing networks. He shows how these are linked to financial markets,
creating a new form of financialised rationality that savers and borrowers routinely
perform. The partial and contingent manner in which actors perform the financial-
isation of saving and borrowing opens up opportunities for dissent and repolitici-
sation of finance. Hence, in similar ways to De Goede, Langley pays attention to
how subjective identities are constructed by performing the dominant discourse.
In this regard, Foucauldian political economists acknowledge the agents behind fi-
nancialisation. For this reason, they could give valuable tools to account for ‘who’,
‘how’ and ‘why’ adapt the practices of financialisation di↵erentially across societies.
However, in spite of these achievements, both the dimensions of performativity and
disciplinary power prevent their approach from doing this. Why is this the case?
Both De Goede and Langley adopt the notion of disciplinary power as put for-
ward by Michel Foucault.65 Contrary to the case of Marxist political economy, power
65Langley (2009, 33-35) attempts to move away from the notion of disciplinary power by em-
phasising the fact that individuals perform disciplinary power in a precarious manner. Therefore
agents maintain considerable scope for political dissent. Yet, Langley does not place power at the
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is no longer ideologically and materially wielded by particular class interests. It is
instead grounded into an apparatus that disciplines society as a whole. Quoting
Foucault (1977, 176) in one of his famous passages:
[power is] organized as a multiple, automatic and anonymous power; for
although surveillance rests on individuals, its functioning is that of a net-
work of relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from
bottom to top and laterally; this network ‘holds’ the whole together and
traverses it in its entirety with e↵ects of power that derive from one an-
other: supervisors, perpetually supervised. The power in the hierarchized
surveillance of the disciplines is not possessed as a thing, or transferred
as a property; it functions like a piece of machinery. And, although it is
true that its pyramidal organization gives it a ‘head’, it is the appara-
tus as a whole that produces ‘power’ and distributes individuals in this
permanent and continuous field.
In this sense, the disciplinary power of financialisation rests on people performing
the seemingly scientific character of modern finance and the culture of risk at a
discursive level. This is a phenomenon which normalises and depoliticises finance
deep inside the fabric of society.
At first glance, performativity and disciplinary power seem to provide a prolific
conceptualisation of agency, one which opens up a terrain untouched by Re´gulation
school, post-Keynesian economics and Marxist political economy: financialisation
as the capillary permeation of people’s identities and libido. However, the two no-
tions eventually produce an inactive view on agency. In fact, performativity confers
excessive coherence to discourses that are experienced by people in a diversity of
ways (Konings, 2009, 73-79). For instance, ordinary people may indeed have di↵er-
ent concerns and strategic capabilities compared to, let us say, Henry Paulson or
Richard Fuld.66 Yet, performativity implies that all social agents are equal perform-
ers of financialisation, whether an individual is a US Secretary of the Treasury or
a teacher in a countryside primary school. Di↵erences amongst performing agents
level of agency, therefore missing the analytical tools to appreciate the di↵erential trajectories of
financialisation.
66Two central figures of the 2007 subprime crisis, Paulson was US Secretary of the Treasury (as
well as former chief executive o cer of Goldman Sachs). Fuld was instead chief executive o cer of
Lehman Brothers.
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are mostly irrelevant, since they altogether conform to the disciplinary power that
normalises society as a whole. It is in this regard that Foucauldian political econ-
omy conceptualises agency in a static manner. Paradoxically, although the role of
agency is acknowledged, it is nonetheless rendered inactive in its political-economic
resources (Konings, 2009, 74). Power is beyond reach of single agents and it resides
instead in the ethereal space of financialisation as a discursive regime.
As this thesis shows later, this inactive view on agency obscures two aspects that
are crucial when exploring the di↵erential trajectories of financialisation. First, some
agents clearly put forward the discourses of financialisation to leverage their actions
against other social forces. Second, and more importantly, agents do not merely per-
form the dominant discourse, but rather manipulate extant institutional and discur-
sive structures in a strategic sense.67 In so doing, they gain certain margins of control
over the surrounding social reality they attempt to rationalise (Konings, 2009, 75).
This aspect is important to the extent that it is only when agency is conceptualised
in performative terms that financialisation appears as a homogeneous entity which
manifests itself everywhere and in similar ways. Accordingly, institutional and dis-
cursive diversity is treated as a minor detail which is analytically insignificant. In
other words, if everybody perform the same dominant discourse everywhere and in
the same manner, it is then di cult to appreciate how people experience financiali-
sation with di↵erent objectives and perceptions, eventually producing distinct traits
of financialised practices across societies. In the end, De Goede and Langley empha-
sise the di↵use and performative character of disciplinary power to the detriment
of asymmetrical relations amongst agents. Unfortunately, this move underplays the
agential ability to experience discursive structures in a di↵erential manner.
67The term ‘strategic’ is based on Konings (2009, 75). This does not imply that people behave on
the basis of cost-benefit considerations. This thesis adopts such term to show how human behaviours
and emotions are open to infinite layers of historical complexity that the notion of performativity
falls short of capturing. For a theory of social action which departs from the rational-actor model
of mainstream economics, and adopts instead the insights of American pragmatism, see Beckert
(2003) and Joas (1996).
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1.2 A methodological turn in the financialisation
debate: from structural to agential power
To recapitulate, the previous section has reviewed some amongst the main contribu-
tions to the financialisation debate: Re´gulation school together with post-Keynesian
economics, Marxist political economy and, finally, Foucauldian political economy.
These studies explore the crisis-ridden expansion of finance in modern capitalism,
an aspect which challenges both the mainstream assumptions of capital market ef-
ficiency and the heterodox conceptualisation of global finance as a disembedding
market force. However, whilst scholars are very attentive to the specificities of the
Anglo-American case, they underplay the di↵erential modalities through which other
societies experience financialisation (Engelen, Konings and Fernandez, 2010, 57). In
the end, the four reviewed approaches fall short of providing the suitable analytical
environment to properly examine the specific developments of derivatives-based risk
management in the Italian context.
As already mentioned in the introduction, scholars are currently mapping the
impact of financialised phenomena across various countries and geographical areas
in the attempt to remedy the lack of research on financialisation outside the US and
the UK (Gabor, 2010; Kaltenbrunner, 2010; Marois, 2011; Painceira, 2010; Stock-
hammer, 2008; Orsi and Solari, 2010). In line with this trend, Engelen, Konings and
Fernandez (2010) propose a preliminary cross-fertilisation between financialisation
studies and the research programme on varieties of capitalism (Coates, 2002; Hall
and Soskice, 2001; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). As they point out:
[...] the financialization literature is specific when it comes to the institu-
tions underlying financialization processes in Anglo-American economies,
but too generic when it comes to [...] financialization elsewhere. How-
ever, as the di↵erential fallout from the credit crisis demonstrates, there
are clear geographies to the trajectories of financialization that di↵er-
ent political economies have undergone, suggesting that financialization
studies need to be infused with a perspective that pays attention to the
institutional specificities of di↵erent territories (Engelen, Konings and
Fernandez, 2010, 57).
At first sight, this cross-fertilisation seems to represent a rigorous way to account
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for the di↵erential trajectories of financialisation. By contextualising the expansion
of financialised practices within national models of capitalism, the analysis explains
not only how they di↵er but also why they do so according to a variety of in-
stitutional configurations. Yet, this solution is not entirely satisfactory. Indeed, in
the attempt to map di↵erent ideal-types of financialisation, Engelen, Konings and
Fernandez overshadow the continuous process through which institutional and dis-
cursive structures are created and reinvented. To put it di↵erently, a comparative
study of financialisation across societies aims at photographing institutions in their
structural condition, as fixed entities at a given point in time and space. But, this
e↵ort nonetheless underestimates the modalities through which (and the reasons
why) these institutions are formed and constantly subject to strategic manipulation
by agents. As a result, whilst the study certainly captures how and why ‘varieties
of financialisation’ exist in their institutional steady state, it nonetheless falls short
of explaining how and why these diverse models emerged in the first place and are
open to continuous change.
To be exact, as this section shows later, Konings has advanced an insightful
critique of the tendency to ontologise institutions in several other self-authored and
co-authored works.68 What is more, Engelen et al. (2011, 2012) have explored the role
of political and financial elites in underpinning the institutional scenario which led
to the 2007 financial crisis.69 However, when proposing a cross-fertilisation between
varieties of capitalism and financialisation studies, they do not clearly specify their
argument compared to other works of their own. Hence, they tend to reveal the
same problems of functionalism and inattention to history currently a✏icting many
comparative institutionalist studies. In fact, as Wolfgang Streeck (2010, 660-661)
intelligibly explains, comparative institutionalism addressed a powerful critique to
both modernisation theory and orthodox Marxism since the 1960s. Against the
former, it emphasised the importance of politics as a source of diversity amongst
di↵erent societies. In contrast to the latter, it highlighted the ability of institutions –
most notably the state – to regulate and ‘suspend’ the self-defeating laws of capitalist
68See for instance Konings (2006, 2008c,b, 2009, 2010b) and Panitch and Konings (2008).
69Engelen has advanced this research on elites in collaboration with Ismail Ertu¨rk, Julie Froud
and Karel Williams, who are based at the Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change (CRESC),
University of Manchester. These scholars avoid reifying capitalism and advance instead a ‘concep-
tually minimalist’ and ‘empirically resourceful’ approach which explores elites’ strategies, conjunc-
tures and bricolage-like practices (Engelen et al., 2011, 14, 50-51).
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motion. Yet, Streeck continues,
[...] what had begun as an investigation of the underlying social and eco-
nomic forces driving the development of modern society turned into a
‘comparative statics’ of individual socio-economic institutions [...] More
often than not, comparative institutionalism turned into pseudo-univers-
alistic ‘variable sociology’: if you have centralized collective bargaining
and an independent central bank, you can expect an inflation rate lower
or higher than that of countries whose institutional ameublement is dif-
ferent [...] ‘Historical’ institutionalism meritoriously added policy legacies
and institutional pasts to the set of variables that were routinely consid-
ered when trying to account for the structures and outcomes of political-
economic institutions. Typically, however, it was not really history that
was brought into play but – as in the study of ‘path-dependency’ – the
costs of change as compared to its expected returns.70
Taking into account the attempt of cross-fertilising the financialisation literature
with varieties of capitalism, this thesis puts forward instead the necessity to recon-
sider the study of financialised phenomena in a methodological sense. As already
pointed out, there is an important reason why financialisation studies are inat-
tentive to the di↵erential traits of financialised development across societies: they
tend to conceptualise finance from the vantage point of structural power. Thus, any
attempt to study financialisation and its adaptation outside the Anglo-American
heartland should find a viable way out of this fundamental problem. Premised on
this claim, the next subsections explain first in which sense the literature adheres to
a structuralist view on power and why this prevents scholars from fully appreciating
the distinct trajectories of financialisation. After this, the study puts forward the
agency-centred approach. In this regard, the analysis brings power back at the level
of agency in order to appreciate financialisation in its diverse proportions across
space and time.
70In the light of these considerations, Streeck (2010, 661-662) argues in favour of a ‘dynamic’
approach to comparative institutional analysis in order to make institutional change “no longer
a special case but a universal condition of any social order.” Furthermore, Streeck emphasises
the importance of developing an analytical context which is attentive to the complex interaction
between specific institutional formations and more general capitalist dynamics.
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1.2.1 Structural power and financialisation
Drawing from di↵erent disciplines and theoretical perspectives, scholars gathered
around the debate on financialisation with a common purpose: questioning financial
economics and its assumptions about finance being an e cient, innovative, beneficial
dimension of modern capitalism. Against this view, financialisation studies aim at
demonstrating that the power of finance is structurally entrenched in our social
reality, producing dramatic inequalities and disarray. For this reason, the debate
articulates financialisation and its multi-faceted phenomena through the lenses of
structural power.
Re´gulationists and post-Keynesian economists interpret financialisation as the
logical outcome of the Fordist capital-labour agreement in its unravelling. After the
social tensions of the late 1960s and 1970s, the power of organised labour diminished
to such an extent that the result was a dramatic increase in income inequality. This,
in turn, asked for the expansion of the financial sector to support the aggregate
demand by means of asset-price inflation, corporate growth based on mergers and
acquisitions, wealth e↵ect and credit consumption. In other words, the institutions
of financialisation are seen as structures permeated by the influence of the rentier
sector. The latter constrains the possibility to achieve a more sustainable form of
capitalism by perpetuating income maldistribution, as well as distorting economic
growth to the detriment of use-value production.
Marxist political economists go beyond the issue of income distribution and
emphasise instead the labour-exploitative character of financialisation. This is the
result of capitalism attempting to overcome its stagnating tendencies by not only
expanding the circulative dimension, but also by opening up new sites for capital
accumulation to take place. Instead of being limited to the traditional role of interest-
rate earner, finance is now able to extract profit directly from labour by means of
securitisation and derivatives. A growing industry of risk-management products lies
behind these innovative financial instruments. Hence, according to Marxist studies,
the power of finance capital is structurally entrenched in society, further expanding
the frontiers of capitalism to the detriment of labour emancipation.
Foucauldian political economy takes us through a di↵erent route. Instead of
articulating power as a force which causally constrains other economic sectors and
classes, it adopts instead Foucault’s more complex notion of disciplinary power.
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In this regard, people perform the discipline of scientific finance at a discursive
level, a phenomenon which depoliticises financial practices and the culture of risk
behind a veil of technical professionalism. Although the role of agency is certainly
acknowledged, it is nonetheless deactivated through the notion of performativity.
Paradoxically, De Goede and Langley ultimately generalise the power of finance as
a seemingly structural phenomenon.
In sum, scholars describe the structures of our social reality as penetrated by the
power of the rentier sector, financial capital or the dominant discourse of scientific
finance. In other words, power is entrenched and reproduced in social structures.
Why is this problematic? To what extent does it prevents scholars from appreciating
the di↵erential traits of financialisation?
The concept of structural power has its origins in the work by Susan Strange
(1988). It is the ability “to shape and determines the structures of the global political
economy [e.g. security, production, finance, knowledge] within which other states,
their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists
and other professional people have to operate” (Strange, 1988, 24-25). In so doing,
Strange has stressed the fact that the interests and discourses of specific social groups
are structurally entrenched in society, exerting power over other marginalised forces.
Although not interacting directly with this study, the literature on financialisation
conceptualises the power of finance in a similarly structural sense, articulating the
relationship between structure and agency in the same inconsistent manner.
In fact, by demonstrating the finance-biased nature of our societies, financialisa-
tion scholars denounce a reality which should be radically transformed. To be sure,
these are laudable reasons. However, when addressing finance from the vantage point
of structural power, financialisation studies are subject to a fundamental contradic-
tion, namely: if today’s reality is to be conceived as structures governed by powerful
financial forces, how is it then possible to account for social transformation?71 At
this point, the analysis resorts to the notion of agency as the ability to resist pow-
erful structures and determine social change. In sum, the powerful institutions and
discourses of financialisation are opposed to agency through a bi-directional causal-
ity. On the one hand, the structural power of finance establishes norms and rules
that condition people and reproduce the status quo. On the other hand, agency
71This paradox and the following analysis concerning the opposition between structural power
and agency are based on Knafo (2010, 497-499).
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resists these structures and gives hope for social change at the right time and the
right moment. Such causative dualism is very problematic, to the extent that it im-
mobilises power within structures, whilst relegating agency to those rare moments
of resistance against systemic forces. Power and agency are faced against each other
as opposite poles. Power is omnipresent in the very structures of society, therefore
it is accurately theorised in its general laws. Agency is merely understood as an act
of resistance against structures. It is hardly examined, but simply acknowledged as
a possibility and then left to a stand-by status.
This understanding of agency as opposed to structural power is the main reason
why the debate on financialisation disregards how and why financialised practices
di↵er throughout the globe. In this analytical scenario, there is no methodologi-
cal space to articulate agency in active terms. Except for those moments of crisis,
agents behave according to quasi-systemic dynamics and abandon their political-
economic resources. In so doing, the literature is unable to capture the agents who
develop and constantly manipulate financialised institutions and discourses in a dif-
ferential manner across societies; the reasons why they construct these institutional
and discursive structures through power struggles and under historically distinct cir-
cumstances. Without paying attention to active agency, financialisation ultimately
appears as a homogeneous entity which replicates similar institutions and discourses
everywhere. If diversity exists, it is nonetheless treated as a minor detail.
Hence, the dimension of agency needs to be opened up in order to explore how
and why derivatives-based risk management emerged in Italy, as well as to which ex-
tent it reflects distinct spaces of financialisation. However, a crucial question comes
up: how is it possible to account for active political-economic agency and historically
specific events, whilst still emphasising the importance of structural constraints and
asymmetrical power relations? The next section addresses this question by intro-
ducing the agency-centred approach.
1.2.2 Agential power and political-economic praxis
This thesis puts forward the idea that power should not be conceptualised as en-
trenched in the institutions and discourses of financialisation, reifying the latter as
oppressive entities against powerless agents of resistance. It is instead fundamental
to place power at the level of agency, once institutional and discursive structures are
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positioned in the context of a social relation amongst agents.72 In this regard, Samuel
Knafo (2010, 504, my italic) emphasises a simple, but often forgotten, aspect:
[...] what appears to be the product of structural constraints is always a
product of agency when properly resituated within a social relation that
takes into account the power of another actor exploiting these structural
constraints. The agency/structure debate is thus ill defined because it
examines the issue in terms of a dual relation between structure and
agent, when in fact we are dealing with a social relation between agents
which is only mediated by structures.
It is this ‘mediating’ character of financialised institutions and discourses that
this thesis pays attention to. In fact, financial structures do not merely exert power
over the manufacturing sector, labour, or society as a whole. They reflect instead
the ability of some agents to shape in their favour the interaction with other ac-
tors through the mediation of institutional and discursive innovations. To put it
di↵erently, the relation between the structures of financialisation and the role of
agency articulates in a ‘triadic’ manner (Konings, 2010b, 68). It does not entail an
agent-structure dualism, but an agent-agent interaction that is mediated by com-
plex institutional and discursive architectures. The subtle di↵erence is that this
triadic perspective on human interaction describes a scenario where agents do not
face objectified power structures, but interact with other agents by continuously
manipulating – or, more simply, relating to – institutions and discourses.
This triadic context brings profound implications for the way in which power is
conceptualised. Indeed, power moves out of its structural constraints and becomes
the agential ability to construct institutional and discursive architectures in order
to gain leverage in a particular scenario. Power is interpreted at a pragmatic level
where some agents are willing and intellectually able to experiment with existing
institutions, to risk failure, to get lost in creative confusion and potentially ad-
vance innovative ideas that could become widely acknowledged institutions and dis-
courses.73 On the contrary, others abandon their search for empowering themselves,
72It is important to note that the emphasis on agency does not entail an understanding of the
latter as an independent and pre-existing entity. Unfortunately, an investigation about the social
construction of agency lies beyond the scope of this thesis. For an entry point to this important
theme, see Emirbayer and Mische (1998) and Konings (2010b).
73This conceptualisation of power as praxis contains elements of bricolage (Engelen et al., 2010,
2011). It denotes the no-nonsense process of improvising with extant institutions and discourses.
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switching o↵ their creativity and accepting almost by default to experience the re-
ality according to extant norms. In this sense, the new institutions and discourses
leverage the power of those who advance them through experimenting and reform-
ing, whilst at the same time gradually closing o↵ opportunities for others. Still, far
from becoming a structural reification of human reality, the newly created institu-
tional and discursive environment reveals opportunities for manipulation through
contested political-economic praxis.
In fact, what is important to appreciate in this triadic context is that it presents a
paradox which becomes prolific for empowering purposes. When agents create new
institutions and discourses, these do not simply constrain other agents, but also
enable them to experience imperatives in potentially infinite ways – often innova-
tively modifying them.74 In other words, referring to a problem which spurred the
emergence and contradictions of linguistic structuralism, grammar contains a set of
rules which create imperatives and constraints. But, considering how neologisms are
constantly introduced in dictionaries, it is clear that linguistic rules are nonetheless
subject to numerous transformations. In this regard, what is today considered an
error might not be considered as such in the future (Knafo, 2010, 503).
As Konings (2010b, 65-72) explains, American pragmatist philosophers such as
William James, John Dewey and George Herbert Mead appreciated these enabling
characteristics of institutional structures and how the latter potentially empower
the creativity of human beings.75 Pragmatists approached modernity at the turn of
the twentieth century as an opportunity for new forms of institutional interactions
to emerge. To put it simply, the development of capitalist relations were not seen as
an increasingly objectified reality, but as a multiplication of possibilities for human
association. To be sure, whilst emphasising the enriching side of modernity, prag-
matists underestimated the power and inequalities which reigned in that period.
However, their focus on the enabling qualities of institutions presents insights that
are crucial for capturing the contested nature of human reality. It sheds light on
how agents produce power by building institutional and discursive structures that
leverage their actions vis-a`-vis other actors in specific historical contexts. Yet, the
74With regard to the enabling qualities of institutions, there are certain similarities between the
agency-centred approach and structuration theory as developed by Anthony Giddens (1984).
75About the philosophy of pragmatism in the United States, see Livingston (1997) and Joas
(1993).
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newly established institutions and discourses do not just restrict other agents’ be-
haviours, but also allow them to make sense of those structural imperatives in their
own words. In so doing, other actors manipulate extant structures by means of their
own agential power.
1.2.3 Applying the agency-centred approach to the case of
derivatives in Italy
What does the agency-centred approach imply for our analysis concerning the dis-
tinct traits of derivatives in Italy? The dynamics of agential interaction, power
struggle, mediating and enabling institutions shift the focus away from the analyt-
ical opposition between structural power and agency. As shown above, the latter
ultimately portraits financialisation as a quasi-objectified and homogeneous entity
oppressing the agents of resistance who are left at the margins. Against this, the
agency-centred approach positions power at the level of agency, therefore giving ac-
tors the resources necessary to create and renegotiate institutional and discursive
structures on the terrain of political-economic praxis. In this historically sensitive
scenario, financialisation – far from being a reified system – finally appears as a con-
tinuously di↵erentiated ensemble of institutional and discursive architectures in the
making. These institutions and discourses reflect the agential power of certain social
forces who advance them to make sense of the surrounding reality and to leverage
their own position vis-a`-vis other forces. In spite of facing an asymmetry in power
relations, other actors are nonetheless capable to experience these institutions and
discourses in their own strategic terms.
Derivatives in Italy are the perfect example to illustrate such distinct dynam-
ics of continuous institutional and discursive building. As chapter three and four
show, technocrats and centre-left politicians adopted derivatives as essential to their
strategies. It all began when technocrats at the Bank of Italy and the Ministry of
Treasury imported the institutions and discourses of derivatives-based risk manage-
ment in the early 1990s. They did so as part and parcel of their attempt to renovate
the available technology for the management of public debt in order to contain its
dramatic expansion. At various stages, the central objective of stabilising public fi-
nance was accompanied by other neoliberal-inspired ideas such as the privatisation
of the state-owned sector and, later in the decade, the shareholder-oriented trans-
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formation of the corporate governance regime. These strategies directly challenged
those conservative forces whose reproduction depended on high levels of public ex-
penditure, the enlargement of the state-owned apparatus and the concentration of
corporate ownership in the hands of few oligarchs.
Over the course of the 1990s, it became clear to technocrats and centre-left
politicians that their project of modernisation – that is, rendering Italy a normal
country – was highly intertwined with the participation in the process of European
integration. Europe became fundamental to impose an external constraint on the
ability by domestic conservative forces to exploit their traditional mechanisms of
political-economic reproduction (Dyson and Featherstone, 1996). In this scenario,
several technocratic governments and the centre-left coalition – which got to power
in 1996 – undertook Herculean e↵orts to renew the domestic institutional and dis-
cursive environment, primarily by slashing government expenditure, taming labour
relations, privatising the system of public enterprise and modernising the financial
system (Sbragia, 2001; McCann, 2000; Deeg, 2005b). All these reforms were un-
dertaken in the name of Europe, a mantra which served very well the purpose of
attracting the consensus of pro-European elites and the public at large (Quaglia,
2011).
Derivatives had a crucial role in these strategies. To begin with, technocrats ex-
ploited the intricacies of OTC derivatives markets in order to drive interest-rate con-
vergence between the Italian and German bonds (Dunbar, 2000, 149-162). However,
this was not enough to join EMU in 1999. Despite the drastic austerity measures,
authorities forecast a level of budget deficit which fell short of 3 per cent for the
year 1997. It is at this point that the practices of derivatives-based risk management
assumed their most strategic essence. Whilst implementing further austerity cuts,
the Treasury entered into a rather peculiar currency swap. In brief, this operation
allowed Italy to receive from its counterpart a large amount of money to be counted
as a reduction in the interest expenditure for the years 1997 and 1998. Only later,
the Treasury had to disburse a greater amount of money to its counterpart at the
expiration of the swap in the late 1998 (Piga, 2001, 122-129).
It is not entirely clear how much this swap artificially a↵ected the budget deficit
reduction in 1997. Yet, the story shows what is most significant for the purposes of
this thesis: it is only when the dimension of agency is properly explored that the idea
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of financialisation as a quasi-homogeneous entity dissolves into a constellation of dis-
tinct and unintended dynamics. In fact, although the institutions and discourses of
derivatives-based risk management cast a seemingly universal character across the
world – in the end, the mechanics of a currency swap are by and large the same
everywhere – Italian actors adopted them for their own specific tactics, therefore
generating di↵erential traits. Furthermore, constructing the market-oriented insti-
tutions and discourses did not lead to an objectified reality. On the contrary, whilst
technocrats and centre-left politicians aimed at eradicating conservative interests,
other actors such as the Agnelli family and municipalities adopted the very same
derivatives techniques to oppose neoliberal reformist ambitions.
1.3 Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed the merits of financialisation studies in critically investi-
gating the expansion of financial markets, instruments, actors and motives in modern
capitalism (Epstein, 2005, 3). Yet, whilst the literature is particularly attentive to
the case of Anglo-American societies, it underplays the di↵erential trajectories of
financialisation across the world. This problem prevents financialisation studies from
fully capturing the distinct features of derivatives-based risk management in Italy.
The chapter has argued that scholars are inattentive to financialisation and its
globally di↵erential di↵usion as a result of their view on finance from the perspective
of structural power. The power of finance is entrenched and objectified in the struc-
tures of society, creating an analytical context where it is di cult to articulate the
agents who adapt the institutions and discourses of financialisation in a di↵erential
manner. Without an enquiry into the dimension of agency, financialisation is then
reduced to a phenomenon which manifests itself homogeneously.
Against this structuralist view on financialisation, the chapter has introduced the
agency-centred approach in order to position power at the level of agency. Agential
power accounts for a social reality where actors are not passive bystanders against the
structural power of finance. On the contrary, they interact with other agents through
the mediation of continuously renegotiated institutional and discursive structures.
In this context, power is not objectified in social structures, but generated by agents
when developing strategies to modify extant institutions and discourses as a lever-
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age to their actions (Knafo, 2010; Konings, 2010b). This agency-centred approach
provides the historically sensitive context where to appreciate how and why di↵erent
spaces of financialisation exist.
The next three chapters explore the dynamics of agential interaction, power
struggle, institutional and discursive mediation creating the distinct traits of deriva-
tives in Italy. Chapter two detours the analysis around the Italian context and it
examines the origins and evolution of this powerful innovation in the United States.
Due to the crucial role played by US capitalism in the development of derivatives, it
is necessary to focus first on the specificities of the American case and to postpone
the analysis concerning Italy to chapter three and four.
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Chapter 2
Derivatives-based risk
management in the United States
This chapter begins our enquiry into the world of derivatives. It examines these
instruments as essential constituents of American financial power in the contempo-
rary global order. The central claim is that societies used derivatives-like contracts
long before the consolidation of commodity futures in the United States during the
late-nineteenth century. However, it is only at this point in history that derivatives
were gradually embedded in an institutional and discursive environment attuned to
market speculation as a mechanism of risk management. In so doing, derivatives be-
came the vehicles through which the risk of commodity price volatility was isolated,
quantified and managed via speculative trading. In a word, derivatives-based risk
management came into shape as a powerful innovation of modern times.
In the early 1970s, under circumstances in which the influence of American fi-
nance became pressing, the practices of derivatives-based risk management – which
in many respects were stagnating in the realm of commodity exchanges – were
adapted to financial markets and the risk that asset volatility entails. From this
moment onwards, following the expansion of American financial actors at home and
abroad, derivatives markets and instruments grew as a phenomenon of global propor-
tions. Their risk-management qualities enticed the minds of financial practitioners
and pro-market reformists across di↵erent societies. Derivatives were projected as a
‘mantra of precision’ (Wigan, 2009, 160), the techniques of which transcended the
immediate realm of securities markets to approach instead the risks experienced by
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society at large (Bryan and Ra↵erty, 2011).
Financialisation studies underestimate the historical origins of derivatives-based
risk management. Re´gulationists, post-Keynesians and, to some extent, Marxists
disregard the phenomenon in question. De Goede (2005, chapter 3) provides instead
a fascinating investigation about the discursive scenario in the United States during
the late-nineteenth century. She shows that speculation was normalised as a scien-
tific mechanism of risk management, providing legitimacy to stock and commodity
exchanges which up until then were considered as gambling arenas. However, De
Goede’s analysis falls short of capturing the power struggle upholding the insti-
tutional and discursive construction about ‘scientific speculation’. In other words,
although the creation of this discourse was extremely important, it was nonethe-
less advanced strategically by specific agents on the ground. It did not reflect the
disciplinary power that permeated society as a whole, but the agential power of
certain social forces (representatives of commodity exchanges, traders, agricultural
entrepreneurs, etc.) over others (populist movement, farmers, workers, etc.). What is
more, once consolidated, these institutions and discourses were subject to continuous
manipulation as part and parcel of agential strategies.
The chapter is outlined in three main sections. The first section traces the origins
of derivatives-based risk management back to the creation of futures markets in the
United States during the second half of the nineteenth century. It shows how futures
trading rethought speculation as crucial to manage the risks inherent to business
activities. The section explains that the gradual institutionalisation of futures was
neither a matter of economic e ciency, nor did it occur with the consensus of the
vast majority. The process of institutional construction – when agents advance new
institutions and discourses – articulated instead during the Gilded Age, at a time
when the debate about futures approached broader social, political, economic and
cultural complexities. In those years, advocates of futures markets faced a fierce
opposition by the growing populist movement, which considered futures trading as
the worst facet of agricultural commercialisation. Futures brought new competitive
imperatives that favoured large entrepreneurs to the detriment of self-subsistent
farming (Levy, 2006). Out of this intense battle, the populist platform was eventually
diluted into the making of the American dream during the Progressive Era, with
its pro-consumerist reforms which ameliorated, rather than questioned, corporate
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industrialisation (McCormick, 1986, 269). The debacle of populism opened the space
necessary for the advocates of futures trading to enact their ideas about speculation
as a valid practice of business-risk management. Thus, after legal and regulatory
e↵orts, futures thrived as an integral dimension of modern America.
The second section moves the analysis to the 1960s and early 1970s, at a time
when commodity futures were regulated by the New Deal reforms. It is in this period
that derivatives – as thus far known on commodity exchanges – began to intersect
the vicissitudes of American finance and its expansionary configuration at home
and abroad. Once transferred from commodities exchanges to the dynamic world
of financial markets, derivatives were rethought as instruments of risk management
for financial investors. Two specific social forces successfully lobbied to emancipate
derivatives from their commodity basis – a process which faced instinctive hostility
by the American establishment. First, top managements of both the CBOT and
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME or, more colloquially, the Merc) searched
for profitable opportunities and decided to apply their expertise on financial assets,
respectively stock options and currency futures (MacKenzie, 2006, 147-150). Sec-
ond, the academic discipline of financial economics considerably helped commodity
exchange o cials. From their prestigious ivory towers, academics isolated risk and
price volatility as fundamental categories of the investment science (Wigan, 2009,
160-163). In so doing, they legitimised in theoretical terms the importance of stock
options and currency futures as instruments through which investors manage their
risk exposures to financial-asset volatility. The linkage between derivatives and fi-
nance occurred at a time when the Nixon administration was increasingly conducive
to the interests of financial actors. In fact, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods
monetary system in August 1971, policy-makers gradually realised that American
finance constituted the main driver of US global power (Gowan, 1999).
The final section concludes by looking at the expansion of financial derivatives
over the course of the 1970s and 1980s. It does so by exploring these instruments
as fundamental elements of American financial power in its conflictual construction.
During the 1970s, derivatives trading on financial assets grew considerably and be-
came an essential activity for banks and institutional investors. However, in many
respects, this growth was hindered by regulatory uncertainties as well as an economic
scenario in which inflationary pressures were accompanied by recession, capital out-
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flows and a declining value of the dollar (Panitch and Gindin, 2008, 30). In 1979, the
monetarist turn of the Federal Reserve ended the class-based contradictions which
had a✏icted the US economy for a decade. In so doing, the domestic institutional
environment was finally ready to fully benefit from American finance and its expan-
sionary features (Konings, 2008c, 53-55). It is at this point that American financial
power consolidated in its global reach. Accordingly, the 1981 Shad-Johnson Accord
adjusted – at least temporarily – the respective regulatory competencies of the Se-
curities Exchange Commission (SEC) and the CFTC concerning derivatives. This
allowed derivatives markets to grow in size and rate of innovation, as demonstrated
by the cases of index derivatives and two over-the-counter instruments: swaps and
asset-backed securities. Several studies confirmed the significance of derivatives in
the management of banking risks and in improving the liquidity of the market for
US Treasury securities (Markham, 2002c, 90). This view on derivatives was hardly
a↵ected by the 1987 stock market crash. On the contrary, this and other critical
events encouraged instead the US government to push for a market-oriented regu-
latory infrastructure upholding the growth of financial innovation (Rude, 2008). As
other countries di↵erentially adjusted to the dynamics of American financial power,
the institutions and discourses of derivatives-based risk management di↵used outside
the US boundaries.
2.1 The origins of derivatives-based risk manage-
ment
Antecedents of modern forwards, futures and options existed for a long time before
the emergence of American commodity markets. Edward J. Swan (1999) shows that
contracts for the future delivery of grain products were already negotiable and reg-
ulated in the Babylonian temples around the 1750 BC at the time of Hammurabi.
These forwards-like instruments related primarily to the delivery of agricultural
products and commodities. It was like that for a large part of human history until
the emergence of chartered companies in the seventeenth century encouraged the
use of contracts for future delivery also on company shares. This activity developed
in Amsterdam during the period of the Dutch Republic (1581-1795) and was succes-
sively exported to London (Gelderblom and Jonker, 2005). In fact, traders gathering
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in the co↵ee houses around the Royal Exchange used contracts for future delivery
on both commodities and shares (Braudel, 1983, 106-110). Here, during the South
Sea bubble of 1720, options-like contracts on the South Sea shares were also given
for free to influential personalities (MacKay, 1841). Furthermore, these practices
were subject to heated debates and regulatory experiments such as the Sir John
Barnard’s Act in 1733 and the Gaming Act in 1845 (Swan, 1999, 184-190, 211-213).
Yet, in spite of such significant developments, these antecedents of modern
derivatives never circumvented one important limit: the final delivery of the un-
derlying commodity. This happened only with the creation of futures markets in
the United States. To be sure, Antwerp merchants used contracts known as contrats
de gageures et d’assurances de changes already during the sixteenth century. These
contracts allowed two parties to settle profits and losses according to movements in
the price of the underlying asset without any ownership transfer of the underlying
itself (Swan, 1999, 144). However, their use was not institutionalised and subject to
regulation as it occurred in the United States. Speculative trading on US futures
markets was embedded in an institutional and discursive environment which recast
speculation as a valid mechanism of business-risk management.
This section explores the social agents, their relations of power, as well as the me-
diating institutions and discourses through which they interacted, eventually leading
to the legitimisation of futures trading and speculation. It begins by introducing the
creation of futures markets – particularly the CBOT – and the challenges of populist
politics during the Gilded Age. Then, it looks at the legal battles between the CBOT
and bucket shops in the early years of the Progressive Era. These events were crucial
to the full acquittal of futures trading. Finally, it concludes by reviewing the Federal
regulatory frameworks implemented during the latest phase of the Progressive Era
and the New Deal reforms.
2.1.1 Futures markets and populist politics in the Gilded
Age
Commodity and agricultural trade was very disorganised in the American colonies.
In 1770, the New York Chamber of Commerce was the first organisation which
aimed at encouraging trade and settling commercial disputes. Successively, Boards
of Trade were established in Baltimore and Philadelphia, respectively in 1821 and
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1834. It was along this trend of growing commercialisation that local businessmen in
Chicago felt the necessity of establishing a Board of Trade. After a series of meetings,
the Chicago Board of Trade was founded in April 1848. During the first decade,
the growing trade of grain was organised through to-arrives. Buyers and middlemen
entered into these forwards-like contracts before delivery. Then, the grain was stored
in the elevators until it was distributed according to the terms of the contract (Stone,
1911; Markham, 2002a, 266-268).
In 1858, this relatively simple business began to change into a modern futures
markets when the CBOT established a department for the inspection and classifi-
cation of grain (Merrill, 1911, 59). One year after, the Illinois legislature granted a
corporate charter to the Board, giving the organisation self-regulatory authority over
its members and the process of grain classification (Cftc, 2011). The standardisation
of grain created the technical basis over which to-arrive contracts were transformed
into widely transferable futures. In brief, futures were flexible enough to be traded
on the market. In 1865, CBOT created three important elements of an organised
exchange. First, it built octagonal concave areas known as pits, where traders ex-
changed the contracts by communicating through an open-outcry system. Second,
a system of margins requirements was established. Finally, contracts began to be
cleared and settled through specific rules (CME, 2011). These three innovations
consolidated the early technology of futures trading.
As soon as the CBOT established a futures exchange, a fundamental aspect
came into light: futures contracts allowed traders to circumvent the necessity to de-
liver the underlying commodity. In fact, the specifics of futures trading were such
that contracts could be closed out before expiration and settled through cash dif-
ferences. Here, profits or losses were adjusted according to price movements of the
underlying commodity without any ownership transfer of the commodity itself. As
a result, CBOT attracted traders who were hardly interested in the actual delivery
of the underlying commodity, but rather speculated on its price volatility. Traders
in Chicago soon came to be known for their ruthless techniques and violent folklore
(Geisst, 2002, 9).
At this point, a powerful rationale emerged in futures markets, one based on an
ambiguous relationship between hedging and speculation. In the case of forwards-
like contracts, speculation remained inherently limited by the fact that the physical
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commodity must be eventually delivered. A radically di↵erent phenomenon occurred
instead in the case of futures trading. Here, traders took long positions when they
anticipated an increase in the price of an underlying commodity. Vice versa, they
took short positions if they anticipated a decline in its price. Due to the process of
daily cash settlements and the possibility of closing out contracts, traders hardly ever
exercised futures contracts at expiration. In this regard, futures markets were the
most striking example of speculation. American futures exchanges made even those
participants with hedging necessities – such as the grain dealer Andrew J. Sawyer
(see technical excursus and figure 2.1) – act also in a speculative guise (Levy, 2006).
The Chicago Board of Trade was the first organisation to introduce these specu-
lative techniques which other exchanges then emulated. In fact, commodity markets
proliferated across the country and gradually began to trade futures. However, this
expansion soon met obstacles. As the United States proceeded along the path of
agricultural commercialisation, the practices in use on futures markets were sub-
ject to intense controversy. Whilst strongly contested in an anti-capitalist guise by
anarchists (Avrich, 1984), commodity exchanges were particularly discredited by
farmers who in those years were building a political identity by joining en masse
the nascent populist movement. Farmers exalted the virtue of productive labour,
certainly not the profits accrued through speculation. As a result of such an intense
agrarian sentiment, futures trading su↵ered enormous political, legal and cultural
challenges well beyond the levels endured by stock markets (Geisst, 2002, 4). Why
did futures markets represent a thorn in the side of the populist movement?
After the Civil War (1861-1865), farmers contested the industrialisation of the
American society and the commercialisation of their way of life (Mayhew, 1972).
At a fast pace, from the Northeast regions to Western and, in some respect, South-
ern territories, the Je↵ersonian myth of the independent yeoman was becoming
entrenched into market dynamics as borrower, producer, seller and consumer.76 To
be precise, farmers did not reject commodification tout court, but the emergence of
new competitive imperatives the complexity of which they hardly controlled. They
rather aimed at playing an active part in the opportunities of modern life (Postel,
2007), but these opportunities were not given to them in those decades.
Futures trading was one of the most controversial aspect behind the market-led
76On Thomas Je↵erson and democracy, see Hardt (2007).
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transformation of the American countryside. Farmers were very concerned with the
disruption caused by traders speculating on fictitious produce (Emery, 1896; Lloyd,
1883; Stevens, 1887). Futures drastically dispossessed farmers from any control over
the determination of crop prices. To all, the situation appeared as paradoxical.
Whilst farmers were heavily a↵ected by declining produce prices, speculators simply
entered into short positions to profit from such a fall in price. Adding insult to
injury, these perverse instruments were turning into profitable vehicles of market
power for capitalist-minded agricultural proprietors. In fact, whilst small farmers
failed to access the complex world of futures, the new agricultural entrepreneurs
were instead well informed about how to enter into futures positions to hedge their
business. At a time when the former were gradually squeezed out of the market,
the latter were growing to dominant positions (Levy, 2006). It was under these
circumstances that futures trading visibly clashed with the populist programme of
cooperative democracy such as the sub-treasury land and loan system. The latter
implied the socialisation of agricultural risk through government-owned warehouses
and certificates to pay the farmers for their produce (Goodwyn, 1976, 90-93).77
The influence of the populist platform was so strong that growing pressures for
Federal regulation soon came to be felt. For instance, Democratic Congressman
William Hatch launched an attack on futures trading by introducing the Hatch
bill in 1892. The initiative was designed to restrict speculation by heavily taxing
short selling. Unfortunately, the proposal was eventually abandoned (Parker, 1911,
141-142).
Four years after the Hatch bill debacle, populists – which in the meantime had
consolidated their political platform in the newly established People’s Party (1891)
– su↵ered a disastrous defeat in the presidential elections of 1896, when they sup-
ported the Democratic candidate William Jennings Bryan (Postel, 2007, 269). The
victory of the Republican William McKinley inflicted a decisive blow to populist
politics. The event inaugurated the so-called ‘system of 1896’, a long period of Re-
publican hegemony which aligned political elites to those corporate magnates who
were transforming the American political-economic landscape (Konings, 2006, 102).
77The sub-treasury land and loan system was put forward by the populist leader Charles Mancune
in 1889. According to Mancune, the Federal government would have issued legal tender notes
– known as greenbacks by the name of their ink – to provide credit for farmers. Furthermore,
government-owned warehouses (or sub-treasuries) would have used Federal sub-treasury certificates
to pay the farmers for their produce. See Goodwyn (1976).
74
As the fortunes of the populist movement faded away, commodity markets were
already on their way to become organisations of civic pride and capitalist ethos.
Yet, despite the decline of the populist movement, political and legal pressures
to ban or restrict futures trading were far from over (Cowing, 1957). As the hearings
during the Hatch bill showed, a fundamental issue separated advocates of futures
markets from the legitimacy of their business: the fictitious nature of futures trading.
Representatives of futures markets argued that futures were an important activity
which, like insurances, concretely helped the American economy manage its busi-
ness risks. To be sure, speculation thrived on organised exchanges. But, the latter
performed a very important function. By entering into long or short positions on
the basis of their probability calculations, speculators were risk-management profes-
sionals who provided market liquidity for hedgers. However, against this argument,
a legal conundrum still persisted: how was it possible to di↵erentiate futures trad-
ing and speculation from gambling? In fact, as long as futures hardly involved the
final delivery of the underlying asset, it was impossible to discern speculation as a
supposedly legitimate business practice (Levy, 2006).
It happened that in those years the Chicago Board of Trade was involved in a
legal battle against pseudo-brokerage houses known as bucket shops. These circum-
stances eventually marked the complete acquittal of speculation on futures markets
and the practices of derivatives-based risk management. Let us focus on these events.
Successively, the analysis concludes with a review of the Federal regulatory frame-
works which the authorities implemented during the Progressive Era and the New
Deal.
2.1.2 Adjusting society to the probable
Bucket shops were a peculiar phenomenon which proliferated in those decades. In
spite of their similarities with brokerage firms, these shops were betting parlours
where customers traded with proprietors and calculated profits or losses on the basis
of changing prices (Fabian, 1999). Bucket shops were connected to the network of
stock tickers that, from commodity exchanges and stock markets, spread through all
brokerage houses (Preda, 2009). But, their transactions had no real e↵ect on stock
and commodity prices. In this sense, the quotations generated by traders reached
the shops in a unidirectional manner (Hochfelder, 2006, 344). In a climate where
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legendary traders piled up their fortunes, bucket shops gave average Americans the
impression that, for a few cents, they too could become rich (Geisst, 2002, 3).
During the congressional hearings for the above-mentioned Hatch bill, represen-
tatives of commodity exchanges and traders had clearly di↵erentiated their spec-
ulative activities from the accusations of gambling on the basis of a specific legal
formula: contemplation of delivery. According to this definition, the contract had to
state the physical delivery. However, as long as one party ‘contemplated’ delivery
in her mind, then the contract could also be closed out before expiration. Whilst
organised exchanges adhered to this legal practice, bucket shops failed to do so be-
cause they did not involve the final delivery of the underlying asset at all. This legal
artifice was soon adopted across the country with courthouses carefully examining
the mindset of traders (Levy, 2006, 318-321, 327). However, public opinion hardly
made a distinction between bucket shops and organised exchanges. The formula of
contemplating delivery was deceptive ‘legalese’ hiding a reality in which, just like
bucket shops, exchanges made no delivery either. This popular perception was fully
embraced by bucket shops owners who argued that organised markets were simply
large shops establishing monopoly power (Cowing, 1957, 407).
In this scenario, advocates of futures markets began to realise that the battle
for the legitimacy of futures trading necessarily involved a strategy of di↵erentiation
from gambling and bucket shops. The case of the CBOT is emblematic and deserves
to be examined. Already during the 1880s, the Chicago Board of Trade claimed
property right over price quotations. It prohibited their dissemination in the attempt
to remove the basic information over which bucket shops were betting. But, in
1889, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled against CBOT’s claims of ownership rights
whilst bucket shops kept proliferating. Hence, by the early 1890s, representatives of
the CBOT shifted their attention towards internal reforms in order to demonstrate
the professional integrity of futures trading on organised exchanges vis-a`-vis bucket
shops. CBOT improved contract rules and prohibited members from dealing with
bucket shops (Lurie, 1972, 233). In so doing, CBOT o cials were slowly constructing
the institutional and discursive basis to isolate ‘scientific’ speculation from mere
gambling. In the mindset of futures trading advocates, the exchange pits provided
real value. Even the most speculative actions nonetheless generated an e cient and
liquid market. Bucket shop transactions were instead fraudulent, and their owners
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represented “economic parasites who fed o↵ exchanges’ quotations and drained their
customers’ pocketbooks” (Hochfelder, 2006, 350).
In 1900, rumours circulated that the CBOT and Western Union Telegraph Com-
pany were reasserting control over price quotations. This news was enough for
Christie-Street Commission Company – a large bucket shop based in Kansas City
– to file a lawsuit. It was the beginning of a conflict which protracted from 1900
until 1905 and was in large part transferred to the Federal courts. This legal battle
brought unexpected outcomes which legitimised futures markets and their profes-
sionalism as fundamental to the nation. The litigation included forty-six cases and
extended across eleven states and fifteen cities (Lurie, 1979, 75-104, 138-198). Dur-
ing this time, after a defeat in the Illinois courts in 1901, Christie changed its name
into Christie Grain & Stock Company. Two moments came to be central in this
battle. In 1903, the Circuit Court of St. Louis stated that:
[...] the Chicago Board of Trade [...] members [...] engage in making
and carrying through deals in grains and provisions, in which it is not
intended to make a future delivery of the article dealt in, but which are
to be settled by payment of money only according to the fluctuations of
the market and which are in all essentials gambling transactions. (Ferris,
1988, 126)
This declaration represented a significant victory for the bucket shop. For the Chicago
Board of Trade instead, it was clear that after all the e↵orts to build up business
integrity, one major problem still remained: most part of the transactions on the
exchange merely contemplated physical delivery, but were in reality set o↵ through
di↵erences. In fact, Christie centred its legal strategy on emphasising the fictitious
nature of trading on the pits. By arguing on this point, the bucket shop hoped
that courts would condone both the shops and the exchanges, rather than banning
futures trading.
However, in 1905 the case reached the US Supreme Court where the historical
decision was finally delivered by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in the following
words:
[...] in a modern market, contracts are not confined to sales for immedi-
ate delivery. [...] Speculation of this kind by competent men is the self-
adjustment of society to the probable. Its value is well known as a means
77
of avoiding or mitigating catastrophes, equalizing prices, and providing
for periods of want. [...] This court has upheld sales of stock for future
delivery and the substitution of parties, provided for by the rules of the
Chicago stock exchange. (USSupremeCourt, 1905, 247, my italic)
In sum, futures contracts were deemed to be important commercial instruments,
even though the physical delivery of the commodity was not involved. CBOT and
other organised exchanges were a source of national prosperity due to their careful
analyses computed by professionals who ‘adjust’ society to the probable. Contrary
to what occurred in bucket shops, exchange activities were based on calculated
knowledge and not on fortuitous wagering. For this reason, exchanges maintained
their property right over prices. These were considered a trade secret and bucket
shops were e↵ectively excluded from accessing such information. The decision taken
by the Supreme Court dealt a decisive blow to the business of bucket shops which
gradually disappeared (Fabian, 1999).
C. C. Christie, the owner of Christie Grain & Stock Company, commented with
remarkable words on the decision taken by the US Supreme Court: “I know now
that this band of hypocrites are busy adjusting society to the probable” (in Levy
2006, 331). In all his bitterness, Christie was not entirely wrong. In fact, if the events
are clearly examined, an important question emerges: could not bucket shops adjust
society to the probable as well? In this regard, Jonathan I. Levy (2006, 327-328,
335) advances the hypothesis that bucket shops worked just as well as organised
exchanges to smaller customers betting for hedging purposes. This interpretation
introduces important elements concerning the competitive dynamics between for-
mal exchanges and bucket shops. According to Levy, hidden behind assumptions
about the professionalism of exchange traders, the decision announced by Justice
Holmes was a truly political one. Bucket shops were as good as organised markets in
contemplating delivery. However, exchanges had something more than bucket shops:
these organisations – with their expensive memberships and margin requirements –
were instrumental to large handlers like Andrew J. Sawyer (see technical excursus
and figure 2.1) in creating their market power in the age of corporate America.
The next and final subsection focuses on the regulation of futures markets during
the Progressive Era and the New Deal. Over the course of these three decades,
power relations were such that the validity of futures markets was hardly questioned.
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Figure 2.1: Advertisement for Andrew J. Sawyer, a grain producer and
distributor, 1891.
Sawyer was an active participant in commodity futures markets.
Reprinted from 1891 Grain Dealers and Shippers Gazetteer. Source:
http://www.memoriallibrary.com/Trans/RRGaz/ADS/sawyer [accessed
on December 30, 2012].
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Authorities aimed instead at regulating speculative excesses within the boundaries
of hedging necessities.
2.1.3 The Federal regulation of commodity futures: from
the Progressive era to the New Deal reforms
Justice Holmes provided legal legitimacy to futures-based risk management, but the
decision hardly stopped farmers malcontent. Yet, the unfolding of the Progressive
Era was such that the claims of the agrarian population were slowly diluted into
consumerist aspirations (Calder, 1999; Konings, 2006, 103-105). This attitude well
reflected the spirit of the times, when reformists intervened “not to dismantle modern
industry and commerce but rather to improve and ameliorate the conditions of
industrial life” (McCormick, 1986, 269). In this regard, they revealed a genuine
outrage against the corruption and collusion of corporate power – in particular, the
J. P. Morgan-centred trust. But, the purpose of their critique was to assist corporate
capitalism rather than questioning its true foundations.
Futures trading experienced a similar stance. Hardly contested in their actual
existence, markets faced instead regulation on two fronts. First, at the level of self-
regulation, exchanges constantly improved rules of conduct and trading procedures.
For instance, after World War I, both the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago
Butter and Egg Board – which in the meantime had renamed into Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange – established modern clearing-houses that assumed the role of central
counter-parties, therefore drastically reducing default risk. Until then, futures had
been settled through a procedure of multilateral netting amongst brokers (Markham,
2002b, 105-106). Second, after forty years since the emergence of futures markets,
Federal regulation was finally implemented in four di↵erent moments: i) the Cot-
ton Futures Act in 1916; ii) the short-lived Futures Trading Act in 1921; iii) the
Grain Futures Act in 1922; iv) and, more importantly, the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA) in 1936. Let us examine the specifics of these regulatory frameworks.78
The Cotton Futures Act was introduced in 1914 when the Department of Agri-
culture decided to set uniform grade standards for commodities. In fact, di↵erences
amongst cotton grades often caused disruptions in cotton trading. The Act imposed
78Unless otherwise referenced, the analysis of these regulatory actions is based on Cftc (2011),
Markham (2002b, 93-106, 214-225) and Swan (1999, 249-255).
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a tax of two cents per pound of cotton sold. However, such tax was not to be levied
if certain conditions were met. The contract should specify the grade, type, sample,
the price per pound, the time of shipment and delivery. More importantly, delivery
could not be e↵ected by setting o↵. In other words, the actual transfer was required.
Challenged by a New York district court in 1914, a new statute was then enacted
in 1916.
Further regulatory actions in futures trading were interrupted at the outbreak of
World War I. During the conflict, commodity prices were controlled by the Food ad-
ministration under the direction of Herbert Hoover. Once restrictions were lifted at
the end of the conflict, prices as well as the value of land dropped. Such decline was
exacerbated by the heavy farm debt which had increased rapidly since 1910. In par-
ticular, the drop in wheat price was marked by speculative attacks which prolonged
for ten months. These events encouraged both the Federal Trade Commission and
the Department of Agriculture – under request of President Woodrow Wilson – to
open an investigation of the grain trade. The seven-volume-long report thoroughly
examined the grain industry, including the role of futures markets. The conclusions
were that futures helped the e cient allocation of resources, but regulatory e↵orts
were necessary to eliminate abuses which artificially a↵ected the prices.
After the investigation, congressional hearings began and led eventually to the
adoption of the Futures Trading Act of 1921. The latter introduced a tax on all
contracts that are traded outside specific exchanges (contract markets) which are
designated by the Department of Agriculture. Furthermore, in order to avoid market
manipulations, full disclosure and record keeping was introduced for large trading
operations. However, the Supreme Court declared in 1922 that the Futures Trading
Act was unconstitutional due to an improper use of taxing powers by the Congress.
After only two weeks from this decision, wheat was again subject to sudden price
manipulations. As a result, authorities were fast in replacing the Futures Trading
Act with an amended version: the Grain Futures Act. This time, the latter was en-
acted in line with Congress’ constitutional powers regarding commercial activities. It
banned, rather than taxed, futures stipulated outside designated contract markets.
Moreover, the Grain Futures Administration was formed as an agency within the
Department of Agriculture to supervise the Grain Futures Act. Finally, the Grain
Futures Commission was instead established and consisting of the Secretary of Agri-
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culture, the Secretary of Commerce and the Attorney General. The Commission had
power to suspend or revoke the designation of a contract market. In spite of these
reforms, several manipulations of commodity markets continued to occur during the
1920s.
In the meantime, the American economy witnessed the gradual growth of multi-
national companies, the interests of which clashed with the isolationist and pro-
cyclical policies put forward by the Republicans and the above-mentioned system
of 1896. The capital-intensive nature of their investments allowed these companies
to better manage industrial relations, an aspect which was attuned to the demand
for social reforms and consumerist aspirations of the American masses. What is
more, investment bankers such as Goldman Sachs and Kuhn, Loeb & Co. associated
their business to these multinational companies, becoming increasingly dissatisfied
with the J. P. Morgan-centred trust. Once the crisis of 1929 broke out, this foreign-
oriented capital bloc and their bankers played a crucial role in supporting the New
Deal reforms advanced by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Democratic Party
(Konings, 2006, 115-117).
The Great Depression inaugurated a period of congressional hearings as well
as attempts by the authorities to stabilise commodity prices, which by that time
reached such historic lows that crops were in surplus whilst many people su↵ered
of hunger (Rochester, 1940). Initially, the 1929 Agricultural Marketing Act and the
Federal Farm Board sought to increase prices by buying commodity surpluses and
holding them o↵ the markets. In spite of these e↵orts, commodity prices continued
to plunge. It was in this context that the Roosevelt administration sought to imple-
ment a form of regulation which, whilst recognising the importance of commodity
exchanges, would also attempt to regulate these arenas by limiting speculative op-
erations. Since futures primarily concerned agricultural and commodity markets,
these instruments fell under the agricultural committees in Congress. The result
of the hearings was the 1936 Commodity Exchange Act which represented the ba-
sic statute of US futures regulation. Commodity market regulation mirrored the
1934 Securities Exchange Act (1934) which provided the regulatory framework for
financial markets, establishing also the SEC as the regulatory agency.
The Commodity Exchange Act replaced the 1922 Grain Futures Act by advanc-
ing some important innovations. First, it extended Federal regulation to a list of
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commodities such as cotton, rice, mill feeds, butter, eggs, and Irish potatoes, as well
as grains. Second, the Commodity Exchange Commission substituted the Grain Fu-
tures Commission, but still consisted of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary
of Commerce and the Attorney General. The Commission was granted the authority
to establish Federal speculative position limits. Day-to-day control over futures op-
erations were handed to the Commodity Exchange Administration, later renamed
Commodity Exchange Authority. Third, futures commission merchants such as bro-
kerage firms were required to register with the Department of Agriculture and to
deposit customer funds for margin purposes. Fourth, all commodity options were
banned. This law remained in e↵ect until 1981. Options were deemed to fuel spec-
ulation by giving traders the right to buy or sell commodity futures. Whilst the
commercial validity of futures was accepted, options on futures were controversial
since they involved only the right to buy or sell futures (Geisst, 2002, 19). For what
concerns stock options instead, these fell under the regulation of the SEC and, up
until the creation of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) in 1973 (see
next section), they were traded on a small informal market in New York.
2.2 American finance and the management of fi-
nancial risk
To recapitulate, the previous section has examined the origins of commodity futures
trading, the power relations, as well as the institutions and discourses out of which
futures were recast as legitimate practices of risk management. After this, the last
part of the section has reviewed the Federal regulatory actions which consolidated
futures markets as an important dimension of the American economy. The practices
of futures isolated speculation from gambling and became functional to manage
business risks. In this context, even hedgers had to go long or short in a speculative
guise.
The present section looks at how and why the idea of derivatives-based risk
management was applied to the world of finance. It begins by introducing deriva-
tives during the post-war period. In these years, trading was hindered by low price
volatility and involved mostly commodity futures. Financial derivatives such as stock
options and warrants were relegated to the margins of American financial markets.
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After this, the analysis focuses on two agential initiatives which – against the ini-
tial hostility of the American establishment – worked together to reinterpret the
idea of risk management into a powerful innovation for financial investors. First,
the analysis looks at the CBOT and Merc with their activities of lobbying for the
introduction of stock options and currency futures on organised exchanges. Then, it
examines how financial economists legitimised the quest for financial derivatives at
a theoretical-discursive level. Finally, the study explores the expansion of American
finance at home and abroad during the post-war years. This aspect facilitated the
agential power of commodity exchange o cials and economists in launching financial
derivatives on organised markets.
2.2.1 Derivatives in the post-war period
The New Deal reforms did not question the existence of futures trading. Yet, the lat-
ter nonetheless operated in an adverse scenario. To begin with, government guaran-
teed a minimum floor for commodity prices, whilst a surplus in agricultural produce
prevented such prices from increasing much (Cochrane, 1993). Second, policy-makers
put forward commodity price stabilisation schemes as an equitable way to secure
stable prices for both producers and consumers (Gosh, Gilbert and Hughes-Hallet,
1987; Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981). As a result, this situation of relatively stable
markets considerably decreased price volatility, that is the raison d’eˆtre of futures
markets. The case against speculation on commodity exchanges was further rein-
forced by the authorities imposing high margin requirements, as well as amending
the Commodity Exchange Act to account for newly regulated commodities. For in-
stance, in 1949, fats and oils, cottonseed and cottonseed meal, peanuts, soybeans
and soybean meal were included in the statute. Wool was added instead in 1954
and onions in 1955. Yet, Congress could hardly keep up with the expansion of fu-
tures. Hence, many commodities remained unregulated, opening up loopholes to be
exploited for speculative purposes (Markham, 2002b, 323-324). In fact, several re-
markable episodes alerted the authorities and filled newspaper headlines. The most
sensational one occurred in 1955 and came to be known as the onion corner.
Onion futures started to be traded at the Merc in the mid-1940s when the ex-
change was trying to find a profitable alternative for butter futures. Ten years after,
onions became the fastest-growing contracts at the Merc. However, few producers
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and dealers controlled the market which was also characterised by an inelastic de-
mand. In other words, onions represented the perfect arena for a so-called market
corner (Greising and Morse, 1991, 80-82). Corners are attempts by a trader (or a
group of traders) to control the deliverable supply of the underlying good, whilst
at the same time going long on a large futures position. Once traders secure the
supply of the underlying commodity, those in a short position would find it di cult
to deliver the asset. In this case, the ‘shorts’ are forced to settle their contracts with
the ‘longs’ at inflated prices (Kolb and Overdahl, 2007, 59).79 After the Commodity
Exchange Act listed onions in 1955, authorities began investigating the New York-
based dealer and onion grower Vincent W. Kosuga and Sam S. Siegel, a Merc-trader
who also owned a produce company in Chicago. The evidence about the onion mar-
ket being cornered was striking to say the least. In March 1956, onions were sold
at less than the cost of the bags in which these vegetables were shipped (Markham,
2002b, 324). Once the investigation was concluded in June 1956, the authorities
charged Kosuga and Siegel with the accusation of market manipulation. In August
1958, Congress passed the Onion Futures Act which banned onion futures trading.
The ban still remains in e↵ect today (Cftc, 2011).
The ban caused enormous losses to the Merc. It brought the exchange to near-
terminal conditions since onion futures were by far its most dynamic products.
However, the defeat prompted the exchange to look for new lucrative contracts. In
fact, these were found in frozen pork bellies, live cattle and frozen concentrate orange
juice, respectively introduced in 1961, 1964 and 1968. The very same year in which
orange juice futures were launched, the Commodity Exchange Act was amended to
add these new products to the list of regulated commodities as well as to increase its
enforcement provisions. Yet, in spite of its amendments, the Commodity Exchange
Act left open many regulatory gaps which speculators exploited, particularly at
a time in which inflationary pressures made commodity prices unstable. For this
reason, congressional hearings proposed a new legislation to regulate commodity
futures trading (Markham, 2002c, 41-46).
On October 23-24, 1974, Congress passed the Act which established the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission, overhauling the Commodity Exchange Au-
thority and obtaining greater powers than its predecessor (Cftc, 2011). CFTC were
79In the early years of the CBOT, corners were popularised by legendary traders such as Benjamin
‘Old Hutch’ Hutchinson. See Geisst (2002).
85
given jurisdiction not only on commodity derivatives but also on “all other goods
and articles [...] services, rights and interest in which contracts for future deliv-
ery are presently or in the future may be dealt in” (Green et al., 2005, 14/72).
This comprehensive definition came to be crucial at a time in which a revolution in
derivatives trading had already begun. In fact, soon before the establishment of the
CFTC, CBOT and Merc o cials had successfully lobbied the American establish-
ment for the introduction of financial derivatives on organised exchanges. The events
had brought into being the International Monetary Market (IMM) in 1972 and the
already mentioned CBOE in 1973. Here, traders dealt respectively in currency fu-
tures and stock options. American banks and institutional investors soon embraced
these innovations in derivatives trading to manage their risk exposures. Financial
derivatives were about to take the centre stage in the realm of risk management.
Representatives of both the CBOT and Merc exerted considerable agential power
in advancing their expertise to the needs of financial investors. But, their agency
was helped at a discursive level by the growing academic discipline of financial
economics. In spite of their legendary semi-feud (Malkiel, 2011), both practitioners
and academics worked together in emancipating derivatives from their commodity
basis. Let us see these two forces in action.
2.2.2 The Chicago Board Options Exchange and the Inter-
national Monetary Market
The use of options in the United States developed over the course of the nineteenth
century, but remained limited to informal activities occurring outside organised
exchanges. As previously mentioned, the New Deal reforms banned options on com-
modities, whilst a small New York-based market for stock options passed under
jurisdiction of the SEC. During the post-war decades, put-call dealers advertised
options in the pages of The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times (see
figure 2.2). Investors would phone these dealers to buy options which expired a
specified number of days from transaction. The strike price was instead the current
price of the underlying stock at contract expiration. If an investor wanted to close
out the position before expiration, she had to refer back to the put/call dealer who
charged prices which well reflected a market under monopolistic conditions (Cboe,
1995, 6-7). The activities on such a small over-the-counter market hardly redeemed
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Figure 2.2: Advertisement for the options dealer Filer, Schmidt & Company, 1959.
The left column (call options) is taken from The New York Times. The
right column (put options) is instead taken from The Washington Post,
both of June 2, 1959. Source: Filer, H. (1959), Understanding Put and
Call Options, cited in Cboe (1995, 7).
options from the numerous abuses they had been involved during the 1920s (Poitras,
2002, 42). After the 1929 market crash, options were seen with widespread hostility
and they were relegated to the margins of American finance.
But, in many respects, options continued to fascinate the minds of the most
attentive market practitioners and financial theorists. For these people, the abuses
and frauds which surrounded options were not enough to discard one intrinsic aspect
of these instruments: the ability, for a small fee, to allow the investor to benefit from
favourable market trends, whilst opting out from the adverse outcomes. It was this
peculiar characteristic – in those days, strongly supported by financial economists
(see next subsection) – which drew the attention of one important trader at the
Chicago Board of Trade, Edmund O’Connor. He thought of trading options on the
Chicago pits rather than the small over-the-counter market in New York. After initial
objections, the President of the Board Henry H. Wilson and his assistant Joseph W.
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Sullivan received this idea favourably. In those days, Sullivan was evaluating new
business possibilities to revive trading volumes which were at historically low levels.
But, all these strategies encountered numerous cultural, political and legal problems
and were therefore abandoned (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003, 112-114).
In 1935, the SEC had granted the Chicago Board of Trade a license to register
as a securities exchange. This meant that, although CBOT never took advantage of
this opportunity, the organisation was nonetheless allowed to trade corporate shares
and not just commodity futures (Cboe, 1999, 9). Yet, the intention of the exchange
o cials was not to trade shares but stock options. Undoubtedly, this project was
going to face great resistance by the establishment.80 In fact, then SEC Chairman
Michael F. Cohen – once invited by Wilson and Sullivan for a meeting – compared
options to Thalidomide, a sedative which was discovered to cause birth defects.
Against this opposition, CBOT looked for an economic justification in support of
an organised options market. This came from a report prepared by the leading con-
sultancy firm Nathan Associates in 1969. Industry leaders, influential investors and
academics such as Burton Malkiel, William Baumol and Richard Quandt provided
analyses to the report. The concluding argument was that the US economy would
have considerably benefited from an options exchange. After the Nathan report was
released, CBOT recruited the prominent security lawyer Milton Cohen to lobby the
SEC for the options case. But, the proposal made very slow progress and after two
years no approval was in sight. In 1971, options finally received positive attention
once the Nixon administration appointed William J. Casey as the new Chairman of
the SEC. As a pro-market corporate lawyer, Casey held Milton Cohen in high esteem
and favoured the arguments in support of the options exchange despite widespread
scepticism amongst sta↵ at the SEC. In this scenario conducive to market-oriented
practices, the CBOE opened on April 26, 1973. The exchange organisation and the
listed contracts were modelled on the same standards of commodity futures trading
at the CBOT.
In the same years when the Chicago Board of Trade advanced the case of stan-
dardised options trading, representatives of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange were
also exploring new trading opportunities.81 Leo Melamed, a law-educated trader who
80The following analysis concerning the CBOT’s plan to establish an organised options exchange
is based on MacKenzie (2006, 149-150).
81Unless otherwise referenced, the following description is based on MacKenzie (2006, 147-150,
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became Chairman of the exchange in 1967, was thinking about futures on a stock
index such as the Dow Jones industrial average or the Standard & Poor 500. After
these ideas clashed with the current political, cultural and legal climate, Melamed
switched to another project: futures on currencies. The case for currency futures
was certainly easier to achieve compared to options. Although related to a mone-
tary asset as the underlying, these instruments worked within the boundaries of the
doctrine of contemplating delivery. Furthermore, the prominent economist Milton
Friedman (1953) – who had for a long time argued in favour of an international
monetary system based on flexible exchange rates – strongly supported the possibil-
ity of using currency futures. Over a dinner with Melamed and Merc’s President E.
B. Harris, Friedman agreed to write a paper in support of a futures market in cur-
rencies.82 This was published in December 1971, four months after Nixon had closed
the dollar-gold parity on which the Bretton Woods monetary system was based. At
this point, altough Merc’s lawyers advised to proceed without government approval,
Melamed and Harris did so carefully and first made appointments with decision-
makers to seek favourable opinions. Most notably, Secretary of the Treasury George
P. Shultz – who had been a colleague of Friedman at the University of Chicago – put
it in very simple terms: “if it’s good for Milton, it’s good enough for me” (Melamed
and Tamarkin, 1996, 195). Hence, the International Monetary Market started its
trading operations on May 16, 1972.
The next subsection presents the academic discipline of financial economics as
a vehicle of discursive power supporting the creation of the CBOE and the IMM.
As already mentioned, pro-market economists such as Friedman, Baumol, Malkiel
and Quandt provided their direct contribution through policy-oriented reports in
support of the exchanges. Besides their specific e↵orts, financial economics and op-
tions pricing theory played a crucial role in creating the wider intellectual milieu
for financial derivatives to gain legitimacy. Indeed, economists from American uni-
versities and research centres isolated the risk deriving from price volatility as the
fundamental element of the investing science (Wigan, 2008, 2009). To begin with,
portfolio theory quantified and priced risk in order to help investors diversify away
unnecessary risks whilst being rewarded for their asset exposure to movements of the
market as a whole. Then, partly on the basis of these achievements, options pricing
170-174).
82Recently, Cato Journal has re-published the paper. See Friedman (2011).
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theory advanced the possibility to eliminate any type of risk through options. Let
us explore the subject more in details.
2.2.3 Financial economics: isolating the risk of volatility
Until the 1950s, business schools taught the subject of finance in a very descriptive
manner. A typical course module would primarily focus on the corporation as a le-
gal entity, the various financing arrangements and investment strategies (MacKenzie,
2006, 37-38). The subject matter was “little more than a collection of anecdotes, rules
of thumb, and shu✏ing of accounting data” (Merton, 1998, 323). Early statistics-
based contributions – such as the theory of speculation which the French physicist
Louis Bachelier (1900) pioneered at the turn of the twentieth century – were sim-
ply ignored. However, this intellectual scenario which was adverse to mathematical
modelling began to change over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, a
small group of economists – most notably, Franco Modigliani, Merton Miller, Harry
Markowitz, William Sharpe, Eugene Fama, Paul Samuelson, Fischer Black, Myron
Scholes, and Robert C. Merton – began to develop sophisticated theories of financial
markets.83 Following a direct lineage from Bachelier’s work, these scholars assumed
that market prices move in a random and unpredictable fashion, a phenomenon
which was popularised as random walk hypothesis (Cootner, 1964; Malkiel, 2011).
Markets process data and promptly adjust to their casual arrival. Due to the ran-
domness through which new information approach the market, it is impossible to
predict future trends consistently and make above-average profits in the long run.84
This meant that both technical and fundamental analysts were mistaken in their
attempts to forecast market forces.85
Hence, rather than forecasting the future on the basis of hunches, investors should
deploy the instruments of modern statistics to express the probability of downward
or upward movements in prices. These innovative ideas formed a theoretical cor-
pus known as financial economics, a mathematics-intensive discipline which came
to dominate the field of finance and marginalised any descriptive approach. In the
83For a history of these scholars and their ideas, see Bernstein (1992, 2007) and MacKenzie
(2006).
84This was the core tenet put forward by the E cient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970).
85Technical analysts study charts of past price variations in the attempt to forecast future market
trends. Fundamental analysts examine instead companies’ balance sheet, cash flow reports and
income statements to estimate the intrinsic value of companies shares. See Malkiel (2011).
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first instance, the mathematisation of finance caused many perplexities. Market
professionals fiercely opposed the models put forward by financial economists. In
particular, they rejected the random walk hypothesis as a challenge to their overly
remunerated ability to ‘beat’ the market by anticipating its trends (Malkiel, 2011).
However, over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, financial economics gained great
attention and its theoretical achievements breached initial resistance. For instance,
the Beta coe cient – the core parameter of the capital asset pricing model (see
below) – became orthodoxy amongst financial investors (Bernstein, 2007). What is
more, the Black-Scholes options pricing model was adopted as the standard method
to evaluate options at the Chicago Board Options Exchange and other options mar-
kets (Cboe, 1999, 11).86
As practitioners adapted the ideas developed by financial economists to the trad-
ing rooms, the concept of risk appeared as the most important element to be con-
sidered in every investment strategy. In turn, the significance of risk gave legitimacy
to financial derivatives as the instruments which are essential to manage such risk
e ciently. Why did financial economists place so much attention to risk? And, more
simply, what is risk?
2.2.3.1 Markowitz’s portfolio theory and Sharpe’s capital asset pricing
model
A key issue facing investors is how to allocate funds amongst alternative assets.
Markowitz (1952) addressed this problem through his portfolio theory.87 He argued
that investors hold those assets that are expected to provide maximum returns for a
given level of risk – or the minimum risk for a given level of returns. In other words,
expected returns are not the only relevant aspect to consider when buying an asset.
Risk is also important. And a trade-o↵ between risk and return exists, according to
which an investment can give higher profits only if it is subject to the probability
of being lost.
Markowitz expressed the expected return on an asset as the probability of its
mean return over a given period of time. He defined instead risk as the probability
86The use of this innovation was not as immediate and widespread as it is often believed. See
MacKenzie (2006, 156-164).
87Unless otherwise referenced, the following analysis on portfolio theory and the capital asset
pricing model is based on Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2008, chapter 5, 6, 7) and Howells and Bain
(2005, chapter 8).
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that the actual return on an asset varies from the expected return – both in excess
or as a loss. Risk is measured by the variance and its square root, the standard
deviation. In simple terms, these two statistical measures show the extent to which
the expected return on assets vary from its mean return, indicating higher or lower
asset-price volatility.
The importance of Markowitz’s theory was that investors could e ciently com-
bine assets in a portfolio with the aim of obtaining a given expected return whilst
reducing the exposure to risk. How is this possible? The answer is portfolio diversifi-
cation. It implies two fundamental aspects: first, as it is obvious, the expected return
of a portfolio is given by the weighted mean of the expected returns of all the assets
included in it. Second, for what concerns risk, this is measured not only through a
weighted mean of the variances of each asset’s expected return included in the port-
folio. But, the formula contains also the covariance of expected returns amongst the
assets, a statistical tool which measures the degree to which the expected returns
on each assets vary together.
Covariance – which includes the so-called correlation coe cient – is crucial to
comprehend the importance of portfolio diversification. For instance, two assets with
high variance would be risky if held in isolation. But, if the investor builds a two-
assets portfolio, and these two assets are less than perfectly correlated, the portfolio
return could be held constant. The two assets would be combined in a way that if
the return on one asset goes up, the return on the other asset goes down. In other
words, the variations of the two assets would cancel each other out, reducing the
risk exposure of the overall portfolio. By using the same logic to diversify a portfolio
of twenty and more assets, returns would be optimised for a given level of risk.
However, continues Markowitz, there are two types of risk:
• unsystematic risk, which is the risk specific to each assets such as news about
individual companies;
• systematic risk, that is the risk to which all assets are commonly exposed, such
as recessions or interest rate changes.
By holding a well diversified portfolio, investors can cancel the e↵ects of unsystematic
risk but not systematic risk. This second risk relates to economy-wide events which
expose all the portfolio assets to a higher probability that actual returns di↵er from
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what was expected. Systematic risk bears important implications in terms of return
on assets to the extent that it represents the only relevant risk to be taken into
consideration. Investors should be rewarded for assuming this risk, reflecting how
much the assets included in their portfolio are subject to the vagaries of economy-
wide events.
After Markowitz’s work, Sharpe (1964) built on this point to develop the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) which addresses two intertwined questions: how is
systematic risk for a given asset measured? How is this risk priced? CAPM helps
investors calculate what returns on assets they should expect on the basis of their
exposures to systematic risk. If the expected returns do not equal or exceed the
required return, they should not undertake the investment. According to CAPM, the
return on an asset equals the risk-free interest rate – for instance, of a three-month
US Treasury bill – plus a premium that a given investor requests as a compensation
for the extra risk she takes. This risk premium consists of two elements. First, the
equity market premium, which is the expected return of the market as a whole. In
the case of the stock market, this expected return of the whole market is established
by using the returns of an all-share index less the yield on the risk-free interest rate.
The all-share index is an approximation for a miniature portfolio which contains
all the risky assets available on the market. This is used as the greatest degree of
diversification which leaves the miniature portfolio exposed only to the risk of the
market itself – that is, systematic risk. In this regard, the equity market premium
gives a price to systematic risk.
Second, given the benchmark price of the equity market premium, it is then nec-
essary to know how much of this price should apply to any individual asset. In other
words, this is the quantity of market risk embedded in a given asset. It is found
by comparing the variance of returns of the individual asset with the variance of
returns of the whole market portfolio (the all-share index). Using a statistical tech-
nique known as regression line, the return on the asset and the return on the whole
market portfolio are plotted on a graph. Sharpe defined the slope of the regression
line as the beta coe cient, which indicates the asset’s exposure to systematic risk.
Beta measures the relative volatility of a given stock compared with the volatility
of the stock market as a whole. When a share price moves exactly in line with the
stock market, it means that the stock’s beta equals 1. If beta is greater than 1, it
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means that the share price is more volatile than the market. When beta is instead
less than 1, it indicates that the stock is less volatile than the market. Beta 0 indi-
cates a theoretical situation in which the share price remains unchanged regardless
of which direction the market moves.
What is the significance of both Markowitz’s portfolio theory and Sharpe’s cap-
ital asset pricing model for the purposes of this thesis? Markowitz and Sharpe gal-
vanised the quest for financial derivatives as fundamental sites of risk management
for financial investors. Both scholars isolated risk and price volatility as the most
significant elements in every investment decision (Wigan, 2009, 161-163). Their ideas
unleashed a radically new way of thinking about financial markets and investments.
They transformed finance into a science which sees investments as bets on an uncer-
tain future and subject to the randomness of chance. For this reason, modern statis-
tics was adopted to control the risk which such randomness entails. In a word, as this
process of theoretical building unfolded, risk and the management of a varieties of
risks appeared as the quintessential determinants of investment success (Bernstein,
2007, xiii-xiv, xvii). At this point, economists increasingly looked at derivatives – in
particular, options – as instruments that could help investors erase their portfolio’s
exposures to market risk. Let us now look at options pricing analysis.
2.2.3.2 The Black-Scholes-Merton pricing formula for a call option
During the post-war period options and warrants were valued following simple
rules.88 There was no theoretical basis for establishing the prices at which these
instruments were bought and sold. However, economists at the Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology (MIT) were becoming increasingly attracted by the idea of
establishing scientific rules for valuing options and warrants (Bernstein, 1992, 206-
207). Many scholars already attempted to provide a formula to calculate the fair
value of options, but all these works were dependent on parameters that were hard
to estimate (MacKenzie, 2006, 119-127). The most innovative steps towards an op-
tions pricing formula were taken by Black and Scholes who met at the MIT Sloan
School of Management in 1968 and began collaborating with Merton in 1970.89
88Unless otherwise referenced, the following study about options pricing is based on Kolb and
Overdahl (2007, chapter 13), Hull (2009, chapter 13), Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2008, chapter 16).
89For the history of how Black, Scholes and Merton reached their conclusions, see Black (1989),
Scholes (1998), Bernstein (1992) and MacKenzie (2006).
94
The Black-Scholes-Merton model involves substantial mathematical and statisti-
cal background, an aspect which is beyond the purposes of this thesis. Yet, the logic
behind the model can be explained in simple terms. The formula for a European
call option on a stock is the following:
C = SN(d1)Xe
 rTN(d2) (2.1)
d1 and d2 are obtained through
d1 =
ln(S/X) + (r     +  2/2)T
 
p
T
d2 = d1    
p
T
where
S=stock price
X=exercise price
r=risk-free interest rate
 =stock volatility
T=time expiration of the option
 =annual dividend yield of the underlying stock (assumed to be 0)
e=the base of the natural log function
N(d1) and N(d2)=cumulative normal probability distributions
ln=natural logarithm function
According to the formula, the options price is a function of five factors: the un-
derlying stock price ("); exercise price (#); time to expiration ("); the volatility of
the underlying stock price ("); the risk-free interest rate (").90 These are all known
parameters except one: volatility. For this reason, traders use historical data to
have an idea of the level of volatility, or they derive the so-called implied volatility
from a premium already quoted by getting the Black-Scholes-Merton model to ‘work
90Arrows indicate how an increase in each variable a↵ects the value of the call option.
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backward’. Once obtained the implied volatility, all the data can be inserted in the
formula to easily get the fair value of the option. What is more, due to an equation
known as the put-call parity relationship, it is easy to get to the price for a put
option from the value of the call option.
What does the formula entail with regard to risk? The formula represents the
most widely known solution to the di↵erential equation which describes a portfolio
made of a short position in the call option C with price C(S, t) hedged at time t by
purchasing  C/ S number of stocks against the call option C. In practical terms,
this hedged portfolio – consisting of a short position in the option and a long posi-
tion in   shares of the underlying stock – eliminates risk through no instantaneous
linear exposure to movements in the stock price S. This lack of instantaneously lin-
ear exposure needs continuous adjustments through dynamic hedging, which means
revising the combination of call options and stocks (Derman and Taleb, 2005, 324).
In so doing, the hedged portfolio provides the risk-free interest rate, a condition
which is maintained by arbitrage trading.
Hence, dynamic hedging allows to protect from the stock-related risk constantly.
Accordingly, the options pricing formula calculates the price of the option which
gives the combination of stocks and options that secures the risk-free condition
(Bernstein, 1992, 218). With the help of options, it is possible to create a portfolio
which not only eliminates beta but also sigma, that is the variance of return on
the hedged portfolio (Merton in MacKenzie 2006, 136). This astonishing theoretical
achievement provided the mathematical rationale to boost options trading and, more
generally, derivatives. As De Goede (2005, 131) notices, people believed that the
more they traded the better o↵ society was going to be as a result of the decrease
in global risks. In sum, the Black-Scholes-Merton formula – as well as the ensuing
options pricing models which either simplified methodologically or accounted for
aspects that Black, Scholes and Merton did not considered initially – legitimated
the post-Bretton Woods expansion of derivatives by arguing that these instruments
reduce the risk of society at large.
2.2.4 The internationalisation of American finance
This section has thus far shown how representatives from the CBOT and the Merc
– together with financial economists and their theoretical insights – revolutionised
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the hostile common sense about financial derivatives. These actors transferred the
long-established techniques of commodity futures trading to the world of finance by
launching stock options and currency futures on organised markets. Initially, CBOT
and Merc o cials faced great hostility to the their business ideas. But, soon the
political-economic and cultural opinions in Washington and New York turned in
their favour. What were the reasons which brought this shift in the American es-
tablishment? This final subsection shows that, at a time when the global glut of
non-resident dollars weighted dramatically on the US balance-of-payments position,
decision-makers realised that American banks had developed international linkages
which enhanced the ability to sell dollar-denominated debt to other countries. In
so doing, the deficit in the US balance of payments gradually lost its importance,
allowing the Nixon administration to end the convertibility of dollars into gold with-
out causing major disruptions (Gowan, 1999; Konings, 2008c; Panitch and Gindin,
2008). These financial and monetary dynamics were fundamental in creating the
political-economic scenario conducive to the consolidation of financial derivatives.
The present study focuses on the period from the 1960s until the collapse of the
Bretton Woods monetary system in 1971. The next section examines instead the
expansion of derivatives-based risk management and its significance for American
financial power during the 1970s and 1980s.
After World War II, American financial actors were in full swing and hardly
limited by an international monetary system attuned to the objectives of full em-
ployment and national economic growth. As Konings (2006, 2008c, 2009) shows,
commercial banks expanded mortgage securities and consumers loans. In so doing,
they permeated the very fabric of society and implemented a form of welfare state
which heavily depended on financial markets in comparison to its European counter-
parts. Furthermore, banks complemented their practices of asset-side securitisation
– already undertaken since the nineteenth century through the market for call loans
– with techniques of liability management which securitised the deposit base. Partic-
ularly important in this regard was the creation of secondary markets for certificates
of deposit (CDs). These were credit instruments through which depositors agreed to
leave funds on deposit at the bank for a given period of time and interest rate. Com-
mercial banks innovated these instruments by transforming them into negotiable
money-market instruments which were issued in large denominations and traded on
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secondary markets to increase their liquidity (Sylla, 2002, 60). For what concerns
investment banks instead, these had been cut o↵ from commercial-banking activ-
ities since the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act. But, in spite of these regulatory barriers,
they developed leading strategies in project financing and the issuing of bonds for
corporations, governments and international organisations (Smith, Walter and De-
Long, 2011, 53). As it is clear, contrary to what is commonly assumed by Marxist,
Re´gulationist and post-Keynesian approaches to financialisation, American banks
developed financialised practices well before the 1970s. In fact, the current growth
of finance could only occur on the basis of institutions and discourses which “pre-
dated and indeed precipitated the disintegration of BrettonWoods” (Konings, 2008b,
258).
Over the course of the post-war period, as the American state constructed hege-
monic linkages with other capitalist nations in the spheres of trade, production and
security, both investment and commercial banks expanded their operations abroad
accordingly. They followed American corporations in their European business and,
in so doing, they began to influence the social formations of other countries (Panitch
and Gindin, 2008, 24). In this regard, the Eurodollar market was fundamental in
expanding the influence of American finance outside the US domestic markets. In
1957, after the Bank of England imposed limits on the use of the sterling pound to
finance international transactions, London-based financial institutions began o↵er-
ing credits and deposits denominated in dollars (Burn, 2006). This o↵shore market
soon turned very profitable and started to pool the large mass of non-resident dollars
(dollar glut) that was floating around the world in those years, causing problems to
the US payment position.91 During the 1960s, American multinational corporations
and banks were increasingly attracted by the Eurodollar market. They circumvented
higher interest rates on domestic money markets through the rates and facilities of-
fered to their branches o↵shore. In particular, US banks were free to exercise their
strategies and innovative practices on the Eurodollar market with few regulatory re-
strictions, “putting an unmistakably American stamp on the re-emergence of private
global finance” (Konings, 2008c, 47-49). Initially, these linkages created by Amer-
ican financial actors abroad constituted a problem for the US administrations in
91These dollars left the United States as a consequence of American imports, foreign investments
and military expenditures abroad. For this reason, they overhung outside the control of the Treasury
and the Federal Reserve. As mentioned above, this phenomenon came to be known as ‘dollar glut’.
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their attempt to restrict the dollar glut. However, this internationalisation of Amer-
ican finance soon turned into a privilege. In fact, it provided the conditions for the
Nixon administration to close the gold window and push the Western world from a
gold-dollar standard to a ‘pure dollar standard’ (Gowan, 1999).
Nixon announced the end of the gold-dollar parity on August 15, 1971. Since its
inception the Bretton Woods monetary system rested on fixed exchange rates and
the US dollar as the vehicle currency. To be sure, the dollar was fixed to gold, but
other member nations held dollars in their central banks as the o cial international
reserve asset. In other words, the US dollar was as good as gold, and supposedly
backed up by vast gold reserves in the vaults of Fort Knox. However, as Robert
Tri n (1966) famously argued, the Bretton Woods monetary system was subject
to a basic contradiction: the ability of the dollar to function as a vehicle currency
decreased with its expanding circulation beyond the national markets. Indeed, in an
international scenario where the dollar was the key currency, liquidity could only ex-
pand through a growing US balance-of-payments deficit. In other words, the system
relied on US deficits to prevent an international liquidity shortage. This paradox
implied that in order to curb speculation against an imminent dollar devaluation it
was necessary to end US deficits. But, in so doing, the system would have faced an
international liquidity crisis. One solution was the creation of a new international
currency issued by the International Monetary Fund, which could play an additional
role as a reserve currency. Special drawing rights, as they were called, were eventu-
ally adopted in 1969 but never significantly used. At this point, due to the dollar
glut, the confidence in the convertibility of the dollar into gold reached its lowest
levels. Initially postponed through negotiations with Germany and Japan agreeing
not to convert their reserves into gold, the confidence crisis eventually escalated
once France refused to accept any agreement. In the meantime, speculative attacks
increasingly targeted the dollar. Hence, the US government faced the decision to
either stop printing dollars or to end the convertibility of the dollar into gold. This
last path was the one chosen by the Nixon administration in 1971 (Eichengreen,
1996; Solomon, 1982).
The United States advanced the pure dollar standard to enhance American struc-
tural power in the global economy (Gowan, 1999, 19). Nixon broke out of the old
arrangements which constrained American control over international monetary af-
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fairs. In so doing, the United States were no longer restricted by the discipline of
the gold-dollar parity and the deficit in the balance of payments. The latter was
not solved, but simply left unchecked. Nixon’s intention was to push European and
Japanese governments towards an important crossroad. They could have financed
the US deficit by lending their dollar surpluses to the American economy – that
is, buying US Treasury securities. Alternatively, they could have dumped their dol-
lars on the foreign exchange market, therefore depreciating the relative value of the
dollar and indirectly favouring US exports. Any of the two roads appealed to US
interests (Hudson, 2003, 348-350). Under these circumstances, other countries grad-
ually accepted to further accumulate dollar-denominated assets. After all, American
financial markets and their London-based satellites were deep and liquid enough to
attract foreign funds, providing also a good rate of return (Gowan, 1999, 24-25).
The 1973 oil crisis further expanded the liquidity of New York and London markets
through the recycling of petrodollars.92
The end of Bretton Woods and the establishment of the pure dollar standard
dramatically increased the influence of US financial markets and actors in the world
scenario. It came into being what Peter Gowan (1999, 24) defined as the ‘Dollar-
Wall Street regime’, a phenomenon which works in two directions. On the one hand,
the centrality of the dollar reinforces US financial markets. The dollar is the world’s
vehicle currency, therefore “the great majority of states would want to hold the great
bulk of their foreign currency reserves in dollars, placing them within the American
financial system (or in London).” On the other hand, Gowan continues, there is
also a feedback in the opposite way. The importance of American financial markets
consolidates the hegemony of the dollar, “for anyone wanting to borrow or lend
money, the size and strength of a financial system is a very important factor. The
bigger a financial market’s resources and reach, the safer it is likely to be” in terms
of liquidity, portfolio diversification and competitive rates for borrowers.
How did these wider monetary and financial dynamics help the CBOT and Merc
in their quest for financial derivatives? The growing centrality of American finance
in the world economy considerably benefited the top managements of the two ex-
changes. Particularly, once the Merc’s IMM and the CBOE were established, banks
92The Nixon administration implemented this strategy through its diplomatic ties with Saudi
Arabia as well as through the abolition of US capital controls in 1974. See Gowan (1999, 21) and
Spiro (1999).
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began to include derivatives in their domestic and global strategies. For instance, the
introduction of currency futures at the IMM was a well-thought business which soon
exploited the new regime of flexible exchange rates to a full extent. Options at the
CBOE provided instead useful strategies to hedge the risk of stock-market volatility.
The next section specifies the interaction between derivatives and American finance
by looking at the expansion of these instruments as fundamental constituents of
American financial power in its global construction.
2.3 Derivatives and American financial power
To recapitulate, the previous section has examined how and why derivatives were
recast as instruments for the management of financial risks. The analysis has first
shown the major developments on commodity markets during the post-war period.
Successively, it has looked at the initiatives of CBOT and Merc in promoting stock
options and currency futures. Their search for financial derivatives was strategically
supported by financial economics, the theories of which emphasised risk as the cen-
tral element of investing. In so doing, derivatives were transferred from commodity
exchanges to financial markets and the risk implied by asset-price volatility. Finally,
the section has explored the domestic and global expansion of American finance, par-
ticularly the modalities through which it provided a political-economic and cultural
environment conducive to the business ideas of CBOT and Merc.
This final section looks at how derivatives-based risk management grew as part
and parcel of American financial power in its global consolidation. The section is
divided into two parts. First, it reviews the early years of derivatives until the Shad-
Johnson Accord in December 1981. This period was characterised by numerous reg-
ulatory uncertainties within a political-economic scenario which failed to support
American finance in its hegemonic potentials. The second subsection examines in-
stead how the restructuring of the US economy in line with the dictates of American
finance provided an institutional and discursive environment upholding the expan-
sion of derivatives from the 1980s onwards. In this regard, particularly astonishing
was the growth of the markets for swaps, index derivatives and asset-backed securi-
ties. It is at this point that derivatives practices began to be projected outside the
US boundaries.
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2.3.1 The early years of financial derivatives
As previously shown, Nixon and his entourage became aware of the seigniorage
power that the United States could have exercised on the basis of the pure dollar
standard. For this reason, Washington resisted any attempt to build another for-
mal monetary regime, proceeding instead on the path of international monetary
unilateralism. Over the course of the 1970s, the various US administrations allowed
American finance to grow in size, liquidity and level of product innovation. Financial
expansion enhanced the di↵usion of American power by o↵ering other societies “the
most competitive terms [...] to borrow money” (Gowan, 1999, 33) and, in so doing,
winning their consent in accepting dollar-denominated assets. However, throughout
the decade, the construction of American financial power remained highly contra-
dictory. In fact, as Panitch and Gindin (2008, 30) explain, the expanding financial
markets were caught in a vortex of economic recession, labour militancy and ac-
commodating monetary policy. Due to these problems, the authorities were unable
to curb the double-digit inflationary pressures, the declining value of the dollar and
the continuing outflows of capital. In other words, domestic institutions fell short of
providing the proper environment for US financial markets to absorb global credit
flows and, in turn, consolidate American financial power in world a↵airs.
This uncertain scenario produced a tension in the realm of derivatives. On the
one hand, these instruments became integral to American finance and its expansion-
ary trends. Banks continued on their path towards disintermediation by innovating
their securitisation techniques. They moved from a model based on taking deposits
and lending the funds, to one in which they mediate, for a fee, the interaction of
security market participants, or engage in trading on their own account (Panitch
and Gindin, 2008, 27-28). Once all items in the banks’ balance sheets were seen
as securities with a certain level of risk and market volatility, derivatives emerged
in all their risk-management significance. Through these instruments, banks miti-
gated their risk exposures to variable interest rates, floating exchange rates, as well
as stock-market volatility – circumstances which also gave opportunities to profit
from risk (Konings, 2006, 508-509). What is more, savings and loan associations,
mutual funds and insurance companies joined banks in their derivatives strategies
(Markham, 2002c, 89-90). Altogether, these financial actors gave a tremendous boost
to the newly established CBOE, IMM and the other exchanges that introduced
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derivatives on financial assets.93 On the other hand, a rivalry emerged between the
Securities Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
over their respective jurisdictions. This regulatory battle demonstrated the absolute
inadequacy of US derivatives regulation in the period. More importantly, it added
further delays to the business plans of derivatives exchanges.
The key issue was that, as already mentioned, the CFTC obtained jurisdiction
over both commodity and financial derivatives. The SEC saw this decision as an
incursion in its realm and a battle immediately emerged over the decision by the
CBOT to trade futures on the Ginnie Mae certificates in 1975.94 The SEC objected
to these contracts by arguing that they were securities, therefore to be considered
under its jurisdiction. On the contrary, the CFTC argued that it had exclusive
jurisdiction over all types of futures trading (Markham, 2002c, 81).
However, besides Ginnie Mae futures, it was particularly the Merc’s proposal for
index futures which came to be a contested territory between the two authorities.
The issue was certainly trivial due to the fact that this instrument could only be
settled in cash and, for this reason, it appeared as illegitimate compared to other
contracts which at least ‘contemplated’ the delivery of an underlying asset. Yet,
regulators were not particularly concerned about the gambling features of index
futures. The SEC was instead opposed to the creation of this instrument due to the
fact that it would have fallen within the CFTC’s regulatory power despite mirroring
an asset that clearly belonged to its jurisdiction (MacKenzie, 2006, 171-172).95
In the end, authorities accepted the creation of an entirely cash-settled con-
tract when John Shad of the SEC and Philip McBride Johnson announced a basic
agreement known as the Shad-Johnson Accords in December 1981. The latter was
enacted into law and established the respective responsibilities between SEC and
93The American Stock Exchange (Amex) announced a plan to trade options in 1974. But, the
SEC refused to allow Amex to begin trading options until both Amex and CBOE agreed on the
development of a common clearing and settlement system as well as a jointly managed price-
reporting system. Amex and CBOE agreed to use the CBOE Clearing Corporation – which was
renamed into Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) – as the common clearing agency. They also
used the newly established Options Price Reporting Authority (Opra) as a national market system
which provided last sale information and options quotations. Hence, options trading was allowed
to expand with other markets entering the business such as the Philadelphia Stock Exchange and
the Pacific Stock Exchange (Markham, 2002c, 52-53).
94After the creation of CBOE as its spin-o↵, CBOT began trading derivatives on its very own
pits (Geisst, 2002, 209).
95In this regard, the Merc argued that an index future did not represent a security since stocks
were never going to be delivered. See MacKenzie (2006, 170-174).
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CFTC concerning a variety of financial instruments. In brief, the SEC obtained
exclusive jurisdiction over options on securities and index options. The CFTC had
instead exclusive jurisdiction over all futures and options on futures, including index
futures and options on stock index futures (Cftc, 2011; Markham, 2002c, 87).
By the time the Shad-Johnson Accords were agreed on, the American establish-
ment recognised the importance of financial derivatives. In 1978, the Treasury and
the Federal Reserve conducted a study to assess banks’ growing use of futures. The
report argued that futures markets were e cient tools for banks and their clients
to manage the exposures to interest rate risk. Therefore, futures were beneficial and
the widespread speculative trading was nonetheless useful in providing liquidity for
hedging purposes and a more e cient pricing. In 1983, the FED also noted that,
due to portfolio theory, futures contracts could be deployed to minimise portfolio
risk and maximise portfolio returns. Finally, in 1984, the Congress commissioned a
joint study to the CFTC, the SEC, the FED and the Treasury. The report found
no evidence about the destabilising e↵ect of futures trading on Treasury securities.
Quite the opposite, futures were deemed to improve market liquidity (Markham,
2002c, 90).
2.3.2 Swaps, index derivatives and asset-backed securities
When these studies were published in the early 1980s, the United States had already
taken a new political-economic course. The latter stabilised the above-mentioned
contradictions which a✏icted the US economy during the 1970s, namely: inflation,
economic downturn, the declining value of the dollar and the outflows of capital
(Panitch and Gindin, 2008, 30). The monetarist turn of the Federal Reserve, with
the appointment of Paul Volcker as Chairman in the August 1979, was crucial to
initiate this new trajectory. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, the squeeze in
money supply and the sky-rocketing interest rate executed by the FED failed to stop
the overgrowth of credit (Konings, 2008c, 54-55). Yet, in spite of monetarism not
working according to its theoretical dictates, the FED was nonetheless successful
in curbing inflation and rendering the national economic environment suitable to
sustain a dollar-centred global order. In other words, the ‘Volcker shock’ adjusted
the operations of the FED in order to create the institutional conditions – above
all, the right balance of class forces – necessary for US finance to attract global
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credit flows and, in turn, to enhance American power in world a↵airs (Konings,
2008a; Panitch and Gindin, 2008). In this regard, three intertwined aspects were
fundamental.
To begin with, for what concerns inflation, the overgrowth of money ceased to
apply intense pressures on the general price level since it no longer entered real eco-
nomic circuits. Funds began instead to be redirected towards the financialisation of
the US economy. In other words, real-growth inflation was contained whilst stimu-
lating asset-price inflation (Konings, 2007, 161-162). Second, the high interest-rate
condition attracted also large capital inflows towards domestic financial markets,
fostering their liquidity and resulting in a dramatic increase in the foreign purchase
of US debt (Frankel, 1988). Third, the high interest-rate scenario also dealt a blow to
the declining manufacturing sector. Since the late 1960s, the latter was a↵ected by a
crisis of overproduction together with European and Japanese competitors (Brenner,
2006). After the Volcker shock, manufacturing corporations had all the incentives
to ‘financialise’ by investing in financial assets rather than productive activities
(Krippner, 2005) – except for the investments in the military-industrial complex, as
well as the information and communications technology sector (Gowan, 2009, 24).
Companies adhered to the praxis of downsizing the labour force and distributing
earnings to shareholders (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). Under the auspices of the
Reagan administration and its assault on trade unions, capital disciplined labour
and reduced the workers’ share of national income (Davis, 1999). Accordingly, the
American population borrowed more to maintain its way of life, expanding con-
sumer debt and allowing finance to permeate the fabric of society (Hyman, 2011;
Montgomerie, 2006).
In sum, the Federal Reserve initiated a stabilisation of the domestic economy in
order to gain international confidence about the pure dollar standard. The United
States aimed at playing the role of safe haven for global capital flows. They did
so through liquid and innovative financial markets as well as an anti-inflationary
commitment guaranteed by a subordinated working class (Panitch and Gindin, 2008,
34). Furthermore, the consolidation of American financial power – with its neoliberal
discipline of labour – showed European societies a viable way to address its own
class-based contradictions through the creation of a similar, although subordinated,
space of finance-led accumulation (Bieling, 2003; Ryner, 2007). In other words, other
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Western societies began to restructure their domestic institutions on the basis of
financialised practices.
Under these circumstances marked by the prevalence of American financial prac-
tices and innovation in the world economy, the use of both financial and commodity
derivatives exploded. Commodity derivatives trading benefited from the reintroduc-
tion of commodity options in 1981, which were banned since the New Deal reforms.
Financial derivatives – especially the over-the-counter dimension – grew instead ex-
ponentially, well beyond the trading volumes of commodity derivatives. Three mar-
kets were remarkable in their expansion: swaps, asset-backed securities and index
futures. Let us examine them in turn.
Governments had used contracts similar to swaps before, but private dealers be-
gan to be involved in swaps contracts extensively during the 1980s. Swaps emerged
as an OTC market since the transactions were too large to be traded on a centralised
exchange. Whilst initially investment banks and bank a liates helped two parties
in structuring the deals, soon these financial institutions realised the potentials of
fee-earning and started acting as market makers (Geisst, 2002, 250). In 1985, they es-
tablished ISDA to represent the industry (Isda, 2012). Over the course of the decade,
swaps became the fastest growing derivatives sector. These instruments became a
very useful way to hedge the risk exposures towards interest rates and exchange
rates (Markham, 2002c, 192). What is more, custom-tailored swaps were the perfect
unregulated instruments which companies “could use [...] to avoid regulation or to
hide risks” (Partnoy, 2009, 47). Local municipalities joined the clientele too. One
of these local governments, the London municipal borough of Hammersmith and
Fulham, became famous for its big losses incurred between 1987 and 1989 (Hull,
2012, 439).
ABSs were popularised by the above-mentioned Ginnie Mae, a body which spun
o↵ from the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) in 1968. Ginnie
Mae issued certificates that represented an interest in a pool of mortgages issued by
banks and thrift institutions. Certificates were then sold to investors on secondary
markets and were guaranteed by the federal government. Such practice allowed Gin-
nie Mae to obtain funds that it used for additional mortgages. The Federal Mort-
gage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie
Mae) also began to issue asset-backed securities. In 1984, the Secondary Mortgage
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Market Enhancement Act opened a regulatory regime which gave a boost to the
market for mortgage-backed securities. The originators were no longer governmental
institutions but bank a liates and SPVs which packaged and sold securities with
no government guarantees. Furthermore, ABSs expanded to include other assets
which generate income streams such as credit card payments, car loans and so on
(Markham, 2002c, 50, 142-144). In sum, structured finance was in full swing and, in
about a decade, would become one the most complex and fastest-growing derivatives
segment.
Contrary to swaps and ABSs, index futures were exchange-traded derivatives.
After the lobbying e↵orts by Melamed and the Merc, these instruments became
very important instruments for institutional investors. They were widely used as
part of portfolio insurance, a risk-management strategy created by two Berkeley-
based economists Hayne Leland and Mark Rubinstein. Index futures and options
allowed managers to hedge their portfolios against market downsides. They were
particularly crucial in a context in which portfolio theory had become financial or-
thodoxy by encouraging investors to diversify their portfolios in line with the general
market performance. In this regard, index futures popularised the methodology of
programme trading, which involved the use of computer-based trading to buy or
sell contracts according to either positive or negative changes in the market. Un-
der declining market conditions, the gain on shorting the index futures would o↵set
the loss on the stock portfolio. But, this strategy had dramatic consequences dur-
ing the stock-market crash of the October 19, 1987. It developed into a self-fulfilling
prophecy which pushed the market downwards as computers entered more and more
sell orders (Bernstein, 1992, chapter 14).
In spite of the 1987 crash, both over-the-counter and exchange-traded derivatives
became embedded in a pro-market regulatory regime by the early 1990s. The United
States influenced a type of global regulation which aimed at managing, rather than
eliminating, financial expansion (Konings, 2008a, 66). To be sure, regulators ex-
pressed concerns about the systemic risk posed by derivatives to the global financial
system. But, as the 1988 Basel Accord demonstrated, banks’ risk exposure towards
on-balance and o↵-balance-sheet operations was managed by imposing weighed cap-
ital requirements of 8% minimum (Nabors and Oatley, 1998). What is more, many
policy-makers agreed with the conclusions expressed by the Group of Thirty, a pri-
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vate group of major financial institutions chaired by Paul Volcker. In an influential
report entitled Derivatives: Practices and Principles, the organisation recommended
no further regulation, but sound risk-management practices adopted by derivatives
dealers through self-regulation (GroupofThirty, 1993; Markham, 2002c, 202).
In the last two decades, American finance pushed even further the process of
financialisation. Banks increasingly based their operations on proprietary trading –
as opposed to trading on behalf of their clients – and prime brokerage lending to
institutional investors and structured investment vehicles (SIVs). These strategies of
proprietary trading and prime brokerage were directed towards speculative arbitrage
and the almost continuous creation of asset-price bubbles. The ability to engage in
these practices was enhanced by overly leveraged balance sheets, as well as by the
growth of the shadow-banking sector as an spin-o↵ of the regulated system (Gowan,
2009). Derivatives became an organic part of this finance-led regime, particularly in
their over-the-counter dimension. By the turn of the 2000s, OTC markets and prod-
ucts had grown several times their exchange-traded counterparts. These markets
existed in an unregulated reality connecting the various trading floors of the major
financial institutions (Schinasi et al., 2000). US regulation such as the 2000 Com-
modity Futures Modernization Act assured that OTC derivatives remained largely
exempted from the supervision of both the CFTC and the SEC. The regulatory
environment in the London-based o↵shore space was even more ‘light-touched’ than
its counterpart on Wall Street (Engelen et al., 2011, 132). Here, the bulk of trading
concentrated on interest rate and foreign exchange risks, but throughout the 1990s
banks began to package also complex instruments such as credit default swaps and
collateralised debt obligations. Whilst the use of these two tools was initially mod-
est, their markets grew exponentially after the 2000 and played a crucial role in the
recent subprime crisis (Lewis, 2010).
Since the 1980s, other countries began to adapt the practices the institutions and
discourse of derivatives-based risk management. Some examples concerning organ-
ised markets can help illustrate the case. In 1978, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange
Association established the European Options Exchange (NyseEuronext, 2012a). In
1979, the Sydney Futures Exchange listed financial futures (ASX, 2012). In 1982,
the London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) began to trade fu-
tures and options on currencies and interest rates through an open outcry system
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(NyseEuronext, 2012b). In 1985, Optionsma¨klarna introduced options in Sweden
(NasdaqOMX, 2012). In 1986, the French futures market Marche´ a` Terme Inter-
national de France (MATIF) traded contract on government bonds and introduced
stock options soon after (NyseEuronext, 2012c). In 1988, the Swiss Options and Fi-
nancial Futures Exchange was established (SIXGroup, 2012). In 1990, the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange (now Deutsche Bo¨rse) created the Deutsche Terminbo¨rse which
traded futures contracts. The Frankfurt Stock Exchange had already introduced
standardised stock options in 1983 (DBGroup, 2010).
2.4 Conclusions
Derivatives-like contracts existed long before US commodity exchanges initiated fu-
tures trading in the late nineteenth century. But, as this chapter has claimed, it
is only at this moment in human history that derivatives were embedded in an
institutional and discursive environment increasingly attuned to speculation as a
mechanism of business-risk management. The creation of derivatives-based risk man-
agement articulated during the Gilded Age at a time when populists opposed futures
trading as the worst facet of agricultural commercialisation. Once the aspirations
of the populist movement were diluted into the pro-consumerist reforms of the Pro-
gressive Era, advocates of futures markets were free to enact speculation as a valid
practice of risk management for corporate America.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, derivatives began to intersect American fi-
nance and its expansionary dynamics at home and abroad. In so doing, derivatives
were rethought as instruments of risk management for financial investors. Derivatives
approached financial markets at a time when the Nixon administration was open
to the interests of financial actors. In fact, Washington was gradually realising that
American finance represented a vehicle of US power in the world economy (Gowan,
1999; Konings, 2008a; Panitch and Gindin, 2008). In this context, CBOT and Merc
successfully lobbied for the introduction of stock options and currency futures on or-
ganised exchanges (MacKenzie, 2006). The rising field of financial economics helped
exchange o cials by providing powerful intellectual support. Their theories isolated
risk and price volatility as fundamental to every investment decision (Wigan, 2009).
Derivatives trading on financial assets grew considerably and became essential
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for banks and institutional investors. However, this growth was hindered by regula-
tory uncertainties and a di cult economic scenario a✏icting the US economy during
the 1970s. Once the 1979 monetarist turn of the FED initiated the stabilisation of
the domestic economy, American financial power consolidated in its global reach.
Accordingly, after the 1981 Shad-Johnson Accords, derivatives markets expanded in
size and innovation as demonstrated by the market for swaps, asset-backed securities
and index derivatives. The US establishment recognised derivatives as important in-
struments of market e ciency. The 1987 stock market crash hardly a↵ected this view
about derivatives which were instead embedded in a pro-market regulatory regime.
In the meantime, other countries began to adopt the institutions and discourses of
derivatives-based risk management.
How and why did the Italian society embrace the institutions and discourses
of derivatives-based risk management? Why and to what extent do derivatives in
Italy reveal distinct features? In the next two chapters, this thesis leaves the United
States to address the specificities of the Italian case.
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Chapter 3
Modernising Italian capitalism: a
historical account
This chapter begins to explore the dynamics of agential power, institutional and
discursive construction through which modern derivatives were adapted in Italy.
It shows that the historical evolution of Italian capitalism was characterised by
complex equilibria between private business oligarchies and a vast public enterprise
(Segreto, 1998). This private-public liaison secured ownership in the hands of the
state and the oligarchs, reaching its most collusive essence during the 1980s. It is
at this historical juncture that a pro-market technocratic elite – based primarily at
the Bank of Italy and the Ministry of Treasury – advanced the idea of modernising
the Italian political economy by disciplining public finances, privatising the state-
owned sector and, few years later, modernising the financial system (Dyson and
Featherstone, 1996; McCann, 2000; Deeg, 2005b). In so doing, these actors aimed at
limiting those mechanisms which guaranteed the reproduction of conservative power
structures. Whilst the process of European integration applied strong pressures in
favour of market-oriented reforms, technocrats exploited these tendencies to impose
an external constraint on the country’s status quo (Dyson and Featherstone, 1996).
By the time Italy adhered to the process of European monetary integration in 1992,
the stage was ready for neoliberal reforms to be implemented systematically under
the auspices of Europe (Sbragia, 2001). The significance of derivatives-based risk
management emerged in Italy under such circumstances. The present chapter is
divided into three main sections.
111
The first section reconstructs the origins of the highly concentrated structure
of ownership and control in Italy from the late-nineteenth century industrialisation
to the 1950s. Until the crisis of 1929, two universal banks, Banca Commerciale
Italiana (COMIT) and Credito Italiano (CREDIT), weaved cross-shareholding al-
liances amongst national oligarchies. But, once these banks entered into a deep crisis
of liquidity during the summer of the 1930, the Fascist dictatorship intervened to
dismantle the system of universal banking. The state assumed control of COMIT
and CREDIT together with the companies that the two universal banks had previ-
ously controlled. Furthermore, a system of semi-independent public institutes was
put in charge of allocating long-term industrial credit, marginalising the stock mar-
ket as a source of business investment and control. In so doing, the state became a
new powerful actor in the Italian economy, one that nonetheless accommodated the
interest of national private oligarchies. In this context, the financial holding Bas-
togi became the meeting place where to manage the equilibria between public and
private ownership (Segreto, 1998).
At the end of World War II, the major political forces opted for a solution of
continuity for what concerned the system of public enterprise and credit allocation.
At the same time, the stock-market reform fell into oblivion and equity finance
never became central to the functioning of the domestic economy. Hence, whilst
public holdings controlled most part of the public industry and financial apparatus,
oligarchs dominated instead private companies. In a word, the ownership benefits of
Italian capitalism were limited to few powerful actors (Amatori and Brioschi, 2001;
Barca, 2001). Bastogi worked well in calibrating this public-private liaison during
the 1950s, but the financial holding was unable to counteract the dramatic expan-
sion of the state-owned sector (Piluso, 1992). This phenomenon was the result of a
specific political programme: Christian Democrats aimed at using state intervention
to develop modern welfare institutions and to form a broad middle class upholding
their power as the main ruling elite. Thus, the system of public industry and finance
grew considerably. Over the course of the next three decades, it gradually turned into
an instrument for Christian Democrats – and successively also for Socialist politi-
cians – to guarantee their power position on the basis of patronage relations with
public managers and society at large (Barca, 2001; Bianchi, 1987). Hence, whilst
Bastogi declined, the merchant bank Mediobanca gradually gained a central posi-
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tion in the defensive ownership strategies of private capitalism vis-a`-vis the state.
The 1962 nationalisation of the electrical energy sector marked the moment in which
the interaction between public and private actors assumed more conflictual traits
(Segreto, 1998).
The second section looks at the consolidation and development of the Mediobanca
regime from the 1960s to the late 1980s. Mediobanca was established in 1946 with
the capital of the former universal banks – and now under state control – COMIT,
CREDIT and Banco di Roma. However, the merchant bank gained margins of au-
tonomy by opening to private shareholders. Due to such a peculiar public-private
nature of its shareholding syndicate, Mediobanca mediated the conflictual dynamics
between the oligarchies and the expanding state-owned enterprise. It became the
financial engineer for large private companies by providing funding strategies which
guaranteed at the same time the oligarchic structures of ownership and control (Bat-
tilossi, 1991; Segreto, 2008).
During the 1980s, the concentrated traits of the Italian political economy as-
sumed new complexities. On the one hand, the system of public ownership underwent
a phase of restructuring and downsizing against the resistance of leading politicians,
particularly the Socialists. In these years, political actors exploited state institutions
and public expenditure for purposes of mass consensus (Bianchi, 1987; Ginsborg,
2001; Pasquino, 2000). On the other hand, major private corporations turned to
equity finance. But, in spite of opening up to minority shareholders, Mediobanca
made sure that national oligarchies kept their ownership ties intact through the use
of pyramidal schemes, dual-class shares, cross-shareholdings and interlocking direc-
torates (Aleotti, 1990; Amatori and Colli, 2001). In the same years, the merchant
bank launched also a controversial plan for its own privatisation with the objective
of increasing the weight of private capital in the syndicate. In so doing, Mediobanca
aimed at decreasing political pressures on its activities (Segreto, 2008). However, by
the late 1980s, new forces were already in motion that were about to transform the
traditional power structure in Italy.
In fact, section three shows that neoliberal-minded ideas emerged within state
institutions since the mid-1970s (Ciocca, 2005). Pro-market technocrats at the Bank
of Italy and the Treasury put forward a critique of Italian capitalism that funda-
mentally clashed with conservative interests both in the public and private capital-
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ist sphere. Over the course of the 1980s, technocrats gradually gained influence in
a political-economic scenario the practices of which had reached the highest level
of collusion and corruption (Ginsborg, 2001). Under the auspices of European in-
tegration, these actors exalted the benefits of reducing public debt, privatising the
state-owned sector and modernising the domestic financial system (Dyson and Feath-
erstone, 1996; McCann, 2000; Deeg, 2005b). In so doing, they aimed at hybridising
domestic institutions and discourses in the attempt to shape the nature of power
struggle to their advantage. By securing control over the decision-making process
which led to the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992, technocrats connected Italy
to the market-oriented dynamics of Europe (Dyson and Featherstone, 1996). Hence,
from this moment onwards, reforms started to be implemented in a systematic fash-
ion. Derivatives-based risk management played a fundamental role in these strategies
(see chapter four).
3.1 The Italian case, 1861-1950
In the early 1930s, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means (1968, 8) famously described
the most crucial development of modern capitalism as “the dissolution of the old
atom of ownership into its component parts, control and beneficial ownership.” In
other words, Berle and Means argued that the consolidation of the joint-stock com-
pany implied a separation of corporate ownership and control such that a myriad of
dispersed owners – the shareholders – emerged. Whilst diversifying their investment
portfolios across several firms listed on the stock exchange, these shareholders ex-
erted almost no control over the managers who e↵ectively ran day-to-day operations.
The condition was such that the latter were potentially able to form a ‘technostruc-
ture’ through which they could consolidate their power over other social groups
(Galbraith, 2007). The research by Berle and Means became very influential and
their ideas about the consolidation of managerial capitalism were unchallenged for
a long time.96 Many studies focused instead on the various practices that could
solve the so-called ‘principal-agent’ problem such as independent boards of direc-
tors, fiduciary duties and the market for corporate control (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Grossman and Hart, 1988). These innovations were supposed to make man-
96For two critiques, see Dobb (1964) and Zeitlin (1974).
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agers accountable to shareholders. What is more, the argument of Berle and Means
was assumed to be valid also for industrial economies other than the United States
(Becht and Mayer, 2001, 1), where the modern corporation assumed its most em-
blematic character (Roy, 1997).
In recent years, however, several scholars have emphasised the existence of di↵er-
ent degrees of separation between ownership and control across the world (Clarke,
2007, 85). For instance, Julian Franks and Colin Mayer (1997) conceptualised the
phenomena in question through the lenses of an ‘insider-outsider’ model. The US
and UK are ‘outside’ cases where the separation between ownership and control is
wide enough for shareholders to be primarily concerned with making managers ac-
countable. Continental Europe is instead fairly di↵erent and sits at the other side
of the spectrum. To begin with, ‘insider’ countries such as Germany, France or Italy
present few listed companies on the stock market. Second, for what concerns the
listed ones, share ownership is concentrated in the hands of three groups, namely:
founding families, other non-financial companies (cross-shareholding) and the state.
Hence, similarly to other European experiences, the logic of Italian capitalism
is characterised by a relatively limited separation of ownership and control. In this
sense, the Italian story is not one in which dispersed shareholders develop mech-
anisms to make strong managers accountable (Roe, 1994). In Italy, the problem
concerns instead the presence of strong blockholders (oligarchs, state) influencing
the activities of weak managers against the interests of unprotected minority share-
holders (Melis, 2000, 354). It is the imperative to hold such high degrees of ownership
concentration in the hands of few actors – whilst at the same time maintaining open
channels for external funding and corporate growth – that encouraged blockholders
to gather around several gravitational centres of Italian capitalism (Segreto, 1997,
649). Reconstructing the evolution of these artifices is crucial to comprehend the
conservative power structures that neoliberal reformists aimed at changing in the
early 1990s, allowing derivatives-based risk management to emerge in Italy as an
essential component of their strategies.
This section looks first at the early years of industrialisation and the importance
of COMIT and CREDIT in weaving cross-shareholding alliances. Then, it focuses
on the emergence of the state as a fundamental economic actor as well as on the
role of the financial holding Bastogi in balancing the ownership equilibria between
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private capitalism and the public enterprise from the 1929 crisis until the late 1950s.
3.1.1 The years of COMIT and CREDIT
The early Italian industrialisation was forged by a close relationship between foreign
capital and the state in the late nineteenth century. It could not have been di↵er-
ently in a newly unified nation (1861) characterized by three ‘organic weaknesses’,
namely: scarce natural resources, inadequate capital due to a limited phase of prim-
itive accumulation and a highly fragmented domestic market – itself a result of the
previous division in several small independent states (Grifone, 1971, 5). Hence, in-
dustrial capitalism emerged in Italy by depending on foreign-influenced banks and
the role of political elites in their di cult project of nation building.
Concrete e↵orts to create a modern industrial base were not put in place until the
government of the so-called sinistra storica (historical left) got to power in 1876 and
implemented protectionist measures which reached the apex in 1887. Protectionism
encouraged economies of scales in textile production and technological improvement
in the steel industry and chemicals (Aleotti, 1990, 35-37). However, these devel-
opments were hindered by the fragility of the Italian banking system which was
overexposed to commercial and industrial activities as well as a real estate boom in
cities like Rome, Turin and Naples. This led to the the 1893-94 banking crisis and
the collapse of the two main banks Credito Mobiliare and Banca Generale (Zamagni,
1993, 142-144).
In spite of the dramatic disarray, this crisis marked a turning point in Italian
history. Political and business elites reached a certain degree of national coherence
and undertook an important process of institutional restructuring. First, the Bank
of Italy was established in 1893 as a sort of primus inter pares amongst the other
two banks of issue, Banco di Napoli and Banco di Sicilia.97 This represented a first
step in the creation of a more homogeneous banking and monetary structure which
until then had su↵ered from traditional localisms. Second, German-Austrian capital
arrived in Italy with the creation of two universal banks, COMIT and CREDIT
(Segreto, 2008, 787-789).98
97About the origins and evolution of Bank of Italy, see Cotula, De Cecco and Toniolo (2003).
98COMIT was created in 1894 by German, Austrian and Swiss capital. CREDIT was instead
established in 1895 by Genoese financiers with the help of other Italian, German and Swiss capital.
It is important to note that by 1901-02, the participation of German capital both in COMIT and
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During the so-called ‘Giolitti era’ (1897-1913),99 the two universal banks financed
activities of both the first and second technological revolutions (Gerschenkron, 1966;
Confalonieri, 1974; Fohlin, 1998).100 COMIT and CREDIT were behind strategic
sectors such as electricity and hydroelectric power (Edison, SADE), steel (Terni,
Falk), chemicals (Montecatini), vehicles (FIAT) and locomotives (Breda) (Amatori
and Colli, 2001, 4). These banks also o↵ered managerial advice to companies through
the presence of so-called fiduciari (Pino, 1991). Last but not least, COMIT and
CREDIT favoured the formation of joint-stock companies and stimulated the growth
of the stock market. Established in the most important cities by a Napoleonic Act
during the years between 1802 and 1808, the national system of stock exchanges –
commonly known as borsa – experienced a remarkably speculative expansion at the
turn of the twentieth century, a phase which ended with the 1907 crisis.101 These
critical events pushed the authorities to implement a reform of the stock market in
1913. But, the latter did not entail any transparency rules for corporate governance
or regulation on insider trading (Aleotti, 1990, 63-64, 73-76).
The problems concerning stock-market activities reflected an anomaly of Ital-
ian universal banking. In Germany, banks were well integrated with stock-market
operations (Fohlin, 2007). In Italy, on the contrary, banks fell short of developing
their investment-banking operations, namely: raising new equity or debt capital for
companies on the market (underwriting); as well as making secondary markets for
these securities (brokerage/dealing). This occurred for two reasons. First, Italian
industrialists resisted the dispersed nature of public ownership (Segreto, 2008, 792).
They preferred instead to secure control over their companies, whilst nevertheless
leaving open the opportunities for external funding by the banks. Second, in the
absence of an e↵ective stock-market regulation, government bonds attracted the
majority of savings. In this context, universal banks could only rely on their de-
CREDIT was drastically reduced in favour of Italian, French and Belgian shareholders (Zamagni,
1993, 144-145).
99Giovanni Giolitti was the politician who inaugurated a period of social reforms in Italy. See
Forsyth (1993).
100Besides COMIT and CREDIT, Banco di Roma (1880) and Banca Italiana di Sconto (BIS,
1914; formerly known as Societa` Bancaria Italiana, 1904) were the other two universal banks.
However, these institutes had no substantial support from foreign capital and played a minor role
in the country’s industrial development (Zamagni, 1993, 146), except for the case of BIS and its
mismanaged expansion during World War I up until its bankruptcy in 1921 (Sra↵a, 1922).
101About the origins and evolution of the Italian borsa, see Aleotti (1990), Baia Curioni (1995)
and also BorsaItaliana (2012). About the 1907 crisis, see Bonelli (1971).
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posits and on access to funds from volatile international capital markets (De Cecco
and Ferri, 1996, 27-28). As a result, the development of Italian business came to
be characterised by an oligarchic structure of ownership and control. Accordingly,
in case of liquidity crises by the banks, state intervention – as exemplified by the
several bailouts in 1894, 1921, and the decisive one in 1931 (Tattara and Toniolo,
1976, 134) – provided a safe solution to socialise losses whilst keeping the power of
family oligarchies intact.
In this overall rationale of Italian capitalism in its cradle, the hegemony of
COMIT and CREDIT to weave the alliances of private business was unquestioned
until World War I. The banks succeeded in forming a network of cross-shareholders
where the two institutes represented the centre of gravity (Segreto, 1997, 650). How-
ever, this situation changed after the conflict when, mostly due to warfare commis-
sions, several industrial groups had grown to the point of unravelling the balance
of forces between banks and the industry. Large family-owned companies such as
Ansaldo and FIAT unsuccessfully attempted to take over the banks in search for new
capital to finance overly bloated investments and post-war reconversion (Zamagni,
1993, 233). Whilst such events agitated the business world, the country experienced
an economic crisis which intensified labour strikes and led to the occupation of fac-
tories. In this scenario, industrialists lost faith in the Giolitti government and its
ability to solve the situation. The rupture between liberal-reformists and industrial-
ists played an important role in paving the way for the emergence of Fascism (Eley,
1983).
The falling apart of the old bank-industry synergies forced CREDIT and COMIT
to concentrate their ownership structures in two holdings: COMOFIN and COFINA.
Banks exploited regulatory gaps concerning cross-shareholdings and, in so doing,
succeeded in controlling COMOFIN and COFINA together with a group of allied
bankers and industrialists (Battilossi, 2009, 111-112). In this scenario, banks expe-
rienced a period of expansion during the first half of the 1920s. They upheld the
export-led economic boom favoured by the displacement of German exports and the
ability of the Fascist regime to contain monetary wages (Filosa, Rey and Sitzia, 1976,
55-57). Between 1921 and 1925, total bank lending to the private sector increased at
an average annual rate of 23.7%. Moreover, both demand and time deposits grew at
an annual average rate that was 2.5 times the growth in national income. Net profits
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for many of the joint-stock banks went up to 10% of their own funds. Again, this
buoyancy had a significant impact also on the stock market the index of which grew
by 160% between 1922 and 1925. However, banks began to experience di culties
as of 1925. In that year, the stock-market index started to decline and banks had
problems in liquidating their shares (Ciocca and Toniolo, 1984, 120-122). These di -
culties further increased when the dictatorship undertook the deflationary policies of
‘quota 90’ in 1926 (Cohen, 1972; Martinez Oliva, 2006). Finally, banks entered into a
deep liquidity crisis once the repercussions of the 1929 crisis hit the Italian economy
(Toniolo, 1978). In this situation, the opportunity for a radical transformation of the
country’s financial system and economic structure emerged. This enhanced the role
of the state and, for this reason, new equilibrating mechanisms in the structure of
ownership and control were necessary. The next subsection looks at the emergence
and consolidation of Bastogi as the centre of ownership gravity for Italian capitalism.
3.1.2 Bastogi: balancing public and private equilibria
When the repercussions of the 1929 crisis reached the Italian economy in the summer
of 1930, banks ran into a deep liquidity crisis. Due to the distinct bank-industry
concentration, COMIT and CREDIT were first of all substantially exposed to long-
term industrial projects for those sectors most heavily hit by the slowdown. Second,
their assets were illiquid, as mainly made of industrial equities the share prices of
which were declining dramatically. Third, bank deposits were growing at a lower
rate compared to previous periods. Finally, these banks were borrowing abroad and
the lines of credit were interrupted in the 1930 (Ciocca and Toniolo, 1984, 130). In
this situation, the Fascist dictatorship opted for a radical solution which replaced
universal banking with a system of public credit.
The opportunity for a radical transformation of the country’s financial system
was put forward by the managerial milieu which had flourished under the leader-
ship of the Socialist reformist Francesco Saverio Nitti since the crisis of 1907. The
ideas of his prote´ge´ Alberto Beneduce – together with those of other managers such
as Bonaldo Stringher and Donato Menichella – concerned the creation of so-called
special credit institutes (SCIs) as entities of state-led development. Separated from
the ordinary public administration, these public institutes were to be directed by
quasi-independent technocrats. At that time, the main SCIs were Consorzio di Cred-
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ito per le Opere Pubbliche (CREDIOP, 1919), Istituto di Credito per le Imprese di
Pubblica Utilita` (ICIPU, 1924), Istituto per il Credito Navale (1928) and, after the
crisis, the well-known Istituto Mobiliare Italiano (IMI, 1934). But, as it is shown
later, their number and importance increased dramatically after World War II. SCIs
were financed by Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (Cassa DP) as well as other public agen-
cies such as the Istituto Nazionale Assicurazioni (INA) and Cassa Nazionale per le
Assicurazioni Sociali (successively known as Istituto Nazionale Previdenza Sociale,
Inps). During the 1920s, these institutes were involved in financing railroads, elec-
tricity and land reclamation (Barca, 2001; Cianci, 1977; De Cecco, 2001; Mortara,
1984).
Under the advice of this state-managerial apparatus, the Fascist dictatorship
intervened in 1931 to solve the liquidity crisis through two agreements with CREDIT
and COMIT. Banks had to sell their industrial portfolios to two holding companies
(Sofindit and SFI), which were both controlled by the Ministry of Finance and the
Bank of Italy.102 CREDIT and COMIT – as well as Banco di Roma (the country’s
third universal bank) – were o cially prohibited to allocate long-term industrial
credit and were transformed into commercial banks. However, once these agreements
were signed, two problems still remained. On the one hand, the Bank of Italy held
a large quantity of illiquid assets. On the other hand, fundamental sectors of the
Italian industrial apparatus were cut o↵ from their lines of credit overnight. At this
point, the solution came in the form of a further interventionist strategy which led to
the creation of Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) in the early 1933. This
government-owned holding first received from Sofindit and SFI all the industrial
portfolios, and then issued long-term bonds with a fixed interest and equivalent to
Treasury bonds (Ciocca and Toniolo, 1984, 132-133).
In so doing, the state assumed control of the companies previously financed by
the main universal banks, namely a large portion of the national industry: over 21%
of all the equity capital of Italian joint-stock companies; 100% of shipbuilding and
80% of maritime shipping; 80% of locomotive manufacturing; 40% of the civilian
steel industry; 30% of electricity production; respectively 20% and 13% of the rayon
and cotton outputs. Moreover, IRI owned several mechanical engineering firms and
real estate holdings. It controlled the largest banks (former universal banks) and
102In the meantime, Bank of Italy had become the only note-issuing institute since 1926 (Zamagni,
1993, 295-297).
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a substantial part of the telephone service (Barca and Trento, 1997, 547). Initially
conceived as a temporary solution, IRI was eventually transformed into a permanent
entity in May 1937. This was due to the dictatorship’s intention to use IRI as a
structure for industrial policy as well the inability to attract enough private capital
to re-privatise the firms owned by the state holding (Cianci, 1977).
It is important to note that the so-called ‘IRI formula’ implied that IRI was a
public holding by law and, for this reason, it followed objectives of public interest
under political guidance. However, and this was a peculiar feature of the Italian
system of public enterprise, IRI controlled joint-stock companies that were open
to private shareholders and market-competition rules. In other words, the system
was based on a very delicate balance between political advice and managerial au-
tonomy, an aspect which reflected the philosophy of the Nittian technocrats. As
it is shown later, political parties undermined this balance of power from the late
1950s onwards, when they began to develop mutual relations of financial support
and political tutelage with public managers (Bianchi, 1987, 269, 277).
Thus, the state became the most important actor in the ownership structure of
Italian capitalism. It is in this context that Bastogi assumed the fundamental role of
a meeting place where to cultivate the equilibria between private and public owner-
ship. The Societa` per le Strade Ferrate Meridionali – commonly known as Bastogi by
the name of its founder Pietro Bastogi – had made a profitable use of the generous
compensations obtained by the state after the 1905 railway nationalisation. After
being involved in the Southern railway development, Bastogi transformed itself into
a financial holding.103 In the 1920s, under the influence of its major shareholder
COMIT, Bastogi directed funds primarily towards the electrical companies. In so
doing, it became crucial to the control of this strategic sector. After the bailout
of the universal banks and their dismantling in 1931, IRI returned Bastogi to the
former shareholders. This move was crucial in granting the financial holding the role
of coordinator in the cross-ownership equilibria of Italian capitalism as a whole. In
particular, Bastogi’s syndicate was formed by: the traditional oligarchies such as
Agnelli, Pirelli, Orlando; the state holding IRI of which president Beneduce had
already become the chairman of Bastogi since 1926; finally, the Istituto per le Opere
Religiose (IOR or, more commonly, the Vatican bank) also participated in the syn-
103About the history of Bastogi, see Piluso (1991, 1992).
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dicate (Segreto, 1997, 652). In sum, Bastogi represented the first episode of what
authoritative journalists later labelled as the salotto buono of Italian capitalism –
referring to the case of Mediobanca (see next section). Up to the present time, this
term indicated an exclusive clutch of business and political echelons whose pur-
pose was to manage tacitly the existing ownership equilibria through shareholding
alliances (Economist, 2010).
The two dimensions of Italian capitalism – public and private – co-existed through
a division of roles in di↵erent industries and services. In this regard, the state ac-
commodated the interests of existing private oligarchies. However, the ‘public hand’
obtained full control over the organisation of finance, a power that was sanctioned
by the 1936 law on banking.104 Here, two intertwined aspects were important. First,
the Bank of Italy was endowed with a wider role in the management of monetary
policy. Second, once universal banks were transformed into ordinary banks, the lat-
ter were also prohibited from holding equities. In so doing, the allocation of credit
was segmented into two dimensions, long-term special credit and short-term ordi-
nary credit. Banks were allowed to provide ordinary credit, whilst SCIs were put in
charge of allocating medium and long-term funds (Ciocca and Toniolo, 1984, 134).
As it is shown later, the expansion of SCIs marginalised the stock market as a source
of business investment and corporate control, at least until the 1980s.
3.1.3 From Bastogi to Mediobanca
To recapitulate, this section has thus far explored the formation of those early
practices which the political and business establishment adopted in order to limit
the separation of ownership and control in Italian capitalism. After the decline of
COMIT and CREDIT as a result of the 1929 crisis, the financial holding Bastogi
assumed particular significance due to its role as a centre of gravity between the
interests of private oligarchs and a new powerful actor: the public enterprise. The
two dimensions demonstrated a certain degree of peaceful coexistence, although
the state gained full control of finance. This final subsection examines how Bastogi
positioned itself within the strategies of ownership and control during the early
104My translation of what the Italian literature often defines as legge bancaria 1936. It refers to
the legislative process that began with the royal decree no. 375, March 12, 1936 and the royal
decree no. 1400, July 17, 1937. These two decrees were then converted into law no. 141, March 7,
1938 and law no. 636, April 7, 1938. See Galanti (2008, 55).
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post-war years. Furthermore, the analysis looks at the inadequacy of Bastogi in
equilibrating the dramatic expansion of the public enterprise after the nationalisation
of the electrical industry in 1962. This episode represented a turning point that
determined the transition from Bastogi to Mediobanca as the new gravitational
pole for the ownership structures of Italian capitalism.
The end of World War II marked the beginning of an intense process of moderni-
sation that transformed Italy into a manufacture-exporting economy. In 1947, under
the auspices of the Truman doctrine, the party Christian Democracy (Democrazia
Cristiana, DC) secured the domestic political arena vis-a`-vis the Communist Party
(Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI). DC formed a dominant bloc together with lib-
eral technocrats, whose economic ideas were instrumental in guaranteeing wage
moderation and establishing an export-led strategy within the Western geopoliti-
cal context. The country’s export specialisation shifted towards modern industries
(vehicles, chemicals, metallurgy, mechanical engineering) and the low-wage regime
made possible to gain competitive quotas for such products. This political-economic
design generated sustained economic growth, price stability and an external-balance
equilibrium over the period 1952-1963. However, it produced also profound distor-
tions such as the ‘dualistic’ structure of the economy, mass emigration from the
Southern regions, uncontrolled urbanisation and a dramatic lack of social services.
These problems eventually erupted in a scenario of intense unrest which reached its
peak during the 1970s (Allen and Stevenson, 1974; De Cecco, 1979; Graziani, 1979;
Kindleberger, 1967).
The public-private structure – as established under the Fascist dictatorship –
was part and parcel of these post-war developments. In fact, during the years of
reconstruction (1945-1950), DC left the system of state-owned enterprise and public
credit mainly unchanged. The issue of continuity and change with the economic in-
stitutions of Fascism was debated at the 1946 constituent assembly. But, in the end,
political forces decided in favour of the strengthening of the state-owned sector as a
vehicle of employment and welfare. The IRI formula was re-confirmed as an impor-
tant balance between autonomous public managers and political parties (Bianchi,
1987, 275-276). What is more, the constituent assembly considered the adoption of
a new stock-market regulation (Morelli and Pace, 1984; Bagella, 2006, 55-61). But,
the debate ended up focusing on mere incentives in the form of tax reduction on
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Type 1936 1950 1960 1970 1975
Industrial credit 6 17 30 32 32
Mortgage credit 12 13 15 21 21
Public infrastructure - 1 9 13 19
Agricultural credit 10 10 13 13 13
Total 28 41 67 79 85
Table 3.1: Evolution of SCIs, number of institutes at the end of each year, 1936-1975.
Source: adapted from Pontolillo (1978, 288).
equity holding. There was instead no concrete reforms concerning the commercial
code, antitrust law and market transparency. Eventually, in spite of a short-lived
growth of the stock market in the early 1950s, the possibility to consolidate its im-
portance in the domestic economy soon vanished under the influence of an adverse
political and cultural climate (Barbiellini Amidei and Impenna, 1999).
In a context where the predominance of loans over equity was never concretely
questioned, the legal separation between ordinary and industrial credit legitimised
the expansion of SCIs even outside the system of public ownership. To illustrate this
last aspect, table 3.1 shows the evolution of these institutes in numerical terms and
by category. In 1936, there were 28 institutes mainly involved in mortgage credit
and agriculture. The number jumped to 67 in 1960, and 85 in the mid-1970s. As it
is clear, the major developments occurred in the allocation of both industrial and
mortgage credits, in line with the transformation of the country’s economic struc-
ture. Throughout the post-war decades, SCIs consolidated into a threefold structure
(Zamagni, 2008; Piluso, 1999). First, the institutes created by Beneduce before the
1936 law on banking (CREDIOP, ICIPU, and IMI) were related to government poli-
cies. Accordingly, public ownership (Treasury, Cassa DP, social security institutes)
prevailed. Second, new institutes such as Mediobanca, Efibanca, Centrobanca and
Interbanca were involved in allocating credit to medium and large-scale companies.
Third, the regional network of Mediocredito, as well as those institutes specific to
the Southern development – such as Istituto per lo Sviluppo Economico dell’Italia
Meridionale (ISVEIMER), Istituto Regionale per il Finanziamento alle Industrie in
Sicilia (IRFIS), and Credito Industriale Sardo (CIS) – were close to the necessities
of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).105
105The vicissitudes around the constitution of Mediobanca are described by Asso and Raitano
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The continuity in the system of public enterprise and finance was accordingly
visible in the highly concentrated structure of ownership and control in private
companies. As Fabrizio Barca (2001, 43-45) pointed out, the decisions to legitimise
the status quo ante concerning the ownership arrangements of private business was
due to three interrelated reasons. First, the regime of low wages – together with its
practically unregulated labour market and the vast reserve of unemployed workforce
(Cella, 1989; Reyneri, 1989) – di↵used the perception that margins of profit were
going to be substantial. This reduced the necessity to turn to external investors,
as investments were in large part self-financed. Second, many believed that Italian
savers were traditionally disinterested in equity wealth, often considered obscure
and fraught with dangers. In the light of this public scepticism, it was di cult to
transform the stock market into a transparent institution of industrial credit and
monitoring. Finally, the Nittian managers – who, in the meantime, were cleared
of their previous loyalty to the dictatorship – firmly opposed the idea of leaving
entrepreneurs exposed to the vagaries of the stock market.
Thus, in the early 1950s, Italian capitalism appeared as one of ‘limited su↵rage’
(Amatori and Brioschi, 2001, 119). Its traits of ‘mixed economy’ revealed a peculiar
liaison between private and public in which both dimensions were similarly insulated
from the dispersion of ownership and transparent control structures. Whilst the
system of public enterprise was controlled by the state, each private company was in
the hands of one family – except for Montecatini which was nonetheless controlled
by few blockholders. The core of private business was the electricity sector and
its leading company Edison. Another important actor in the sector was SADE, the
interests of which expanded in textiles, real estate, hotels and tourism. Two financial
holding played a fundamental role in the electricity industry: the already mentioned
Bastogi and La Centrale – which was controlled by the Pirelli and Orlando families.
Not far from the centre of private capitalism were three other companies: FIAT,
Montecatini and Pirelli. The Turin-based car manufacturer was controlled by the
Agnelli family and held the leading position in the sector. Montecatini was instead
involved in the chemical industry. Initially founded as a mining company in 1866,
(1999) and one of the rare speeches given by Cuccia (1986) in memory of Mattioli. About Cen-
trobanca, see again Asso and Raitano (1999). About the events which led to the transformation
of EFI into Efibanca, see Bagella (1999). About the system of Mediocredito, see Pelu↵o (1997).
About ISVEIMER, see Croce (1999).
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it was transformed into a chemical empire during the interwar period. Finally, for
what concerns Pirelli, its core activities were the production of tyres and cables for
telecommunications and energy (Amatori and Brioschi, 2001, 119-120).
The architectures of ownership in the private industry were so complex that
they secured control even when the ownership quotas of blockholders decreased as
a result of business expansion. Two mechanisms were indispensable for such condi-
tion to be achieved. The first one was the pyramidal group, in which two or more
companies were legally separated but controlled by a holding through ownership
chains. For instance, at the top of the pyramid sat the family-owned holding, whilst
all the other companies had a mere subsidiary role. Of course, the voting rights
of minority shareholders were dispersed over a large number of these subsidiary
firms. The blockholders’ shares were instead concentrated in the holding at the top
of the pyramid. Second, besides these pyramidal constructions, cross-shareholding
alliances were cultivated to further secure a narrow separation of ownership and
control. Such coalitions linked blockholders into structures of mutual dependence.
In addition to these two mechanisms, several other artifices were adopted such as:
including insurance companies as part of the pyramidal group in order to inject
liquidity whenever it was needed; proxy votes with no obligations by the proxies
to the principals; or the possibility for the management to refuse new shareholders
as a protective measure against takeovers. Of course, the ine cient stock exchange
and the absence of a transparent corporate governance regime completely sealed the
power of blockholders over minority shareholders (Barca, 2001, 44-46).
The Bastogi mode of control worked well in calibrating such private-public equi-
libria during the 1950s, but several di culties became visible. First, IRI withdrew
from the controlling syndicate in 1954, a role which was replaced by the Governor
of the Central Bank Menichella as arbitrator of shareholding pool agreements. A
block syndicate was formed in which Italcementi, IOR, and Assicurazioni Generali
prevailed over the historical group formed by Edison, Montecatini, Pirelli, FIAT
and Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta` (RAS). As a consequence, Bastogi came to rep-
resent the interests of one specific private group and gradually lost the legitimacy
as the neutral arbiter of Italian capitalism (Segreto, 2008, 801). Second, and more
importantly, the di culties of Bastogi also stemmed from the inability to provide
defensive strategies for private capital in the face of a dramatic expansion of the
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public enterprise (Piluso, 1992, 386-391). This aspect merits some further clarifica-
tion in order to understand the historical forces behind the decline of Bastogi and
the emergence of Mediobanca.
In the mid-1950s, the balance of power within Christian Democracy shifted in
favour of the social-Catholic faction. These actors began to elaborate a plan for the
development of modern welfare institutions and the formation of a broad middle
class in support of their elite power (Bianchi, 1987, 276). This plan implied a com-
prehensive rationalisation of the economy as well as a thorough reconsideration of
state intervention. The latter was to be put under a more strict form of political
control. In this regard, two dimensions were crucial. First, the system of public en-
terprise and SCIs such as IMI, ICIPU and CREDIOP were to be brought under the
authority of political parties and away from the managers. Second, the rate of pro-
ductivity had to replace the centrality of profit as an indicator of economic success
(Barca, 2001, 84-87). These ideas soon attracted the attention of the Socialist Party
(Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI), the programme of which converged with Christian
Democrats on the experiment of economic planning. This project came into being
when the first DC-PSI government was formed in 1963 (Ru↵olo, 1973).
The growing influence of the social-Catholic faction within DC – and their grad-
ual convergence with the Socialist platform – led to the establishment of the Min-
istry of State Shareholdings in 1956. This Ministry reorganised the system of state
holdings that, besides IRI, now included also the following conglomerates: Ente
Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), established in 1953 and involved in oil and gas pro-
duction; the Ente Gestione Attivita` Minerarie (Egam), Ente Autonomo di Gestione
per il Cinema (Eacg), and the Ente Autonomo di Gestione delle Aziende Termali
(Eagat), which were all created in 1958 and respectively involved in mining, cinema,
and thermal baths; finally, Ente per il Finanziamento dell’Industria Manifatturiera
(Efim), founded in 1962 and involved in machinery, glass and aluminum industries
(Toninelli, 2004, 59).106 Furthermore, the Ministry of State Shareholdings advanced
a far-reaching plan for the industrialisation of the Mezzogiorno (Graziani et al.,
1973). State-owned companies were obliged to localise 60% of their new investments,
as well as at least 40% of their total investments, in the Southern regions.107 As a
106About the system of state shareholding in Italy, see Amatori (2000).
107Cf. law no. 634, July 29, 1957. Unless otherwise referenced, this and all the following Italian
laws and decree laws (enacted in the period 1945-2012) were consulted through the institutional
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result, industrial investments in the South reached a level of 25% of the national
whole in the period 1958-1963. In the meantime, the network of Autostrade – the
state-owned company for highways – expanded in proportion with the motorisation
of Italian society. In a word, public investments substantially influenced the national
economic cycle (Bruno, 1995).
However, it was the nationalisation of the electricity sector – with the creation
of the Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica (ENEL) in December 1962 – that repre-
sented the most important political-economic move of the DC-PSI alliance. Initially
conceived by Nitti at the beginning of the century, the project became a central
aim of the Socialists since 1955 (Scalfari et al., 1960). Intense negotiations began
in 1962 and focused on the modalities of compensations, particularly whether these
were to be given to the shareholders as the ultimate owners or the companies’ oli-
garchs. Considering the intentions of decreasing the political influence of the baroni
elettrici, the logical solution would have been to indemnify the shareholders. The
latter was the position advanced by Socialists, the social-Catholic faction and the
Communist Party. However, the Governor of the Bank of Italy Guido Carli – who
replaced Menichella in 1960 – advocated the opposite solution. He argued in favour
of giving companies’ managers the possibility to open a new course for the Italian
industry (Carli, 1993, 296). In fact, according to the Governor, the balance of power
between public and private was such that it was necessary to be more attentive to
the interests of private capital. In the end, this was the agreement reached. But,
later on, this path came to be gravid of managerial incompetencies as the very same
Carli (1976) admitted in a famous interview.
The establishment of ENEL considerably increased the weight of the state en-
terprise. Together with ENI, the entire energy sector was now brought under state
control. In this context, DC put forward its idea of creating a modern middle-class
nation through an intense process of industrial transformation. However, this ambi-
tious project had a fundamental consequence: it subverted the core principles of the
IRI formula. As Patrizio Bianchi (1987, 277, my italic) pointed out:
[...] the reinforcement of the public company system became the instru-
ment of the establishment to demonstrate the centrality of the DC inside
the Italian political system. But this reinforcement also became the way
database http://www.normattiva.it/ [accessed on December 30, 2012].
128
to emphasise a new politics – business connection between politicians and
public managers which upset the institutional balance of powers which
had characterised the ‘IRI-formula’ [...] Public managers started to sup-
port political groups essentially within the DC, and these groups started
to o↵er protection to public managers. The main result was to create a
vicious circle for the mutual promotion of the interests of politicians and
public managers. The political struggle was accentuated by the aim of
controlling public firms and, therefore, of providing political groups with
the means of self-reproduction.
From this moment onwards, the Italian political-economic scenario became marked
by two intense forces – public and private capitalism – with their respective logics
and points of friction. On the one hand, governing political parties were concerned
with controlling and driving the expansion of public enterprise as a way to guarantee
their ‘self-reproduction’. In so doing, the dynamics of so-called partitocrazia came
into being, a condition in which the ruling parties, DC and PSI, eliminated any
possibility for alternation in power and consolidated their clout over the state and
society at large (Pasquino, 1995b). They politicised appointments in nearly every
public institution – from banks to hospital, via schools and post o ces – through
widespread networks of patronage and factional loyalty (Ginsborg, 2001, 139-142).108
On the other hand, private oligarchs necessitated of adequate solutions to protect
their ownership structures against the expansion of the state-owned apparatus.
In this context, it was clear that Bastogi was unable to mediate the latest syn-
ergies between public and private. Hence, Mediobanca arose to the status of new
gravitational centre for the management of ownership equilibria.
108DC was a heterogeneous party – organised in di↵erent factions (or correnti) – with strong
consensus amongst the petty bourgeoisie. This aspect opened up many possibilities to establish
relations of patronage, that is the ability to control o ce appointments or the entitlement to
any sort of privilege. In fact, the petty bourgeoisie – e.g. smallholders, shopkeepers, independent
professionals, public white-collar employees, small entrepreneurs – is particularly dependent on
forms of assistance such as subsidies, protective legislation and tax exemptions. Of course, besides
the petty bourgeoisie, DC had also a large support base amongst blue-collar workers and other
lower-class fractions, whose members (especially in the Southern regions) were granted disability
pensions in spite of not being entitled to them. For what concerns PSI, this party aimed at becoming
an inter-class entity like DC, especially once Bettino Craxi became the leader (1976). Since its
electorate was less stable, PSI relied more than DC on using the state resources to attract consensus.
It is well known how their methods of patronage were very ruthless. For instance, they demanded
higher kickbacks and a wider Socialist representation in key positions of the state-owned sector.
See Amyot (2004, 96-105).
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3.2 Counteracting the expansion of the public en-
terprise
Thus far, this chapter has examined the origins and evolution of the highly concen-
trated structure of ownership and control in Italian capitalism. It has first looked
at the period from the late nineteenth century until the emergence of the public en-
terprise in the 1930s. During these decades, universal banks led the process of early
industrialisation and weaved cross-shareholding alliances. However, these banks ex-
perienced a dramatic liquidity crisis in 1930. At this point, the Fascist dictatorship
intervened by dismantling the system of universal banking, by gaining control of
the companies which the banks had previously owned and, finally, by positioning
SCIs in charge of allocating long-term credit. In this context, as the state emerged
as a new powerful economic actor, the financial holding Bastogi assumed the role
of arbiter in the coordination of the public-private equilibria. Yet, the dramatic ex-
pansion of the state-owned sector overturned the balance of power in favour of state
capitalism from the late 1950s onwards. As a result, Bastogi became inadequate as
the guarantor of the political-economic equilibria. For this reason, the present sec-
tion looks at the emergence of Mediobanca and how this actor evolved to become
the new salotto buono of Italian capitalism. Mediobanca was unique in serving the
necessities of private corporate echelons whilst mediating their interaction with the
expanding public enterprise. The first part of the section examines the period from
the creation of Mediobanca in 1946 to the late 1970s. The second part focuses the
attention on the strategies of Mediobanca during the 1980s, a period of stock-market
boom as well as decline of the public enterprise.
3.2.1 Mediobanca in the 1960s and 1970s
If IMI, CREDIOP and ICIPU were the largest special credit institutes in terms
of volume of credit allocated (table 3.2), Mediobanca was instead the custodian of
ownership structures for the big private business (Lombardo and Zamagni, 2009).
Compared to IMI, which was subject to public law, Mediobanca was a joint-stock
company listed on the Milan stock exchange since 1956. Up until the reforms of the
1990s, the institute was the only e↵ective investment bank in the Italian scenario
(De Cecco and Ferri, 1996). Ra↵aele Mattioli and Enrico Cuccia – respectively,
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Institute % credit
IMI 28.6
CREDIOP 16.8
ICIPU 12.8
Mediobanca 10.6
Mediocrediti 8.3
ISVEIMER 5.3
Efibanca 4.1
Interbanca 3.4
Sezz. public banks 3.2
CIS 2.8
Centrobanca 1.4
IRFIS 1.6
others 1.9
Total 100.0
Table 3.2: Percentage volume of credit allocated by SCIs involved in industrial
financing, 1975.
Source: adapted from Bisoni (1979, 15).
president of COMIT and former manager of IRI and Bank of Italy – established
Mediobanca in September 1946. Mattioli and Cuccia aimed at creating a SCI that
could act as an investment bank for large private companies in spite of being con-
trolled by the state. The Bank of Italy and IMI were initially opposed to the creation
of Mediobanca. But, Mattioli and Cuccia eventually prevailed with the financial sup-
port of two other partners, CREDIT and Banco di Roma (Asso and Raitano, 1999;
Cuccia, 1986). In other words, Mediobanca’s capital came from the very same former
universal banks which, after the post-1929 bailout, were now under control of the
state holding IRI as the majority shareholder.
During its first years, Mediobanca provided financial support to big companies
mainly in the form of debt securities. The institute used the branches of COMIT,
CREDIT and Banco di Roma in order to undertake its activities. In this period,
although with increasing di culties, Bastogi was still the mediating centre of na-
tional capitalism. However, as of its initial public o↵ering (IPO) in 1956, Mediobanca
moved away from the influence of the state-controlled banks by opening up to pri-
vate shareholders (Segreto, 2008, 799-800, 802). In detail, the institute established a
corporate governance design in 1958 – which was not o cially revealed to IRI (the
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majority shareholder of state-owned banks) until 1983 – that guaranteed a parity
condition between the representatives of public banks and those of private capital.
This occurred in spite of the fact that the former held three times more assets than
the latter (Battilossi, 1991, 646-647). The important aspect of this apparently con-
tradictory governance is that it allowed Mediobanca to balance the two dimensions
of public and private capitalism, guaranteeing certain margins of autonomy from
politics.
In the mid-1960s, the scenario was finally ready for Mediobanca to play a major
role in Italian business. As shown before, the state enterprise expanded dramatically
as a result of the nationalisation of the electricity sector. Against this, Mediobanca
led the merger between Montecatini (chemicals) and Edison (former leading elec-
trical company). In so doing, Montedison was formed in 1966.109 Soon after the
merger operation, the mismanagement of the company led the state-owned ENI and
IRI – through the financial holding Sogam – to buy up shares of the company. The
process was followed by Mediobanca which obtained a decisive 2% participation in
the block syndicate where public and private capitals had 49%. The creation of
Montecatini-Edison and its future vicissitudes until the 1990s had Mediobanca as
the main protagonist. This operation emphasised two aspects of Mediobanca. First,
the institute announced its role of financial engineer for large private companies vis-
a`-vis the growth of the public enterprise. Second, Mediobanca’s investment banking
expertise was unique to the extent that it provided funding strategies for private
business whilst guaranteeing continuity in the oligarchic ownership structures (Seg-
reto, 1997, 653-655).
In the same years, Mediobanca participated also in a syndicate – together with
FIAT, Pirelli, IMI and La Centrale – to solve the crisis of Olivetti, the company
which produced Italy’s first computer in 1959. The bail-out of Olivetti revealed an
aspect which became a major feature of Mediobanca, that is: the scarce interest in
the technological and innovative aspects of the companies financed by the institute.
In fact, Mediobanca was strictly concerned with keeping firms in good financial
conditions, by manoeuvring the ownership structures within the perimeters of the
private oligarchies (Segreto, 2008, 805). In the light of this, the information tech-
nology division of Olivetti was indeed sold to General Electric. The decision soon
109The company was initially known as Montecatini-Edison. It was renamed Montedison in 1969
(Marchi and Marchionatti, 1991).
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turned into a missed opportunity in the computer revolution (Soria, 1979).
During the 1970s, Mediobanca showed more than ever its ability to secure the
ownership assets of private capital in a scenario of global recession. The operation
that consolidated the important status acquired by Mediobanca came with the crisis
of FIAT, a situation which Cuccia solved in 1976 through the inflow of new capital
in the company. Deutsche Bank joined the syndicate together with the controversial
entry of Lafico, the financial holding of Colonel Gaddafi. This move was mediated
by Lazard Fre`res and Giovanni Agnelli who won the perplexity of Washington. The
operation re-modelled the ownership structure of FIAT, guaranteeing the power of
the Agnelli family over the company (Segreto, 2008, 808-809).
Whilst Mediobanca successfully solved the crisis of FIAT, the state-owned ap-
paratus found itself in extreme di culties. As previously shown, the DC-PSI al-
liance advanced a plan to industrialise specific areas of the Mezzogiorno through
the delocalisation of state-owned companies such as iron and steel, chemicals and
petrochemicals. IMI and other public SCIs became heavily exposed to these sectors
due to their primary role in the allocation of so-called credito agevolato (Zamagni,
2010), a type of subsidised credit that the heavy industry used for its operations
in the Southern regions (Marzano, 1979). Both Christian Democrats and Socialists
upheld these flows of ‘easy money’ as part and parcel of their political-economic
strategies. In fact, politicians and public managers were connected through linkages
of financial support and political protection (Bianchi, 1987). In so doing, at the
turn of the 1970s, the relationship between IMI and the system of public enterprise
was tightly secured under governmental control. Credit was allocated even in the
face of low margins of profits, therefore creating an artificial propensity to invest in
the heavy industry despite its critical condition (Canovi, 1986). During the 1970s,
authorities attempted to counteract the problem but their measures were belated
and ine↵ective. Quite remarkably, the Bank of Italy forced ordinary banks to buy
up bonds from SCIs up to 75% of the overall debt issuance. This decision de facto
abolished the 1936 law on banking (Pontolillo, 1980).
Thus, Italian capitalism approached the 1980s in a condition largely unchanged
for what concerns the system of ownership and control. To be sure, di↵erent strate-
gies were adapted to the various historical circumstances, but the final result was
the reproduction of private oligarchic structures as well as the critical over-extension
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of state ownership. In this context, Mediobanca played the delicate role of providing
strategies that limited the separation of ownership and control for private compa-
nies, whilst also mediating the overall public-private equilibria of the Italian political
economy as a whole. As shown below, the dynamics of both public and private capi-
talism assumed new complexities during the 1980s. On the one hand, private capital
developed collusive mechanisms to limit the separation of ownership and control in
spite of opening up to the stock market. In this regard, the role of Mediobanca was
crucial in introducing private oligarchs to the world of equity finance. On the other
hand, the system of public enterprise began instead its gradual and final decline.
The events concerning the state-owned enterprise were marked by the objection of
the Socialists to the restructuring and downsizing undertaken by the top manage-
ment of IRI. Amidst these events, Mediobanca launched a plan to privatise its own
shareholding syndicate in order to decrease public influence on its activities.
3.2.2 The stock-market boom and the fall of the public en-
terprise
In the early 1980s, after comprehensive strategies of industrial and financial restruc-
turing, companies turned towards the stock market.110 As previously shown, the
Borsa did not represent a central dimension of the Italian economy during the post-
war period. However, the crisis of the 1970s had considerably a↵ected the capacity
of large business to rely on self-funding. What is more, SCIs had become a preroga-
tive of the state-owned sector in its contradictory expansion. Finally, the possibility
of taking out loans with commercial banks on a short-term basis – as allowed by
the 1936 law on banking – was in many respect an ine cient solution. In these
circumstances, equity finance became an attractive opportunity, especially after the
introduction of mutual funds in 1983 (Amatori and Colli, 2001, 12-14, 32-33).111
As a result, the stock-market index grew from 1694.55 in 1983 to 6767.79 in 1989,
with a peak of 7552.86 recorded in 1986. Between 1984 and 1985, the index showed
a percentage variation of 94%. Listed companies increased from 140 in 1981 to 223
at the end of the decade (Aleotti, 1990, 228-229). However, this financial expansion
110Throughout the 1970s, large companies cut down labour force, undertook productive decen-
tralisation and improved their technology (Graziani, 1998).
111About the introduction of mutual funds in Italy, see Turani (1991).
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was not a sign of concrete transformation in the traditional strategies of ownership
concentration. Quite the opposite, the growing importance of the stock market in the
1980s was the result of the long-established practice of pyramid-building through
which major groups increased the number of related spin-o↵s listed on the stock
exchange (Deeg, 2005b, 528). These pyramidal structures were reinforced in their
controlling function by a corporate governance legislation inattentive to the neces-
sities of minority shareholders, as well as a system of cross-shareholding alliances
and interlocking directorates that diminished the possibilities for hostile takeovers
(Brioschi, Buzzacchi and Colombo, 1990).
In sum, the end result was that the growth in equity finance merely reinforced
the traditional parameters of business control. The same few groups accounted for
virtually the whole market capitalisation. For example, in 1987 the Agnelli empire
accounted for over 20% of market capitalisation, followed by the government-owned
holding IRI (16.8%), Generali (15.3%), Ferruzzi (11.8%) and CIR Group (7.2%)
(Amatori and Brioschi, 2001, 142-143). In the early 1990s, Bank of Italy conducted
an in-depth research concerning the structure of ownership and control in the Ital-
ian business (Barca et al., 1994; Capra et al., 1994). Comparative analyses were also
undertaken for several other European countries (Barca and Becht, 2001). These
studies confirmed that corporate ownership and control was extremely concentrated
in the hands of families, coalitions, the state and other non-financial companies
through cross-shareholding alliances. In di↵erence to other countries, both institu-
tional investors and private banks held no substantial stake in corporate ownership
(Bianchi, Bianco and Enriques, 2001, 155-156). To illustrate the peculiarity of the
Italian case, figure 3.1 shows the complex structure of the Agnelli empire (FIAT) in
1996. As it is clear, Agnelli controlled an empire of twenty-eight companies through
the financial holding IFI. Fifteen of the twenty-eight companies were listed on the
stock market.
Mediobanca played a fundamental role in the ownership strategies of Italian
capitalism during the 1980s. The institute directed the IPOs of 23 amongst the 98
companies which were newly listed in the period 1981-1993, as well as the 30% of
share capital increases in companies that were already listed (De Cecco and Ferri,
1996, 109-119). What is more, Mediobanca increased the stability of the private
oligarchies by favouring voting syndicates to secure mutual protection (Amatori and
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Colli, 2001, 20-21). However, the most significant operation directed by Mediobanca
at the interstice between private and public capitalism was another episode of the
Montedison saga.
As already seen, the chemical industry was heavily hit by the 1970s crisis, an
aspect which led the state-owned holding IRI and ENI to leave the shareholding
syndicate of Montedison in 1981. As a result, Montedison was now in the hands of
private shareholders. In this situation, Mediobanca organised a syndicate – under
the control of the financial holding Gemina – where the interests of oligarchs such as
Agnelli, Pesenti, Pirelli, Orlando and Bonomi converged and secured Montedison’s
assets. What is more, Cuccia promoted the manager Mario Schimberni as the com-
pany’s chief executive o cer. However, Schimberni aimed at acquiring margins of
autonomy from the blockholders by turning Montedison into the ideal public com-
pany with over hundred thousand minority shareholders. Of course, the objectives
of Schimberni represented an anomaly in a country where oligarchs and the state
controlled the large corporate world. In fact, his ambitions came to a halt when the
Ferruzzi group – a new actor involved in the agro-industry – became the majority
shareholder of Montedison in 1987.112 Once Ferruzzi – under the leadership of its
chief executive Raul Gardini – obtained control over Montedison, it advanced a far-
reaching plan for the establishment of a public-private joint-venture in the chemical
sector. This led to the creation of Enimont in 1988 in which the state-owned ENI
and Montedison held 40% each. In so doing, an alliance between private and public
– which could have strengthened the global competitiveness of the Italian chemicals
in several product lines – came into being. But, conflicts between the two parts soon
led to a stalemate and eventually ended the Enimont project. The Ferruzzi Group
left Montedison and Mediobanca drew a recovery plan for the severely indebted
company (Segreto, 1998, 463-464).
During the 1980s, besides its role in the stock-market boom and the events
concerning Montedison, Mediobanca designed also a project to privatise its own
ownership structure in order to reduce public influence over the institute. The plan
faced the opposition of many political forces and, above all, the management of IRI.
In fact, the state holding owned the three public banks – COMIT, CREDIT, Banco
di Roma – of which share ownership in Mediobanca was supposed to be decreased
112For a chronicle of those days’ events concerning Montedison and Schimberni, see Suro (1987).
About the rise and fall of the Ferruzzi family, see Bonanno and Constance (2008, chapter 3).
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in favour of private actors (Segreto, 2008, 813-814). The privatisation was finalised
in 1988 and implied an ownership syndicate of roughly 25% each between public
and private actors. The remaining half of Mediobanca shares floated on the market
(Brioschi, Buzzacchi and Colombo, 1990, 190).
For what concerns the system of public enterprise, the latter had functioned as a
‘social bu↵er’ against the employment di culties of the 1970s (Bianchi, 1987, 279).
As a result, its economic and financial situation worsened dramatically. At the same
time, the system became exposed to political pressures with increasing corruption
and illegal practices penetrating its internal mechanisms (Toninelli, 2004, 60). At
the turn of the 1980s, the Ministry of State Shareholdings stated in its report that:
[...] the system of public shareholdings, that is, the main instrument of
industrial policy organised in our country, has become terribly costly in
terms of collective resources absorbed, while the results are worsening
day by day [...] If there is a clear will to reshape the Public Shareholding
system a better managerial skill is necessarily associated with a govern-
ment behaviour which must be more respectful towards the promises
made when the public enterprise system was asked to play a precise role.
(cited in Bianchi 1987, 281, 282)
Premised on these considerations, IRI underwent a decade-long process of restructur-
ing and downsizing under the leadership of Romano Prodi, a professor of economics
who was appointed as President of the public holding in 1982.113 In particular, IRI
sold the car-manufacturer Alfa Romeo to FIAT in 1986 (Saulino, 1986) and Fin-
sider was liquidated in 1988 (Borriello, 1988). The management also attempted to
sell SME (food processing) to the CIR Group in 1985. But, the sale was eventually
blocked and became a controversial case of corruption (Economist, 2003). Finally,
minority share packages of IRI’s biggest companies were also listed on the stock
exchange (Bianchi, 1987, 283).
The crucial aspect to highlight with regard to the system of public enterprise
during these years is the struggle between Prodi and the government led by the
113Prodi was a member of DC. Before being appointed at IRI, he was Minister of the Indus-
try, Commerce and Craftsmanship (1978-1979). Prodi chaired IRI until 1989 and then again in
1993-1994. As the next chapter shows, he became President of the Council of Ministers (1996-
1998; 2006-2008). In the period between the two Italian presidencies, he was President of the
European Commission (1999-2004). See http://www.romanoprodi.it/ and http://ec.europa.eu/
archives/commission 1999 2004/prodi/index en.htm [both accessed on December 30, 2012].
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Socialist Bettino Craxi. On the one hand, Prodi attempted to reintroduce those
mechanisms of managerial autonomy vis-a`-vis politics that the DC-PSI alliance had
dismantled since the late 1950s. On the other hand, Socialists opposed any e↵ort
which was directed at diluting political influence over IRI. In fact, PSI intended to
use the system of public enterprise as an economic and financial pillar in support
of its political strategies. In other words, just like DC had done in the late 1950s,
Socialists saw the state-owned sector as an entity to be controlled for purposes
of power consolidation (Bianchi, 1987, 284-285). This tactical aspect explains the
political-economic imperatives behind the corrupt networks that PSI weaved in the
period.
3.3 Towards the 1990s season of reforms: the for-
mation of a neoliberal technocratic elite
To recapitulate, this chapter has examined the history of Italian capitalism and its
uniquely concentrated structure of ownership and control since the early industrial-
isation. The imperative to secure ownership and control in the hands of few block-
holders encouraged the formation of several centres of gravity which coordinated
shareholding strategies and calibrated the equilibria between private business and
public enterprise – a function particularly performed by Mediobanca. This condition
of restricted su↵rage further accentuated during the 1980s, a period which was char-
acterised by the collusive expansion of stock-market trading and the controversial
downsizing of the public enterprise.
However, this scenario was about to change dramatically under the influence of
intertwined external and domestic dynamics. In fact, whilst the process of European
integration applied strong pressures in favour of liberalising reforms, domestic actors
‘cultivated’ these tendencies internally (Deeg, 2010, 174, 186). This final section
examines the formation of a technocratic elite within state institutions such as the
Bank of Italy and the Ministry of Treasury.114 It shows how these actors put forward
114Since the post-war period, the Italian Ministry of Treasury was one of the four ‘economic’
Ministries together with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning,
and the Ministry of State Shareholding. The Ministry of State Shareholding was closed down
in 1993. The Ministry of Treasury merged instead with the Ministry of Budget and Economic
Planning in 1996, forming the Ministry of Treasury, Budget and Economic Planning. In 2001,
the latter merged again with the Ministry of Finance, eventually forming the current Ministry of
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a pro-market critique of Italian capitalism through which they aimed at modernising
its institutional foundations.115 In the early 1990s, taking advantage of a general
consensus for European unification, technocrats linked Italy to EMU and used it as
an external discipline to overcome domestic failures (Dyson and Featherstone, 1996;
Sbragia, 2001).
Many influential scholars advanced rigorous pro-market critiques of Italian cap-
italism since its early industrialisation. Most notably, the politician and economist
Luigi Einaudi (1911) denounced the concentrated ownership structure of the Ital-
ian big industry already during the Giolitti era.116 Later on during the 1950s and
1960s, a group of influential intellectuals gathered around the journal Il Mondo and
pursued a battle for the reform of company law as well as the adoption of antitrust
regulation (Marchetti, 2001). However, in spite of these important critiques, it was
only once the system of public enterprise fell into crisis during the 1970s that the
discourse of neoliberalism began to acquire considerable weight at the Bank of Italy
and the Treasury Ministry. In this regard, Pierluigi Ciocca (2005, 36-37) contex-
tualises the rise and consolidation of neoliberal reformism during the central-bank
governorships of Paolo Ba  (1975-1979) and, in particular, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi
(1979-1993). According to Ciocca:
[t]he central bank was convinced of the urgent need to strengthen the
response of resource allocation and the financial structure to the eco-
nomic crisis of the 1970s [...] The critique focused on the mechanisms
Economy and Finance. See http://www.mef.gov.it/ministero/di-piu-mef/la-storia.html [accessed
on December 30, 2012].
115Scholars contributing to the debate on varieties of capitalism have accurately examined the
broad institutional processes of market-oriented transformation in Italy. According to this re-
search programme, Italy was a case of ‘dysfunctional’ state capitalism during the post-war period
(Della Sala, 2004). In fact, compared to models of market capitalism (US, UK) and managed cap-
italism (Germany), the Italian state played a more extensive and programmatic role in areas such
as government policies, inter-firm relations, financial a↵airs, and labour relations (Schmidt, 2002).
In some respects, Italy was similar to France but with the crucial di↵erence that the Italian case
was paralysed by factionalism and patron-client relations. Since the early 1990s, this model of
dysfunctional state capitalism has been subject to profound institutional change in the wider con-
text of globalisation and European regionalisation. Yet, in spite of this rupture with the past, the
literature on varieties of capitalism tends to agree that the Italian case did not converge to either
a market-based or a managed model. As Vincent Della Sala (2004, 1041) argues, Italian capitalism
“adopted and mimicked elements of both without becoming either. This is because many of the
political and economic factors that were at the heart of the model in the post-war era remain in
place.”
116Einaudi served as President of the Republic between 1948 and 1955. See http://www.quirinale.
it/qrnw/statico/ex-presidenti/Einaudi/ein-biografia.htm [accessed on October 26, 2012].
140
propagating inflation: 100 per cent indexations and the loss of control
over the public finances. In the 1980s the first of these would be defused,
the idea of wages as an ‘independent variable’ overturned; but the sec-
ond degenerated into the dissipation of public money. Ba  and Ciampi
were among the few to grasp, early on, that [...] the ultimate limit to the
capacity to respond to shocks lay in the spheres that ought to have over-
come the inconsistency between relative prices and the use of resources:
the markets, imperfect; the state’s presence, redundant; and the whole
model of Italy as a mixed economy, inadequate.
As it is clear from this extract, technocrats were haunted by the collective mem-
ory of the economic indiscipline which characterised Italy during the 1970s (Dyson
and Featherstone, 1996, 274).117 To their dismay, the country still lacked concrete
market discipline by the mid-1980s – especially for what concerned the ‘dissipation’
of public finance. With this in mind, technocratic elites – strong in their economic
expertise – advanced a critique of Italian capitalism which was centred on few key
ideas. First, it was necessary to restructure public finance and reduce the growing
level of debt (Giavazzi and Spaventa, 1988). Second, the system of public enterprise
was ine cient in the allocation of productive resources. Political parties imposed
non-economic objectives on public managers and hindered a correct response to
market changes and technological innovation (Goldstein, 2003, 1). For this reason,
the system of state-owned enterprise had to be downsized and privatised (Scog-
namiglio, 1990). To this two aspects should be added a third one which emerged
particularly during the 1990s: rendering the system of corporate governance more
attentive to shareholder value (Disiano-Preite, 1997). This would have improved the
competitiveness of Italian business (Barca, 1996). These ideas were very powerful
and disturbed those mechanisms upholding conservative power structures in Italy.
Why was this the case?
To begin with, downsizing and privatising the public enterprise implied hindering
the normal reproduction of partitocrazia which, as already seen, depended on the
clientelistic exploitation of the state-owned apparatus. Although these conditions
117Technocrats refer to experts in specific fields – e.g. economics, law and so on – who apply
their high-level knowledge to government a↵airs either as technical advisers or unelected decision-
makers. For a review of the debate on technocracy, as well as an interesting study about technocrats
in Chile, see Silva (2008).
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had always existed in Italy, they acquired even more systemic and corrupt traits
during the 1980s (Della Porta and Me´ny, 1995). To a large extent, the situation was
due to the Socialists’ thirst for resources to be deployed in their ambitious plan of
dominating the national political scene in spite of their relatively small electorate.
As Paul Ginsborg (1996, 23-24) puts it,
Christian Democrats, and often exceeding them, the Socialist Party of
Bettino Craxi played a leading role in the systematisation and theorisa-
tion of corrupt practice. This was the period when kickbacks on public
contracts became a highly organised a↵air, when party and personal
financing flourished directly from the illegal use of political prerogative.
In addition to this, the objective of reducing public debt entailed removing govern-
ment expenditure as an essential tool of mass consensus. In fact, especially during
the years of the Craxi administration (1983-1987), public spending was instrumen-
tal to creating an atmosphere of enrichissez-vous amongst large strata of privileged
groups (Pasquino, 2000, 79).
For what concerns instead private capitalist oligarchies, the shareholder-oriented
transformation of the financial system implied an attack on their concentrated struc-
ture of ownership and control. More transparent rules of corporate governance, as
well as an e cient and liquid stock market, would have ensured equality of rights
amongst shareholders and less opportunities to weave cross-shareholding alliances.
In a word, a growing call for meritocracy in corporate ownership and control en-
dangered the traditional practices of private capitalism in Italy (McCann, 2000,
49-50).
In the early 1980s, neoliberal reformism was still relatively weak. To be sure,
many forces were already in motion. For instance, large companies had undergone
financial, technological and territorial restructuring in order to cut productive costs
whilst breaking up labour resistance (Graziani, 1979). Furthermore, industrial re-
lations were to a large extent normalised after the turmoil of the previous decade
(Bevacqua and Turani, 1978). Finally, Italy had joined the European Monetary Sys-
tem (EMS) in December 1978, although with a wider fluctuation band of 6 per
cent and the so-called ‘parallel measures’ for less stable economies (Quaglia, 2002,
159-190). Yet, in spite of this early reformist trend, conservative interests still op-
posed the introduction of concrete market reforms. In particular, the Craxi cabinet
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o↵ered the Italian society a unique way to address the aesthetics of rampant indi-
vidualism, consumerism and entrepreneurship, whilst reinforcing at the same time
the system of partitocrazia and its dependence on unrestrained public expenditure
(Ginsborg, 2001, 150-157). Similarly, big private capital turned to the Milan Borsa
as the symbol of entrepreneurial progress and modernisation.118 But, as already seen
in the previous section, companies did so whilst remaining within the boundaries of
traditionally collusive strategies.
The practices and discourses of neoliberalism began to gain influence in the
second half of the 1980s. During this time, the process of European integration re-
vealed a new impetus under the European Commission Presidency of Jacques Delors
(1985-1994).119 In February 1986, the signing of the Single European Act fixed the
objective of creating a common market for goods, services, labour and capital by the
year 1992. The importance of creating a single market amongst European countries
was already acknowledged in the Treaty of Rome (1957), but progress had been slow
throughout the post-war period. This was due to the fact that market integration –
especially for what concerns the realm of finance and capital mobility (Howells and
Bain, 2005, 448-449) – would have undermined the institutions of European welfare
states. However, the situation had changed considerably by the early 1980s. In fact,
the mixed economy entered a profound crisis which opened up a struggle over the
future of Europe. In this regard, as Bastiaan Van Appeldoorn (2002, 78-82, 158)
shows, the Single European Act emerged out of a hegemonic compromise between
the most globalised fractions of European capital (both industry and finance) and
the more inward-oriented industries. Whilst the former upheld the rising neoliberal
discourse, the latter put forward instead a neo-mercantilist narrative that saw the
single market as a protected space vis-a`-vis global competition. Together, neolib-
eralism and neo-mercantilism displaced the plan of building a Europe-wide social
market democracy.
The same hegemonic configuration which led to the single market was also cru-
cial in launching the wider and more ambitious project of EMU (Bieling, 2003,
118Stock-exchange practices and technology perfectly epitomised what journalists dubbed la Mi-
lano da bere (‘the Milan you can easily drink’). Borrowed from the advertisement of a popular
after-dinner liquor, such expression reflected the role of Milan as the capital of the rising economic
sectors such as marketing, fashion and finance (Foot, 2001, 166).
119Unless otherwise referenced, the following analysis concerning the historical documentation of
EMU is based on the institutional web site of the European Commission at http://ec.europa.eu/
economy finance/emu history/part a.htm [accessed on December 30, 2012].
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208). In 1989, the ‘Delors report’ proposed the practical steps for undertaking a
process of economic and monetary integration. This report laid the groundwork for
the intergovernmental conference on EMU which opened alongside the other IGC
on the political union in December 1990.120 The IGC on EMU agreed that the path
towards a single currency entailed i) a European central bank defining and imple-
menting monetary policy, assuring price stability and acting autonomously from
political pressures; ii) close convergence of member states’ economic policies based
on budget discipline; iii) transforming the European Currency Unit (ECU) from
a basket unit into a true currency.121 The two IGCs were closed at the Maastricht
Summit in December 1991. They resulted in the Treaty on the European Union (EU)
which established the EU in its three-pillar structure and amended the old European
Economic Community (EEC) Treaty to include the EMU articles.122 Members states
were to undertake the process towards EMU in three stages. These would gradually
lead to economic convergence, price stability and discipline in government finance
before permanently fixing the respective national currencies in a monetary union.123
Member states had to adhere to five convergence criteria in order to qualify for the
120Delors chaired the ad-hoc committee of the twelve central bank Governors which prepared the
report. The latter was accepted at the Madrid European Council (June 1989). Here, it was decided
to begin the first stage of EMU in July 1990 – when the liberalisation of all capital movements also
came into force. In December 1989, the European Council eventually took the decision to convene
the IGC on EMU before the end of 1990.
121The currency was renamed the ‘euro’ during the Madrid European Council in December 1995.
122The Maastricht Treaty was signed on February 7, 1992 and came into force on November 1,
1993. EEC indicates the common market established in 1957 (Treaty of Rome). EEC was renamed
European Community (EC) in 1992 (Treaty of Maastricht), becoming part of the first of the
complex three pillars of the EU together with the European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC)
and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) – the other two pillars being the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal
Matters (PJCC). The 2009 Lisbon Treaty replaced this overly complicated three-pillar structure
by creating a common body (the European Union). See Nugent (2010). To simplify, this thesis uses
the term ‘Europe’ regardless of the di↵erent phases of European integration.
123In brief, the first stage started with the liberalisation of capital movements (July 1990). During
the first stage, all member states were to become full members of the EMS in its narrow band,
increasing also the mutual coordination of domestic monetary policies. The second stage began in
January 1994 and implied the establishment of the European Monetary Institute which monitored
the correct use of fiscal and monetary policies by member states. Finally, the third stage entailed
the replacement of the European Monetary Institute with the European Central Bank. The latter
formed the European System of Central Banks (ECSB) together with the national central banks. At
this point, exchange rates were permanently fixed and national currencies were eventually replaced
by the single currency. Member states had to decide before December 1996 when this third stage
would begin. If no date was set by the end of 1997, it would nonetheless start as of January 1,
1999. See Howells and Bain (2005, 467-468).
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EMU membership.124
Italy looked at the process of European unification very positively. To begin with,
public opinion was supportive of Europe and considered the latter as the benchmark
for domestic modernisation (Quaglia, 2011; Ginsborg, 2001, 168). This aspect is re-
markable if we take into account the restrictive economic measures that the Italian
population had to deal with in order for the country to join EMU. Furthermore,
business elites also showed strong pro-European opinions. In particular, big private
capital saw Europe as an opportunity for introducing fiscal and monetary orthodoxy,
therefore disciplining both state intervention in the economy and, above all, the bar-
gaining power of the trade unions (Talani, 2003).125 Remarkably, private capital was
not very much concerned – at least, until the mid-1990s – about how EMU mem-
bership implied also creating a regime of market transparency which undermined
their strategies of oligarchic control.126 Paradoxically, the very same politicians who
epitomised the immobility of partitocrazia were also strong supporters of European
unification. For example, DC-leader Giulio Andreotti advocated the entry of Italy in
the two-band mechanism of the EMS in 1978 (Quaglia, 2002, 165-168). Furthermore,
he again agreed with Treasury Minister Carli and the Governor of the Bank of Italy
Ciampi in their decision to place Italy within the narrow band of the EMS in 1990
(Scalfari, 1990).127 Even Craxi played a fundamental role in steering the process that
led to the Single European Act. In June 1985, during the Milan European Council,
he called the vote – against Margaret Thatcher’s opposition – which established an
intergovernmental conference on the single market (Ginsborg, 2001, 244-245). This
pro-European attitude of the political class was certainly surprising considering that
124Briefly, these criteria were: i) inflation rate must be no more than 1.5% higher than the average
of the three ‘best performing’ member states; ii) the government deficit-to-gross domestic product
(GDP) ratio must not exceed 3% at the end of the previous fiscal year; iii) the debt-to-GDP ratio
must not exceed 60% at the end of the previous fiscal year; iv) member states must not devalue
their currencies for two consecutive years as part of the EMS; v) the nominal long-term interest
rate must not be higher than 2% relatively to the three lowest inflation members.
125It is important to note that monetary orthodoxy came with a cost for business elites: the
removal of devaluation as an important strategy for the Italian industry. This aspect was par-
ticularly significant for export-oriented SMEs, which nonetheless looked at EMU positively as it
was expected to lower domestic interest rates. SMEs would have benefited from it since they were
heavily dependent on loans to finance their activities (Amyot, 2004, 59).
126It is possible that such inattention to market transparency was due to the fact that, although
Italy was a particularly virulent case of concentrated ownership, other European countries pre-
sented similar corporate structures. See Barca and Becht (2001).
127As already seen, Carli was Governor of the Bank of Italy in the period 1960-1975. He was
Treasury Minister from 1989 until 1992.
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Europe entailed drastic changes to their way of life.128 Despite the inherent dangers,
political leaders recruited key technocrats in government a↵airs since the late 1980s.
As Ginsborg (2001, 253) pointed out, “much of the history of Giulio Andreotti’s
last two governments was an essay in politics of this sort: not reforms that served
to keep the storm on the distant horizon, but rather brought it nearer.”129
Hence, amidst a general consensus for European integration, market-oriented
reforms were gradually introduced in the Italian political-economic landscape. For
instance, after the lira joined the narrow band of the EMS in 1990, all restrictions to
the free flow of capital were removed.130 This reduced considerably the authorities’
ability to manoeuvre monetary policy independently from market forces. As Carli
explained in rather populist terms, the freedom of capital movements gave citizens
the ability to control politicians by choosing in which jurisdiction to invest their own
savings (Polidori, 1990). In the same year, the ‘Amato’ law transformed public banks
into joint-stock companies by allowing the sale of up to 49% of their shares to private
investors.131 Yet, the majority of banks (mostly savings banks) remained under the
influence of local administrations through the so-called fondazioni, the non-profit
128It is logical to question whether Italian politicians understood the consequences of their actions,
especially with respect to EMU and its tight restrictions on public finance. In this regard, on the
basis of a press survey and interviews, Lucia Quaglia (2002, 218-220) provides several explanations
regarding the attitude of the political class towards monetary integration. Let us report the most
relevant ones. First, it is possible that politicians neither debated nor rejected EMU as Italy
had already joined the EMS in 1978. In other words, past decisions had set the path for future
commitments. Second, as the same Minister Carli (1993, 437) argued, the Italian political class
lacked the economic expertise to properly assess the implications of a monetary union. Third, there
was the belief that the criteria could be ‘softened’ to fit the Italian condition. Fourth, ‘shrewd and
seasoned’ politicians perfectly understood EMU’s drastic implications. However, they believed
that adjustments in Italy were necessary. Hence, by undertaking them ‘in the name of Europe’,
would have diluted their ensuing political and social costs. Taking into account the diversity of
explanations, Quaglia concludes that di↵erent reasons held for various political forces. Even in the
case of single politicians, their individual views might have reflected several concerns.
129Andreotti led the last two governments of the so-called pentapartito alliance from July 1989
to April 1992. DC and PSI formed this governing alliance in 1981 together with three small liberal
parties: Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Psdi), Partito Repubblicano Italiano (PRI), and
Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI). See Pasquino (1995a).
130Cf. ministerial decree April 27, 1990 at http://www.dt.tesoro.it/export/sites/sitodt/modules/
documenti it/prevenzione reati finanziari/normativa/DM-27-aprile-1990.pdf [accessed on Decem-
ber 30, 2012].
131Cf. law no. 218, July 30, 1990. In Italy, laws and decree laws are often nicknamed with the name
of their promoters – in this case, Giuliano Amato. A professor of constitutional law and member
of the Socialist Party. Amongst other tasks, he was Treasury Minister (1987-1989; 1999-2000) and
President of the Council of Ministers (1992-1993; 2000-2001). See http://www.giulianoamato.it/
biografia [accessed on December 30, 2012].
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bodies which held the newly-issued shares (Deeg, 2005b, 530).132 The significance
of the Amato law stems from the fact that it took the first step in the far-reaching
privatisation of the state-owned sector which, as the next chapter shows, was imple-
mented throughout the 1990s (Goldstein, 2003). Other important reforms included
the long-awaited antitrust regulation, the law on insider trading and, finally, the
stock-market reform.133 The latter dismembered the stockbrokers’ executive com-
mittees (Comitati Direttivi degli Agenti di Cambio) which had directed the national
stock exchanges since 1932.134 It established instead the Milan-based stock exchange
board (Consiglio di Borsa) which paved the way for the stock-market modernisa-
tion, including: the shift from open outcry to electronic trading in 1994; the 1997
centralisation of national exchanges in the Milan-based market; the privatisation of
the stock exchange which implied the dismantling of the Consiglio di Borsa and the
creation of Borsa Italiana, a joint-stock company that began its operations in Jan-
uary 1998. The most immediate and critical aspect of the 1991 stock-market reform
was that stockbrokers lost their monopoly over share trading and their professional
category ceased to exist. Brokerage firms – known by the acronym of SIM (societa` di
intermediazione mobiliare) – were instead authorised to operate both on their own
behalf and on behalf of third-parties, supposedly increasing market transparency
and price competitiveness (Petrini, 1990).
Besides these early reforms, it was particularly during the intergovernmental
conference on EMU that technocrats gained considerable decision-making power
over national a↵airs. As Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone (1996, 274-279)
explained, political leadership was limited in ensuring that Italy remained an active
participant in the process of European integration. Within this wider framework, a
small technocratic elite consciously negotiated EMU to impose an external discipline
on the country’s status quo. To be sure, the negotiations were beyond the control
of Italian actors, being dominated instead by the Franco-German axis. But, Italian
technocrats willingly tied the Italian economy to the Maastricht convergence criteria
132As Deeg (2005b, 530) explains, the Amato law was highly debated since most of the banks
were connected to networks of patronage. In this sense, fondazioni smoothed the process of bank
privatisation by ensuring certain margins of continuity in the political influence over banks.
133Cf. respectively law no. 287, October 10, 1990; law no. 157, May 17, 1991; law no. 1 January
2, 1991.
134Unless otherwise referenced, the following summary concerning the modernisation of the na-
tional stock exchanges is based on the institutional web site of Borsa Italiana at http://www.
historytour.it/ [accessed on December 30, 2012].
147
in order to limit the ability of manipulating domestic public finance in line with the
necessities of partitocrazia.135 As as result of EMU, Italy was irrevocably linked
to the market-oriented dynamics of Europe. On the very same day in which the
Maastricht Treaty was signed, the ‘Carli’ law enacted the independence of the Bank
of Italy from the Treasury.136 Since 1981, the Treasury no longer obliged the central
bank to finance its necessities either through overdraft in the Treasury’s account or
via the purchase of government securities (Epstein and Schor, 1989, 150). Now, the
Bank of Italy was granted full autonomy to fix interest rates.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter has shown that Italian capitalism historically evolved through the
construction of complex equilibria between private business oligarchies and a large
public enterprise (Segreto, 1998). This liaison between the state-owned sector and
private capitalism secured ownership in the hands of the state and the oligarchs,
producing a scenario which – both in its public and private dimensions – reached its
most collusive and corrupt traits during the 1980s (Ginsborg, 2001). In this context,
135Dyson and Featherstone (1996, 277-279) showed that the total number of personnel involved
in the EMU negotiations was no more than 16 people. The Socialist Gianni De Michelis (Foreign
Minister) convened a steering group in preparation for the six-month Italian Presidency of the
Council of the EU (July-December 1990). Part of this steering group were: Umberto Vattani
(Diplomatic Counsellor to the Prime Minister); Raniero Vanni d’Archirafi (Director-General for
Economic A↵airs at the Ministry of Foreign A↵airs); Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (Deputy Director-
General, Bank of Italy); Mario Sarcinelli (Director-General, Ministry of Treasury). These actors
played a central role during the period of the Italian presidency. After these six months, Mario
Draghi replaced Sarcinelli in February 1991. Giovanni Jannuzzi substituted instead D’Archirafi
in July 1991. Furthermore, Rocco Cangelosi served as the personal representative for the Foreign
Minister De Michelis in both the IGC on EMU and that on political union. Draghi was instead
the personal representative for the Treasury Minister Carli at the IGC on EMU. This implied that
when the IGC met frequently at the level of o cials, Draghi and Cangelosi led the Italian team.
They were assisted by Augusto Zodda, Draghi’s deputy, and Francesco Papadia (support sta↵ for
Padoa-Schioppa, Bank of Italy). In addition to this, Andreotti attended as the Prime Minister,
whilst Ciampi took part in the negotiations of the Committee of Central Bank Governors. Finally,
Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi was an assistant to Padoa-Schioppa, Fabrizio Saccomanni to Ciampi and
Roberto Nigido to Vanni d’Archirafi. According to Dyson and Featherstone, the crucial aspect of
the Italian delegation was that Andreotti and De Michelis were not particularly interested in the
policy content of EMU, being simply keen to secure Italy’s participation in the project. Carli was
instead very old and ill. He attended only the IGC on EMU when it met less frequently at the
ministerial level. This means that Draghi, Vattani and Padoa-Schioppa played the most important
role in the negotiations. However, whilst Vattani’s intervention was limited to diplomatic a↵airs,
Draghi and Padoa-Schioppa emerged as the key experts on EMU.
136Cf. law no. 82, February 7, 1992.
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neoliberal technocrats – which enhanced their agential power within state institu-
tions such as the Bank of Italy and the Treasury Ministry – advanced a powerful
critique of the country’s political-economic establishment. Taking advantage of a
general consensus which favoured Italy’s participation in Europe, these actors tied
Italy’s destiny to EMU. In so doing, they established an external constraint on the
system of partitocrazia and the dissipation of public finance (Dyson and Feather-
stone, 1996).
The next chapter shows how unelected technocrats captured the Italian executive
as of 1992. In so doing, they reinforced their power vis-a`-vis the Parliament and the
political parties (Sbragia, 2001, 81). As a senior observer commented, the Bank of
Italy and the Treasury became “the import agents and the authorized interpreters
of the austere market sentiment. The relative power of both institutions (vis-a`-
vis markets) [...] declined, but the relative power of their technocratic heads [...]
increased vis-a`-vis that of the ministers” (cited in Dyson and Featherstone 1996,
296). In 1996, centre-left politicians embraced the strategies that technocrats had
already undertaken. In so doing, a neoliberal reformist coalition came into being
and embarked on a dramatic fight in order to conform Italy with the Maastricht
convergence criteria. At the same time, this coalition implemented reforms that
aimed at modernising the domestic financial system and corporate governance (Deeg,
2005b). The significance of derivatives emerged in Italy as part and parcel of these
events.
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Chapter 4
Deriving a normal country
This chapter looks at the emergence and consolidation of derivatives-based risk man-
agement in Italy. It shows that Italian neoliberal reformists deployed this innovation
as a crucial factor in their strategies vis-a`-vis conservative forces. For this reason,
modern derivatives acquired distinct traits in relation to the uniqueness of Italian
power relations. Furthermore, whilst neoliberal reformists unfolded their strategies
in the attempt to make Italy a modern market democracy (a normal country), other
actors adopted derivatives practices for their own requirements. Paradoxically, mu-
nicipalities as well as the Agnelli family embraced derivatives in order to oppose the
very same constraints stemming from neoliberal reforms.
The chapter is outlined in four main sections. First, the analysis focuses on the
marketisation of public-debt management as the major incentive to the emergence of
derivatives in Italy. Over the course of the 1980s, public debt increased dramatically,
the interest payments of which absorbed a substantial portion of government expen-
diture. Technocrats developed all possible strategies in order to reduce such costs,
whilst becoming impatient towards the system of partitocrazia and its inability to
rein in the deficit. In this context, technocrats began renovating the management
of public debt in a market-oriented guise. This shift entailed the adoption of new
practices and technology on primary and secondary markets through which the Trea-
sury could develop its policies of active debt management. Technocrats believed that
this newly renovated scenario would have helped save on the debt costs. Derivatives
practices were integrated within this public-debt marketisation as instruments which
supposedly made government bonds more attractive to investors.
The second section focuses on the period 1992-1999. Once technocrats captured
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the executive power in the first half of the decade, they implemented neoliberal
reforms systematically. These reforms were done in line with the objective of fighting
for Europe. In particular, technocrats normalised labour relations in order to curb
inflation. In addition to this, they cut down government expenditure to stabilise
public finance (Sbragia, 2001, 81). They also undertook a first round of privatisation
and, finally, they reintroduced universal banking. In 1996, the Olive Tree coalition
got to power and reinforced these neoliberal measures with the objective of bringing
government deficit down to 3 per cent of the GDP – a threshold which would have
secured Italy a place in the EMU project. It is in this context that both technocrats
and centre-left politicians adopted derivatives as crucial to their strategies. First,
the Treasury and the Bank of Italy encouraged Long-Term Capital Management
and other arbitrage desks to engineer interest-rate convergence between Italian and
German bonds via OTC derivatives markets (Dunbar, 2000, 153). This battle for
convergence lasted from the late 1993 until 1997. Second, the Olive Tree coalition
not only continued this battle, but it also arranged a very unique currency swap
which window-dressed the 1997 budget deficit (Piga, 2001, 122-129).
The third section explores a parallel project which centre-left politicians and
technocrats implemented in the second half of the 1990s: the modernisation of Italian
finance in line with the ideology of shareholder value. This was done in order to
eradicate the oligarchic structure of Italian business. However, by emphasising the
enabling qualities of the newly developed institutions and discourses (Knafo, 2010,
503), the analysis shows that the construction of this shareholder-oriented regime of
corporate governance did not merely restrain corporate oligarchies. On the contrary,
it also opened up opportunities to use newly available resources in a tactical sense.
In this regard, derivatives were one of the new and most powerful tools to be adopted
for purposes of oligarchic control. In fact, as the case of FIAT shows, equity swaps
played a fundamental role in keeping corporate ownership tight in the hands of the
Agnelli family.
Section four examines instead the controversial use of swaps by local authorities.
The analysis explains that municipalities entered into swaps contracts as part and
parcel of a highly strategic move which often transcended economic rationality: to
circumvent the budget squeeze imposed by the EU-inspired pact of internal stability.
Similarly to the FIAT a↵air, the events concerning municipalities demonstrate how
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the construction of new institutions and discourses – in this specific example, the
dismantling of the state-centred system of local finance – enabled actors to adopt the
newly available resources in order to manipulate the constraints they were initially
exposed to.
4.1 Setting the stage: the renovation of public-
debt management
The institutions and discourses surrounding the use of derivatives acquired a signifi-
cant role in Italy once the authorities began to marketise the practices of public-debt
management. According to the mainstream argument, a market-oriented approach
to public debt entailed developing e cient primary and secondary markets in or-
der to guarantee a stable flow of funds to the government, at minimum borrowing
costs and with an acceptable level of risk (Oecd, 2002; IMF, 2003). However, by
undertaking this change, the risk of debt service was expected to increase since
markets were more volatile than the services provided by syndicate banks. As a re-
sult, derivatives were put forward as instruments which smoothed price fluctuations
and improved the informational e ciency of cash markets (De Broeck, Guillaume
and Van der Stichele, 1998, 10-13). How did this renovation of public-debt practices
occur? What role did derivatives play?
Italian technocrats advanced the necessity to contain the expansion of public
debt during the 1980s. As already seen, this was the most crucial point within their
neoliberal critique of Italian capitalism. Public debt grew considerably throughout
the decade and eventually went beyond 100 per cent of the debt-to-GDP ratio by the
early 1990s (figure 4.1). To be sure, the problem of high debt was common across the
Western world. In fact, as societies shifted from a regime of higher inflation/lower
real interest rate to one of lower inflation/higher real interest rate, they experienced
the accumulation of public debt due to higher interest payments (Masson and Mussa,
1998). Yet, the debt problem in Italy assumed a unique significance in relation to
the dynamics of partitocrazia. To give a better sense of the issue, Italian public debt
was sustained by a market for government securities that was the world’s third-
largest after its American and Japanese counterparts (Scobie et al., 1996, 75). What
is more, according to the data for 1993, interest payments on the debt absorbed 22.6
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per cent of government expenditure (IMF, 2003, 101).
It is in this context that proposals for reforms began to be discussed at the Trea-
sury in collaboration with the Bank of Italy. In 1986, the Treasury Minister Giovanni
Goria formed a technical committee under the direction of Director-General Mario
Sarcinelli.137 This committee ended its works in 1987. Successively, the new Trea-
sury Minister Giuliano Amato established another committee in 1988, this time
under the leadership of Luigi Spaventa.138 Here, experts examined several aspects
such as: the most appropriate policies of debt management; the functioning of the
markets for government securities; and the linkages between debt and monetary
policy (Ru↵olo, 1988). Through their research and advising activities, they looked
for all possible solutions to reduce the costs of debt service for the Italian govern-
ment. Whilst doing so, they also became intolerant towards the political class and
its inability to contain the deficit. As Sarcinelli explicitly declared in October 1990,
“we issue a colossal amount of government debt which is practically unsustainable.
[...] I have to tell everyone that the current situation is no longer feasible and we
need constraints on our public finances” (Signoretti, 1990, my translation). At that
time, Italy was about to start the EMU negotiations and Sarcinelli’s opinions were
shared by the Treasury Minister Carli – who was appointed after Amato left the
post in July 1989 – as well as the majority amongst those who took part in the
intergovernmental conference.
These two committees were instrumental in building an environment for the
management of debt which was more attuned to market-oriented principles. Over
the course of the 1980s, the Treasury strived to minimise the costs of debt whilst
controlling the risk related to interest-rate fluctuations as well as the one concerning
debt refinancing. In order to achieve these objectives, it became crucial to extend
the average life of debt and to spread the distribution of maturity more regularly
137Sarcinelli was former deputy Director-General of Bank of Italy (1976-1981) and joined the
Treasury in 1982. See http://www.cavalieridellavoro.it/cavaliere.php?numero brevetto=2321 [ac-
cessed on December 30, 2012]. The Sarcinelli committee included as advisers: Mario Arcelli, Cor-
rado Conti, Felice Gianani, Francesco Giavazzi, Lucio Izzo, Mario Monti, Rainer Masera, Antonio
Pedone, Paolo Ranuzzi and Luigi Spaventa. See Tesoro (1987).
138Advisers to the committee were: Mario Arcelli, Francesco Giavazzi, Mario Monti, Antonio
Pedone, Maria Teresa Salvemini, Giacomo Vaciago, Mario Sarcinelli, Rainer Masera and Pierluigi
Ciocca. See Tesoro (1989). Spaventa was a professor of economics and Member of the Parliament
(1976-1983); Minister of Budget and Economic Planning (1993-1994); President of CONSOB (1998-
2003). See http://storia.camera.it/deputato/luigi-spaventa-19340305 as well as http://archivio.
lavoce.info/lavocepuntoinfo/autori/pagina86.html [both accessed on December 30, 2012].
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throughout the year (IMF, 2003, 101-102). As suggested by the Spaventa committee,
the authorities decided that – besides diversifying the range of securities o↵ered to
investors – the quantity of fixed-rate long-term BTPs should have been increased
relatively to the amount of floating-rate medium-term certificates (CCTs) and short-
term bills (BOTs) in circulation.139 The declining inflation rate would have favoured
such a shift by persuading investors that it was no longer risky to hold long-term
bonds. However, this strategy led to a segmentation in the structure of the Ital-
ian public debt. On the one hand, households kept investing in CCTs and BOTs
as they had traditionally done since the late 1970s. They held these instruments
until maturity. On the other hand, most part of BTPs ended up being bought pri-
marily by large foreign investors who – far from holding these bonds to maturity
– adopted them instead for their speculative and arbitrage activities. As a result,
these mechanisms began to impose a certain degree of external discipline on the
sovereign management of interest rates (De Cecco, 1994).
Besides opening up to global market dynamics, it was particularly the establish-
ment of Mercato Telematico dei Titoli di Stato (MTS) that provided the major incen-
tive to the introduction of market-based techniques in public-debt management.140
The Italian government had traditionally relied on underwriting bank syndicates
for the primary issuance of debt securities (Scobie et al., 1996, 76). The secondary
market was instead based on interbank contracts amongst few insiders.141 In May
1988, once the Treasury launched MTS, this rather passive scenario began to change
rapidly. In fact, whilst a greater use of auctions was made as the standard procedure
for issuing debt instruments (IMF, 2003, 103), MTS provided instead a screen-based
environment for the wholesale secondary trading of government bonds. Here, a sys-
tem of primary dealers quoted bids and asks, creating a condition in which investors
could easily divest their positions (IMF, 2003, 106). This facilitated the access of
139BTP stands for Buono del tesoro poliennale; CCT is the acronym for Certificato di credito
del tesoro; BOT stands for Buono ordinario del tesoro. See http://www.dt.tesoro.it/it/debito
pubblico/titoli di stato [accessed on December 30, 2012].
140About the creation of MTS, cf. ministerial decree February 8, 1988. See Caputo Nassetti (2011,
292).
141These conditions were perfectly integrated with a scenario in which the authorities conducted
monetary policy by manoeuvring banks’ lending ceiling. Imposing a limit on the lending activities
by banks – and in the presence of international capital controls – simply meant redirecting their
deposit base towards government securities as the only investment choice available to them (Ron-
delli, 1994, 98). Although with increasing di culties, this process guaranteed the necessary flow of
funds towards the borrowing requirements of partitocrazia.
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foreign actors to the secondary market for Italian bonds (Petrini, 1987). Hence, the
Treasury had concretely switched to market-based practices of public-debt man-
agement by the early 1990s. This was done on the basis that “private-sector-type
structures or procedures for managing public debt [...] [could have saved] some frac-
tions of a per cent in debt costs” (Giovannini, 1997, 45). The government began
to be seen as a market actor undertaking an active management of its debt. This
entailed the development of benchmark portfolios in order to capture the optimal
trade-o↵ between the costs and risks of debt service (Cassard and Folkerts-Landau,
1997).
At this point, with the marketisation of public debt in full swing, the institu-
tions and discourses of derivatives-based risk management emerged in Italy. Futures
and options were deemed to make government bonds more attractive by provid-
ing hedging solutions to fixed-income investors (Repubblica, 1992). Besides this,
more pragmatic opinions were instead daunted by the launch of BTP futures at
the Paris MATIF and the London LIFFE.142 It seemed that foreign markets had
gained a first-move advantage on a product which was Italian by definition. As the
leading newspaper La Repubblica commented, “a market which is valued roughly
sixty thousands billions lire per year [was] born in foreign land” (Petrini, 1991c, my
translation). Thus, the process of learning by imitation gained momentum and the
Treasury Minister Carli finally announced that futures were going to be launched
in Italy by the first half of 1992 (Signoretti, 1991). In fact, the Mercato Italiano
Futures (MIF) was established by ministerial decree on February 18, 1992 (Girino,
2010, 542). It became operative on September 11 of the same year (Repubblica,
1992). This market was an adjunct to the above-mentioned MTS and, for this rea-
son, it was based on the very same electronic platform and organisational structure
(Rondelli, 1994, 109-110). Cassa di Compensazione & Garanzia (CC&G) was es-
tablished as the clearing house in charge of central counterparty functions in March
1992.143 The first contracts traded at the MIF were futures on the 10-year and 5-year
BTPs (Caputo Nassetti, 2011, 264-265).144
142BTP futures were introduced at the MATIF and LIFFE respectively on September 5 and 19,
1991 (Petrini, 1991b).
143See http://www.ccg.it/jportal/pcontroller/NavigatorHandler?nodo=20639 [accessed on De-
cember 30, 2012].
144In 1994, options on BTP futures were introduced on a market segment known as Mercato
Telematico delle Opzioni (MTO) (Repubblica, 1994c). By that time, exchange-traded derivatives
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By the time MIF began its operations in September 1992, the domestic political-
economic scenario had already begun to change dramatically. To begin with, Italy’s
destiny was now tied to the neoliberal dynamics of EMU and the construction of
the single market. As already seen, these processes had considerably increased the
agential power of technocrats vis-a`-vis the old political-economic regime. Second,
the system of partitocrazia approached its inexorable decline. In this context, tech-
nocrats captured the executive power and implemented their austerity measures in
a systematic manner. More importantly, these actors moved their attention away
from organised derivatives markets and unleashed instead their fight for Europe in
the ‘wild Wild West’ of derivatives trading (Partnoy, 2009, 18): the over-the-counter
markets.
4.2 Derivatives and the fight for Europe
Technocratic elites gained influence within state a↵airs since the 1980s. They gradu-
ally advanced practices that disturbed the reproduction of the status quo in Italian
capitalism. Yet, these tactics were not su cient to dismantle long-established power
structures, both in their political and business dimension. For instance, early re-
forms – which were introduced in line with the single market – did not involve
major changes in the country’s financial system and corporate governance regula-
tion. In this regard, the oligarchic structure of big business was largely unchallenged.
Furthermore, for what concerns instead partitocrazia and the dissipation of public
expenditure, this was certainly the primary vexation of technocrats who used the in-
tergovernmental conference on EMU to impose mechanisms of external discipline on
Italian public finance (Dyson and Featherstone, 1996). However, imposing a regime
in Italy had begun to transcend the dimension of government securities. In fact, the Consiglio
di Borsa in Milan launched index futures and options respectively in 1994 and 1995 (Sunseri,
1994; BorsaItaliana, 2008, 34). As a result, the Italian Derivatives Market (Idem) came into be-
ing. Here, equity derivatives were adopted later (BorsaItaliana, 2008). After the privatisation of
capital markets (BorsaItaliana, 1999), the newly privatised Borsa Italiana acquired MIF in May
1998 (BorsaItaliana, 1998). However, following the introduction of the euro, trading volume con-
centrated particularly on German bonds and MIF shut down in 2002 (Fiore, 2007, 99). At this
point, Borsa Italiana had already expanded towards other products such as covered warrants and
certificates (BorsaItaliana, 2008). Today, exchange-traded derivatives markets in Italy are organ-
ised around four segments: Idem; securitised derivatives exchange (SeDex); exchange-traded funds
(ETFplus); Mercato Telematico delle Obbligazioni e dei Titoli di Stato (MOT) where ABSs are
traded (BorsaItaliana, 2007).
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of macroeconomic austerity could not have unravelled an entire political system. All
these considerations point to one important fact: it was not the technocratic assault
per se which brought the system of partitocrazia to a full collapse, but rather the
judiciary investigation disclosing Tangentopoli.
The latter was the extensive system of kickbacks and illicit party funding which
linked politics with the business world during the 1980s.145 It all started on February
17, 1992 in Milan, when the police caught Mario Chiesa red-handed whilst accepting
a bribe from the owner of a cleaning firm. Chiesa was the manager of a retirement
home and an influential member of the Socialist Party. He let everything out and
explained to prosecutors how the system of bribes he was involved in worked. As
the magistrates began to uncover these schemes, they realised that Chiesa was not
an isolated case. What Italy experienced in those years was instead an immense
network of corruption which involved all the ruling parties – primarily, DC and PSI
– together with their business clientele. As the news about the investigation spread
in the media, the scandals spiralled amidst huge popular outrage. At a moment in
which Italian politics had already reached a dead end, Tangentopoli represented the
‘emotional factor’ that ‘made a clean sweep’ of the entire political regime (Berselli,
2001, 7), its long-established practices of partitocrazia and most part of its business
connections.146
Hence, it was only once the bribery scandals exploded in 1992 that technocrats
had the chance to capture the executive power and unleash their reforms in the
name of Europe. How did these dynamics unfold? More importantly, how did they
integrate derivatives as crucial practices of their strategies? Let us look first at the pe-
riod 1992-1996. During this time, a series of technocratic governments – only partly
interrupted by the brief Berlusconi administration – began the fight to conform
145The following summary of the events is based on Ginsborg (2001, 179-186, 249-259).
146About the crisis of Italian politics at the turn of the 1990s, see Berselli (2001) and Ginsborg
(1996). According to Berselli (2001, 4), the DC-PSI alliance produced several structural prob-
lems such as the “unbalanced national budget, insu cient modernization, an aging institutional
establishment, an increasingly wasteful welfare structure.” Ruling parties managed to hide these
critical factors, but both external and internal phenomena turned against them by the early 1990s.
First, the Soviet Union collapse removed the communist threat over which DC had built its own
legitimacy. Second, the Northern League emerged as a secessionist political force and gained great
consensus in the Italian Northern regions. Finally, Italians supported a referendum the aim of which
was to transform the electoral system into one based on a majoritarian representation. Hence, at
a moment in which Italian politics faced such critical conditions, Tangentopoli represented the
missing element that demolished the entire system (Berselli, 2001, 7).
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Italy with the Maastricht convergence criteria, whilst also implementing a substan-
tial round of privatisation and banking reforms. In this period, the Treasury and
the Bank of Italy used over-the-counter derivatives markets in order to manoeuvre
interest-rate convergence between Italian BTPs and German bunds (Dunbar, 2000,
149-162). After this, the section moves on to examine the period 1996-1999. In these
years, the Olive Tree coalition got to power and joined forces with the technocrats
by strengthening their neoliberal strategies. This coalition reinforced the regime of
austerity in public finance, launched a second round of privatisation and continued
the battle for interest-rate convergence. Last but not least, the Olive Tree coalition
arranged a unique currency swap which manipulated the budget deficit for the year
1997 (Piga, 2001, 122-129).
4.2.1 Capturing and insulating the executive
After the general election of April 1992, DC and PSI managed to form a govern-
ment together with two long-time political partners, Partito Socialista Democratico
Italiano (Psdi) and Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI). But, as the Tangentopoli inves-
tigation escalated, it involved more and more members of these ruling parties. For
this reason, the President of the Republic Oscar Luigi Scalfaro chose the Socialist
Giuliano Amato – whose reputation was still intact – as the new President of the
Council of Ministers on June 28, 1992.147 As soon as he entered the executive, Amato
faced the events of the speculative attacks on the lira and its eventual devaluation
outside the EMS in September 1992 (Eichengreen, 2000; Harmes, 2001). This crisis
dealt a blow to Italy’s ambition to participate in the EMU project. It encouraged
the Parliament to delegate to the executive the power of introducing reforms in the
areas of pensions, health, public sector employment and local finance. At the same
time, the government undertook substantial cuts in public expenditure and signed
a tripartite agreement with the trade unions (Sbragia, 2001, 90). The latter over-
hauled the system of wage indexation with the aim of containing inflation (Regini
and Regalia, 1997, 213-214).
Amato eventually resigned in April 1993. Yet, in spite of this, his government
marked a turning point in the decade. Public opinion perceived that Italy was a
147About the Amato government, see http://www.governo.it/Governo/Governi/amato1.html [ac-
cessed on December 30, 2012].
159
country at risk due to a lack of convergence with the Maastricht criteria. This ‘lack
of fit’ appeared as a threat of exclusion from the project of European integration
(Sbragia, 2001, 83). For this reason, it justified the introduction of austerity measures
and market-oriented reforms in the years to come. Few voices questioned this trend,
most notably left-wing radical exponents who criticised EMU for being a project that
was implemented to the detriment of social equality (Benedetto and Quaglia, 2007).
However, these opinions came from a minority which was marginal in the political
landscape. Hence, they were not given enough attention to. In other words, the public
debate was insulated from any critical perspective on European integration. General
consensus favoured Europe and there was only one direction to take: neoliberal
austerity and market-oriented reforms.
By the time Amato stepped down, the investigation concerning Tangentopoli
had already involved a large fraction of the political and business establishment,
including top politicians and businessmen such as the Socialist leader Craxi, the chief
executive of ENI Gabriele Cagliari and the entrepreneur Raul Gardini (Ferruzzi).
In other words, the country’s traditional party system and its business linkages
disintegrated. It is at this point that technocrats fully captured the executive and
consolidated their agential power in the domestic scene. Indeed, instead of calling for
early elections, President Scalfaro opted for establishing a technocratic government
led by Ciampi. It was the first non-elected cabinet in the history of the Italian
Republic.148 Having just resigned from his governorship at the central bank, Ciampi
vehemently reasserted the objective of fighting for Europe. He secured the agreement
of July 1993 with the trade unions, continuing what Amato had already achieved in
the realm of labour relations. This pact confirmed the abolition of wage indexation
and established a clearly defined architecture for collective bargaining (Regini and
Regalia, 1997, 214).
Furthermore, the Ciampi administration implemented important reforms in two
realms. First, it gave a new impetus to the privatisation of the state-owned enter-
prise by establishing the technical committee which advised on the necessary opera-
tions.149 This committee was led by Mario Draghi who had replaced Sarcinelli in the
position of Director-General at the Treasury in February 1991 (Petrini, 1991a). In
148About the Ciampi cabinet, see http://www.governo.it/Governo/Governi/ciampi1.html [ac-
cessed on December 30, 2012].
149About the process of privatisation in Italy, see Goldstein (2003) and Tesoro (2001).
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addition to this, it dismantled the Ministry for State Shareholdings and established
the sinking fund where the privatisation revenues were to be deposited and used
for purposes of public debt control.150 Second, besides the events concerning the
privatisation process, Ciampi ratified also the consolidated law on banking (Testo
Unico Bancario, TUB), a fundamental reform which reintroduced universal banking
in Italy.151 By transposing the European second banking coordination directive into
Italian law, TUB gave foreign banks the right to operate in Italy through a single
‘passport’ obtained from the home-country authorities.152 The emergence of foreign
actors – as well as the creation of big national banking groups through mergers
and acquisitions – challenged the consolidated position of Mediobanca within the
Northern industrial universe (Economist, 2000).
More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, it was during the last period of
the Ciampi government that the Treasury developed an aggressive strategy aiming
at the reduction of debt servicing which lasted until the 1997.153 This manoeuvre
was undertaken on the over-the-counter derivatives markets and involved the most
famous and highly leveraged hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management. In 1994,
Alberto Giovannini – co-chairman of the council of experts who directly answered to
the Director-General Draghi – was responsible for the coordination of foreign debt
at the Italian Treasury.154 Although Giovannini claimed that his role was marginal,
it is clear that somebody gave LTCM – and few other arbitrage desks – privileged
information.155 The objective was to encourage these powerful financial actors to
150Cf. respectively presidential decree no. 174, June 5, 1993; law no. 432, October 27, 1993.
151Cf. law decree no. 385, September 1, 1993 and successive updates.
152Cf. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, December 15, 1989 at http://eur-lex.europa.eu
[accessed on December 30, 2012].
153Piero Barucci replaced Carli as Treasury Minister in June 1992. He remained in his post
until May 1994. Barucci was former president of the Italian banking association (ABI). See http:
//www.agcm.it/organizzazione/105.html [accessed on December 30, 2012].
154Mario Sarcinelli established the council of experts in 1985 as a research department advis-
ing the Director-General. Experts were appointed for four years on a renewable basis (Quaglia,
2002, 93-95). When Draghi replaced Sarcinelli, he brought in a group of young and influential
academics: Francesco Giavazzi, Vittorio Grilli and the above-mentioned Giovannini (Repubblica,
1994a). Both Giovannini and Giavazzi left the council in August 1994 (Repubblica, 1994b). Gio-
vannini began working for LTCM in 1995. See http://www.technologyreview.com/article/424397/
alberto-giovannini-phd-84/ [accessed on December 30, 2012]. Grilli became Director-General for
Economic Analysis and Privatization (1994-2000); regent Director-General for Public Debt and
State Treasury (1996-1997); Italy’s State Accountant General (2002-2005); Director-General
of the Treasury (2005-2011); incumbent Minister of Economy and Finance (July 2012). See
http://www.tesoro.it/en/ministero/ministro.html [accessed on December 30, 2012].
155According to Dunbar (2000, 153), this information came from the Bank of Italy.
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buy huge amounts of Italian bonds, therefore inflating bond prices and pushing
down interest rates accordingly. This strategy dealt a blow to domestic banks which
up until then had bought bonds at low prices and earned high interests. In return
for this favour, the Treasury and particularly the Bank of Italy established a cosy
relationship with LTCM by investing $100 million via the Italian foreign-exchange
o ce in October 1994 (Dunbar, 2000, 152-154).156 As Frank Partnoy (2009, 252-253)
points out:
Much of LTCM’s activity was in Italy, where it had extraordinary con-
nections. Not only did LTCM employ the former Italian Treasury o cial
responsible for debt management [Giovannini], but the Bank of Italy
[...] invested $100 million with LTCM. [...] It was no coincidence, then,
that in one trade LTCM purchased an estimated $50 billion of Italian
government bonds. [...] LTCM owned 25 percent of one segment of the
Italian government-bond market. In other trades, LTCM benefited from
an Italian tax loophole for foreign investors, and from the prospect of
Italy’s entry into the European monetary system, about which it had
very good information.
Derivatives entered the picture through the arbitrage strategies of LTCM and
the other actors following its steps. For instance, as Dunbar (2000, 155-156) shows,
one of the profitable trades that Victor Haghani – head of LTCM’s o ce in London
– and his team were able to implement was a typical swap-spread arbitrage.157 The
opportunity for this operation was signalled by the swap spread, that is the di↵erence
between the fixed-rate leg of a swap and the yield on a government bond of the same
maturity. In 1994, receiving Italian lire swaps-rate payments was considered less
risky than buying Italy’s government bonds and receiving their coupons. In graphic
terms, the swaps yield curve stood below the one for the Italian BTPs. This was
due to the fact that the swap rate fell in the expectation of Italy’s participation in
the EMU. Yet, investors were still wary of Italian government bonds. Hence, they
required a higher interest rate. In this context, Haghani’s trade would work in the
following way. His team would buy BTPs on the market for repurchase agreements
156Berlusconi got to power in May 1994 and remained until January 1995. Although his cabinet
was less eager to fight for Europe, this aspect did not a↵ect the policies concerning public debt.
157For a full description of Haghani’s strategies, see Dunbar (2000, 156-162). For a study about
LTCM and arbitrage, see also MacKenzie (2003).
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(repo) through Morgan Stanley.158 In so doing, they would receive fixed-rate coupons
from their BTP position whilst paying lira LIBOR to Morgan Stanley. At this point,
traders would hedge their floating LIBOR payment to Morgan Stanley through a
floating-to-fixed interest rate swap. In other words, they would enter into a swap
with another bank such as Deutsche Bank where the latter would pay lira LIBOR to
LTCM, therefore cancelling out the LIBOR payment to Morgan Stanley. Haghani’s
team would instead pay the fixed swap rate which, as mentioned above, was lower
than the BTP’s fixed rate. This arbitrage strategy would allow LTCM to profit from
the di↵erence between the BTP and the swap rates until the two would converge.
This and other types of trades by LTCM and other arbitrage desks resulted in a
huge amount of capital flowing into the Italian bond market. These tactics were
crucial to support Italy qualifying for EMU (MacKenzie, 2003, 357).
Whilst arbitrageurs inflated prices and caused great losses to the Italian banks
(Dunbar, 2000, 159), the course of events continued on the political arena. The
coalition led by the media entrepreneur Silvio Berlusconi won the national elections
in May 1994.159 His government was a centre-right coalition which included Berlus-
coni’s own party (Forza Italia) together with former DC members, the neo-fascist
National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, AN) and the Northern League (Lega Nord).
In this regard, the Berlusconi administration was rather hesitant towards Europe
(Ginsborg, 2001, 297). However, as a sign of continuity with the former technocratic
government, Lamberto Dini was chosen as the unelected Treasury Minister.160
In line with this continuum, the so-called ‘privatisation’ law was enacted dur-
ing the Berlusconi’s government.161 This law introduced the procedures and rules
for the sale of state shareholdings, a dimension that had also a profound impact
on the overall transformation of the corporate governance regime (see below). Un-
der this regulatory framework, the Treasury reinforced the process of privatisation
and generated a total return of over d90 billion by the year 2000 (Amatori and
158The market for repurchase agreements – or repo market – is a money market where actors raise
short-term capital. A repo involves a dealer selling bonds to investors on an overnight basis and
then buying them back at a slightly higher price. Vice versa, for the party who buys the securities
and agrees to sell them back, the practice is called reverse repo. See Choudhry (2011).
159About the Berlusconi’s cabinet, see http://www.governo.it/Governo/Governi/berlusconi1.
html [accessed on December 30, 2012]. About the rise of Berlusconi, see Seisselberge (1996).
160Dini was a former Director-General at the Bank of Italy (1979-1994). See http://www.
repubblica.it/online/politica/dini/dini/dini.html [accessed on December 30, 2012].
161Cf. law no. 474, July 30, 1994.
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Colli, 2001, 26). In the next years, particularly after the centre-left coalition got
to power in 1996, the privatisation law served two objectives. First, it dismantled
the institutional basis over which political parties established their relations of mu-
tual reproduction with public managers. Second, privatisation increased the stock-
market capitalisation through the IPOs of newly privatised companies, an aspect
which encouraged the creation of shareholder-friendly rules undermining the power
of business oligarchies (McCann, 2000).
Berlusconi lasted only until January 1995. By the time he left Palazzo Chigi (the
executive’s o ce), the traditional party system had entirely collapsed. PSI dissolved
on November 12, 1994. The majority of ex-PSI members ended up scattered across
the entire political spectrum. DC had already separated during the Ciampi admin-
istration (January 16, 1994), splitting in three di↵erent formations which largely
reflected its old factions: the Italian Popular Party (Partito Popolare Italiano, PPI)
at the centre; Christian Democratic Centre (Centro Cristiano Democratico, CCD) to
the right; Social Christians (Cristiano Sociali, CS) to the left. Finally, PCI had dis-
membered on February 3, 1991. Most part of its members joined the newly founded
Left Democratic Party (Partito Democratico della Sinistra, PDS). Radical left expo-
nents established instead the Party of Communist Refoundation (Rifondazione).162
After Berlusconi resigned, President Scalfaro refused again to call for new elections
and chose Dini as the new President of the Council of Ministers in January 1995.
This administration included all unelected technocrats with Dini assuming also the
position of Treasury Minister.163 This transitional government overhauled the pen-
sion system and implemented drastic cuts in public expenditure (Sbragia, 2001, 93).
Eventually, the national elections of April 1996 brought to power the centre-left
coalition of the Olive Tree (L’Ulivo) under the leadership of Prodi.
4.2.2 The Olive Tree coalition: engineering ‘a trick or two’
This section has thus far shown how technocrats captured the executive and asserted
the objective of fighting for Europe amidst the general consensus of Italian elites
and also the wider public. In so doing, these actors introduced austerity measures in
162About the transition from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ party system in Italy during the 1990s, see
Gundle and Parker (1996).
163About the Dini government, see http://www.governo.it/Governo/Governi/dini1.html [accessed
on December 30, 2012].
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public finance, initiated the privatisation of the state-owned sector and implemented
a far-reaching banking reform. More importantly for what concerns the aim of this
thesis, technocrats began making use of the available technology on the over-the-
counter derivatives markets. They directed their e↵orts towards breaking the vicious
cycle of low-price/high-interest bonds. They thought that “life would be much better
if Italy could get a high price for its bonds and pay a low rate of interest” (Dunbar,
2000, 152). However, in spite of all these e↵orts, Italy was still far from meeting the
Maastricht criteria when the Olive Tree won the elections in 1996. The deficit-to-
GDP ratio was 6.7 per cent, whilst the level of debt to GDP was 123.8 per cent. The
level of inflation was 3.9 per cent, that is 1.3 per cent higher than the average level
of the three ‘best performing’ EU countries (Ginsborg, 2001, 304). Interest rates in
Italy were considerably higher than in Germany, whereas the lira floated outside
the EMS widely until November 1996, when it entered the system again (Quaglia,
2004, 1104). Furthermore, important reforms had been implemented during the
previous years in line with the construction of the single market – most notably, the
liberalisation of capital movements and the privatisation of the state-owned sector.
Yet, this neoliberal re-regulation did not challenge business oligarchies.
Taking into account these aspects, it is fair to say that technocratic governments
laid the groundwork for the modernisation of Italian capitalism. But, it was only
once Prodi got to power that a neoliberal reformist coalition came into being and
reinforced the initiative of rendering Italy a normal country in the name of Europe.
Let us focus first on the e↵orts to join EMU in 1999. After this, the analysis looks
at the unique currency-swap transaction put in place to window-dress the budget
deficit. The next section (4.3) examines instead the reforms of corporate governance
and their impact on business oligarchic structures.
4.2.2.1 The great battle for convergence
The Olive Tree coalition was formed when the PDS-leader Massimo D’Alema opened
up to part of the Catholic forces after Prodi announced his intention of running
against Berlusconi in the 1996 elections (Ginsborg, 2001, 300). This move by the
PDS leader signalled a profound transformation in the Italian left which – after the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of PCI – abandoned its Gramscian
legacy in favour of an ill-defined liberal socialism. As Ilaria Favretto (2002, 403)
165
shows, PDS portrayed itself as the only political force which was capable of solving
the long-lasting disparities in Italian capitalism. It aimed at doing so by dismantling
the old regime and constructing instead a modern, normalised, Europeanised mar-
ket democracy. However, apart for few of these vague slogans, former communist
politicians ultimately embraced the neoliberal tenets which technocratic elites had
espoused until then (Ginsborg, 2001, 303). Hence, technocrats showed the newly
elected Olive Tree coalition the areas where to intervene in order to normalise Italy.
Crucial in this regard was the appointment of Ciampi at the Treasury – again, as an
unelected policy-maker – who immediately strengthened the power of his Ministry
through a merger with the Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning.164
With Ciampi in this position, the Prodi administration was very determined
to join EMU. However, as mentioned above, the macroeconomic scenario in 1996
was far from being in line with such parameters. In June 1996, the government
initially submitted an economic and financial planning document which would have
brought the deficit down to 4.4 per cent in 1997 and, finally, 3 per cent only in
1998. In other words, Italy would have been one year late on the reference period
agreed for EMU membership. The document nonetheless left open the possibility for
further tightening manoeuvres in the late 1996. Several explanations could be given
for why the government prepared this initial plan. Su ce it to say that although
the majority within the cabinet was fully committed to EMU membership, many
political-economic forces were conscious that reaching a deficit of 3 per cent was not
feasible. It was hoped that other member states – primarily, France and Germany –
would have interpreted the imperative of meeting the criteria with some margins of
flexibility. In the end, the very same Prodi admitted that not joining EMU on time
was hardly a tragedy (Quaglia, 2002, 256-258).
Yet, this attitude changed dramatically after Prodi met with the Spanish prime
minister Jose´ Mar´ıa Aznar in mid-September 1996. Here, Prodi put forward the
possibility of interpreting the Maastricht criteria more flexibly than what stated on
the Treaty. But, Aznar was not “interested in holding hands” with Italy (White and
Burns, 1996). Spain was going to join EMU on time and by meeting the criteria in
164As a result of the merger, the economic ministries were now only two: the newly established
Ministry of Treasury, Budget and Economic Planning; the Ministry of Finance. About the Prodi
administration, see http://www.governo.it/Governo/Governi/prodi1.html [accessed on December
30, 2012].
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full. At this point, Prodi realised that Italy was practically isolated at the European
level (Battocchi, 2011). Both the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the French
President Jacques Chirac did not intend to postpone the beginning of EMU after
1999. Furthermore, they rejected the possibility that the convergence criteria could
be interpreted loosely. It was a logic reaction from two governments which had been
very sceptical about Italy joining EMU from the start (Quaglia, 2002, 249-253). Now,
Aznar’s bold statement eliminated also the chance for building a common Southern-
European front to pressure in favour of loosening up the criteria. Considering this
external scepticism, there was no other option but showing that Italy was ‘fit for
Europe’ on the basis of sound macroeconomic data.
For this reason, Prodi turned to the domestic scenario and depicted EMU as an
issue of national interest. Being left out of Europe was a threat which justified drastic
economic measures. It was a test for Italy’s patriotism in a situation of emergency
for the entire nation (Ginsborg, 2001, 305-306).165 Thus, the government presented
a budget law in October 1996 which aimed at achieving the target of 3 per cent
in 1997. This manoeuvre involved drastic spending cuts and increased taxation,
including a one-o↵ ‘tax for Europe’ (Radaelli, 2002, 223-224). At the same time,
Ciampi engineered the re-entry of the lira in the EMS on November 24, 1996. The
new parity was overvalued mostly in line with what suggested by the Bundesbank
(Quaglia, 2002, 247-248).166
The decision to join EMU on time caused intense controversy. Whereas centre-
left politicians, trade union leaders and even the radical left exponents went along
with the plan, centre-right forces strongly opposed the government and organised a
major rally in the late November 1996. Business elites – most notably, Cesare Romiti
of FIAT – also demonstrated scepticism about joining EMU in 1999 (Ginsborg, 2001,
306-307). Even within the community of experts and the very same policy-makers,
many voices argued that the country was not ready to join EMU yet. In particular,
the new Governor of Bank of Italy Antonio Fazio was rather pessimistic about the
project, an aspect which signalled a reorientation in the central bank’s attitude
165The image of a threat to the nation seemed even more real due to the secessionist propaganda
of the Northern League (Ginsborg, 2001, 305-306).
166Technically, Italy was already precluded from joining EMU in 1999. Indeed, the country had
been outside the normal fluctuation bands of the EMS since September 1992. As noted by the
Financial Times, “[u]nder plausible interpretations, Italy can no longer meet this criterion. Ever
optimistic, Italy hopes for a fudge” (FT, 1996).
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towards Europe (Quaglia, 2002, 271-272). In the end, the budget law was passed on
December 23.167
Domestic opposition was a rather minor concern compared to what the Prodi
administration had to face abroad. Germany and France were, to say the least,
intolerant about Italy joining EMU. Germany showed a clear preference for a ‘two-
tier’ Europe in which a core of member states could launch the single currency.
Successively, other countries such as Italy, Spain or Portugal could have joined
too once they had put their houses in order (Quaglia, 2002, 250). This strategy
became even more clear in mid-October 1996, once Hans Tietmeyer – head of the
Bundesbank – warned that “member countries [should] not just reach the criteria
through a breathless short-term e↵ort with one-o↵ results quickly cobbled together”
(FT, 1996).
The most interesting aspect of this attack by foreign governments on Italy was
how it launched powerful signals to financial markets where, as already seen, ar-
bitrageurs were betting on Italy and the German bonds to converge. It is fair to
say that financial markets represented the major ground were Italy fought its right
to join EMU in 1999. In fact, as Lucia Quaglia (2002, 66) explains, “[t]he key ele-
ment in the Italian fiscal adjustment [...] was the reduction of the interest payments
on the Italian public debt.” In other words, reducing the amount of money that
Italy had to pay to bondholders would have allowed the Treasury to deduct from
the total deficit a large sum of money – possibly achieving a primary surplus. So
crucial was this element that a convergence between Italian and German interest
rates could have cut down the deficit “by up to 1 per cent of GDP without the Ital-
ian government lifting a finger” (Barber, 1997b). Needless to say that this strategy
was a top priority for the Treasury Minister Ciampi since its appointment in April
1996. Indeed, by the end of the same year, the Treasury had already managed to re-
duce the spread between Italian and German bonds substantially. According to the
mainstream rhetoric, Italy was being rewarded for its ‘credibility’ in implementing
macroeconomic discipline (Quaglia, 2002, 253).
Considering how rapidly the spread was shrinking, it became imperative for
those opposing Italy’s participation in the EMU to change the course of financial
market expectations. The most emblematic moment was the media ‘plot’ against
167Cf. law no. 663, December 23, 1996.
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Italy which was launched through the pages of the Financial Times on February
5, 1997. According to the article, Italy was made an o↵er that postponed its entry
to EMU until 2000 or 2001. In other words, Rome would have missed the ‘first
wave’. However, it would have nonetheless joined the single currency before the
actual adoption of euro notes and coins on January 1, 2002. In this regard, “[t]he
trick [was] to allow the Germans to say that Italy is out of the first wave... while
making the Italians feel comfortable enough to say they are more or less in” (Barber,
1997a). Whether the plot was true or not, financial markets received the message.
As a result, the spread widened between January and March 1997 (Quaglia, 2002,
254).
As luck would have it, whilst the debate focused on Italy as a risk to the stability
of the euro, events both in Bonn and Paris turned sour. In Germany, unemployment
figures soared and cast doubts about the stability of the major economy in Europe
(Barber and Norman, 1997). In this situation, it was di cult for German elites to
oppose Italy’s participation on the basis of a lack of convergence with the Maastricht
criteria. In France, on the contrary, the Socialist Lionel Jospin became the new prime
minister in June 1997. Jospin opposed any possibility that the Bundesbank could
cast its hegemonic projections over European monetary a↵airs. In addition to this,
he also feared that Italy would have gained in terms of export-price competitiveness
by staying outside the Euro area. Finally, his government had growing problems
in meeting the deficit parameters too (Quaglia, 2002, 252-253). These three factors
converged in making Jospin a strong supporter of Italy’s participation in the EMU.
In sum, the events along the Franco-German axis changed Italy’s position in Europe
for the better. The idea of a hard core of member states leading the first entry to
EMU was waning.
In the mid-1997, financial markets began supporting the spread convergence
between Italian and German bonds again. Whilst in April 1995, the 10-year-old
spread was as high as 600 basis points, it had fallen to merely 97 basis points
by July 1997 (Guha and Luce, 1997). Arbitrageurs became confident about Italy’s
participation in the EMU (Quaglia, 2002, 255). At the same time, Italian leaders
were also receiving supportive signs from other member states. For instance, the
Austrian Minister of Finance Rudolf Edlinger stated that Italy had designed “a
very creditable consolidation and convergence programme” and that he “would not
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be happy” if EMU had started without Italy (Hall, 1997). This support to the
Italian government became even stronger once the Prodi administration proposed
to attack the pension system in October 1997. The party Rifondazione opposed the
cuts and overthrew the government. Although a compromise was eventually found
and Prodi returned to power, the episode spurred an atmosphere of great hostility
by the wider public towards the radical left. As Sbragia (2001, 94) pointed out,
the episode showed “how deep was the desire to do what was necessary to enter
the Eurozone.” Most tellingly, Prodi’s brief crisis had no major negative impact on
financial markets. Thus, the Parliament approved the 1998 budget law including all
the drastic reforms which had been initially proposed.168
By February 1998, when Ciampi visited Germany, political-economic and finan-
cial elites applauded Italy’s policy achievements and welcomed him warmly (Schmid,
1998). It was the sign that relations between the two governments were smooth and
Italy deserved a place in Europe. In this friendly atmosphere, three convergence re-
ports were released respectively by the European Commission, the European Mone-
tary Institute (EMI) – the predecessor of the European Central Bank (ECB) – and
the Bundesbank in March 1998. It was recommended that eleven countries should
have adopted the euro currency as of 1999. Italy was part of this group regardless
of the high level of public debt (Barber, Fisher and Munchau, 1998). Prodi and
Ciampi could finally sigh with relief. According to the EMI report (1998), Italy’s
macroeconomic figures for 1997 were: inflation (1.9%); interest rate (6.9%); budget
deficit (2.7% of GDP); public debt (121.6% of GDP). On May 3, 1998, the European
Council, held in Brussels, made this decision o cial (Quaglia, 2002, 240).
4.2.2.2 LIBOR minus 16.77%: an unusual currency swap
As shown above, France and Germany opposed the Italian centre-left government
in its attempt to join EMU against all odds. In such a hostile environment, Prodi
expressed the following thoughts during an interview with the Financial Times in
October 1996 (Graham, 1996):
If others carry out window-dressing we can do the same... If no-one does
then we don’t... If the French get away with it, then we can show them
a trick or two as well.
168Cf. law no. 449, December 27, 1997.
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Prodi referred to the French plan of transferring 37.5 billion francs from France
Telecom’s pension funds to the Treasury in order to window-dress the budget deficit
in line with the Maastricht convergence criteria (Friedman, 1996). Prodi did not
explain what his ‘trick or two’ implied. However, it was clear that, as the fight
for Europe intensified, the Italian government was ready to deploy all its available
resources in order to participate in the launch of the single currency from the start.
Let us remember again that this was a very crucial point in the political-economic
strategies set in motion by the neoliberal reformists. For them, Italy’s struggle to
become a normal country passed through Europe inevitably. Missing EMU in 1999
entailed the great danger that the ‘first joiners’ would have eventually marginalised
the ‘latecomers’. In other words, Italy would have been relegated to the lower level
of a two-speed Europe – a situation which, according to Ciampi, could have easily
become ‘chronic’ (Quaglia, 2002, 260).
It is in this scenario of disquietude about the threat of being left out that the
Prodi administration adopted derivatives practices in the most controversial manner.
Here, a rather simple currency swap was twisted into a device that window-dressed
the decisive budget deficit for the year 1997. It is not clear to which extent such
artifice helped Italy’s macroeconomic data fit with the convergence criteria (Piga,
2001, 128). Yet, for the purposes of this thesis, the episode clearly demonstrates
how Italian neoliberal reformists adopted these instruments as crucial to their highly
politicised struggle. Following the insightful research by Gustavo Piga (2001, 122-
129), this is how the story went.169
169Unless otherwise referenced, the following analysis is based on Piga (2001, 122-129). Piga’s
work is the most accurate account of the use of swaps in public-debt management. His research
– based on o cial documents and interviews – is particularly impressive considering that the
subject matter is hardly open to public accountability. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, Piga
kept the country’s and the financial counterpart’s identities confidential. He opted instead for the
hypothetical ‘country M’ and ‘counterpart N’ – a large derivatives market maker. However, one
year after Piga’s research was published, Ben Steil (2002) – the senior fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations who wrote the foreword to Piga’s report – revealed that country M was Italy.
What is more, the details of the yen-denominated bond issued by ‘country M’ – as reported by
Piga – are consistent with the bond issuance made by Italy in 1995 (Repubblica, 1995). For what
concerns the identity of the counterpart, ZeroHedge (2010) believed it was Goldman Sachs. Yet,
the majority of sources referred instead to J.P. Morgan (Alloway, 2010). In the absence of concrete
evidence, this thesis avoids directing the attention to either Goldman Sachs or J.P. Morgan. Hence,
it simply uses the term ‘counterpart’.
171
In early June 1995, Italy borrowed by issuing a 3-year and 3-month foreign
currency bond which was denominated in yen.170 The bond’s par value was of ¥200
billion, its yearly coupon was 2.3% and maturity was set for September 25, 1998
(Repubblica, 1995). What is more, the bond was sold ‘at par’, therefore ¥200 billion.
The exchange rate on the day in which the bond was issued was 193.44 Italian lire
for 1 yen. The choice of issuing a foreign currency bond was justified by the fact that
domestic interest rates for this maturity were higher that their Japanese equivalent.
However, in spite of its convenience in terms of interest rate di↵erentials, the bond
presented the risk related to the exchange rate between yen and lira. As it is clear, an
appreciation of the yen meant that the Italian Treasury would have incurred a loss in
its yearly payments of the yen-denominated coupons and the final redemption of the
par value in 1998. Luckily, by the late 1996, the yen had experienced a considerable
depreciation against the lira. At that time, it was possible to buy 1 yen for 134.1 lire.
But, despite this favourable depreciation, the Italian Treasury was still exposed to
the exchange-rate risk in the remaining period until the maturity of September 25,
1998. It is at this point that active debt management through derivatives entered
the story in a rather unconventional manner.171
Instead of using a normal currency swaps transaction to hedge the risk of the
yen appreciating against the lira, the Italian Treasury designed an unusual strategy
through which it managed to lower interest expenditure in 1997 and 1998, although
increasing it from 1998 onwards.172 Simply put, the Treasury shot itself in the foot
to join Europe! What does this scheme entail?
As Piga (2001, 126-129) shows, Italy entered into a currency swap with its coun-
terpart in December 1996. The swap matured on September 25, 1998, that is the
170The bond was the first of a three-tranch mega emissione of ¥550 billion. The maturity of the
other two tranches were June 8, 2005 and June 8, 2015 (Repubblica, 1995).
171At the end of 1996, the Prodi administration had been in power for seven months. As already
mentioned, Ciampi was Minister of Treasury, whilst Draghi was still the Treasury Director-General
(he remained in that position until 2001). Under the direction of Draghi, Vittorio Grilli was head of
the Treasury’s directorate in charge of public-debt management (1996-1997). Successively, Vincenzo
la Via replaced Grilli in 1997 and remained in charge of the directorate until 2000. La Via was
financial director at the World Bank (1995-2012). He is the current Director-General of the Treasury
since March 2012. See http://www.dt.tesoro.it/en/dipartimento/Biografia laVia.html [accessed on
December 30, 2012].
172Piga (2001, 123, 147) provides striking evidence of such scheme through the copy of a swap
undertaken by ‘country M’ and given to the scholar by a public o cer. For what concerns the issue
of how swaps transactions a↵ects interest expenditure – and the budget deficit accordingly – see
Piga (2001, chapter 3). This was possible under the European System of Accounts (ESA 95).
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same date as the yen-denominated bond. Here, the financial intermediary paid 2.3%
yearly fixed rate on a notional principal amount of ¥200 billion to the Italian trea-
sury as well as the entire notional (again ¥200 billion) at the expiration of the
contract. In so doing, the Treasury was perfectly hedged against the exchange-rate
risk of its yen-denominated bond. So far, the contract included no irregular detail.
The crucial element emerged in the yen-to-lira exchange rate at which the Italian
Treasury had to return the notional principal amount of ¥200 billion. This was not
134.1 lire per 1 yen – that is the prevailing rate on the day the swap was agreed.
On the contrary, the exchange rate was 193.44 lire per yen. This implied that the
Treasury had to pay a much larger sum that what it would have done according to
standard practices. The surprise did not end here. Every six months, Italy had to pay
a rather singular interest rate of LIBOR minus 16.77% on the the lira-denominated
notional amount of ¥200 billion times the o↵-market exchange rate of 193.44 lire
per 1 yen. In other words, LIBOR minus 16.77% was a negative interest rate that
allowed Italy to receive interest payments on both legs of the swap – taking into
account the above-mentioned fixed 2.3% paid by the intermediary – until maturity.
To sum up, Italy promised to pay the financial intermediary a much bigger
amount of lire due to the higher exchange rate of 193.44 lire per 1 yen. The inter-
mediary paid Italy instead in four semi-annual instalments the very unusual LIBOR
minus 1,677 basis points. On the basis of such evidence, Piga (2001, 128) concludes
that:
[d]e facto, the sovereign borrower received four loans from counterpart
N, every six months from 1997 to 1998. These loans were paid back at
maturity in 1998 by disbursing a greater amount than would have been
disbursed had the currency swap been constructed in a standard way.
These four loans from counterpart N should have simply been considered
as an increase in the public debt of country M, as standard international
accounting practice requires for all loans a sovereign borrower receives
[...] Was it? We strongly doubt it. Otherwise, why enter into such a
complicated transaction in the first place? It is more likely that these
four payments by counterpart N were used (against accepted accrual
principles) to reduce interest expenditure in 1997 and 1998.
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As already anticipated, it is not entirely clear how much this currency swap
a↵ected the budget deficit in 1997. It is obvious that the largest contribution to
reducing the deficit was due to cuts in public expenditure and the convergence of
the interest-rate spread between Italian and German bonds. However, according to
Piga (2001, 128), ten transactions like the one reported above could have easily
saved 0.2% at a time when the deficit-to-GDP forecast for the year 1997 was near
3%. To put it di↵erently, such a saving of 0.2% would have allowed Italy to respect
the EMU criteria.
4.3 Derivatives and corporate control
Thus far, this chapter has explored the unique modalities through which neoliberal
reformists adopted derivatives in their crucial battle for conforming Italy with the
Maastricht parameters. However, normalising public finance was only one side of
the story. In addition to this, as already mentioned, reformists attempted also to
challenge the oligarchic structure of Italian business. They did so by pushing for a
comprehensive modernisation of Italian finance in line with the ideology of share-
holder value. In this regard, it is possible to appreciate how the construction of a
new corporate governance regime did not simply constrain corporate oligarchies. It
also opened up opportunities for them to use derivatives in a tactical sense, ma-
nipulating the very same restrictions they were initially exposed to (Knafo, 2010,
503). Let us look first at the major changes in the corporate governance system as
implemented by the Olive Tree coalition. After this, the study presents the case of
FIAT and how the Agnellis deployed equity swaps to circumvent regulation and to
consolidate the ownership over their business empire.
4.3.1 The shareholder-oriented transformation of corporate
governance
Whilst stabilising the country’s macroeconomic figures, the Olive Tree coalition
implemented also another related project: the shareholder-oriented transformation of
Italian finance. This process entailed constructing a regime of corporate governance
which favoured the dispersion of ownership as well as the development of a liquid and
e cient stock market. In other words, this strategy was coherent with the objective
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of diluting the long-lasting oligarchic nature of Italian business in the attempt to
render it more reactive to global market inputs and innovation. As the PDS-leader
D’Alema explained, “we still have not done enough to create a proper financial
market [...] We do not have guarantees for small shareholders, no rules for public
companies” (Betts and Blitz, 1997).
The ideology of shareholder value originated in the historical evolution of Amer-
ican corporate capitalism, particularly once the latter fully unleashed the dynamics
of financialisation after the 1970s crisis.173 At its core stands a large and transpar-
ent stock market which functions as a source of business investment and corporate
control for public companies. In a given company, dispersed and legally protected
shareholders are the ultimate owners.174 These actors delegate to the board of di-
rectors the task of monitoring the managers who are in charge of directing the
company’s day-to-day activities – e.g. investment, production, pricing, marketing
and so on. In other words, managers are accountable to the board of directors and,
ultimately, to the shareholders who have the voting power to select the board. The
crucial point of this shareholder-oriented regime of corporate governance is the fol-
lowing: once the management fails to deliver profits and dividends, shareholders
exercise their power at the general meeting and vote for a new board of directors
and management. However, in reality, shareholders are too fragmented to exercise
this control vis-a`-vis the management and the passive board of directors. In this
case, the market for corporate control enters the picture. Shareholders could show
their dissatisfaction by selling the company’s shares and, in turn, depressing the
share price accordingly. At this point, the company turns into an attractive target
for takeover strategies (Clarke, 2007, 130-131). The potential bidders buy up shares
of the target company in order to take control of the board and replace the top man-
agement. In this sense, the market for corporate control disciplines the managers
by pushing them to maximise shareholder value, otherwise they would succumb to
hostile takeovers.
Once applied to Italy, this simple story concerning shareholder value promised
173Unless otherwise referenced, the following brief analysis concerning shareholder value is based
on Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000).
174In reality, the majority of shares are not properly dispersed, but owned by large institutional
investors such as pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds and insurance companies. Institutional
investors represented a powerful force behind the emergence of shareholder value since the 1970s
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000, 16).
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a profound impact on the national business establishment. To be exact, as chapter
three has shown, the historical rationale of Italian capitalism was rather di↵erent
than the Anglo-American experience. In Italy, strong blockholders – such as the
oligarchs and the state – influenced the activities of collusive managers against the
interests of unprotected minority shareholders. In other words, whilst the major
concern for shareholders in the Anglo-American system of corporate governance
was the abuse of power by top managers, in Italy the key concern was instead the
abuse of power by the blockholders (Melis, 2000, 354). Yet, as Dermot McCann
(2000, 49-50) clearly explains:
[a] properly functioning capital market with strong institutional investors
would ensure a greater equality of rights between shareholders, thus un-
dermining the capacity of [blockholders] to gain a dominant control of
firms despite possessing only minority holdings. The marginalization of
cross-shareholding alliances would greatly increase the feasibility of suc-
cessful takeover bids and thus intensify the pressure on management to
deliver higher profitability and larger dividends [...] [T]his would serve
to enhance economic e ciency and contribute to a growing meritocracy
of ownership and control.
Liberal intellectuals had for a long time advanced the importance of reforming the
Italian company law in order to prevent the formation of blockholders (Marchetti,
2001). Yet, in spite of these influential opinions, it was particularly during the 1990s
that the political-economic and cultural climate turned conducive to introducing
the institutions and discourses of shareholder value. In 1991, the Parliament passed
the law which reformed stock-market regulation as well as a new regulation con-
cerning insider trading.175 Furthermore, a law on takeover bids was also passed in
1992.176 Finally, in the same year, the Bank of Italy sponsored a research project
which analysed corporate governance in Italy and the potential benefits deriving
from market-oriented reforms.177 However, the major push to corporate governance
reforms came from the process of privatisation itself. Indeed, the 1994 privatisation
175About the 1991 stock-market regulation, see previous chapter. About insider trading, cf. law
no. 157, May 17, 1991.
176Cf. law no. 149, February 18, 1992.
177The research was coordinated by Fabrizio Barca. See Barca et al. (1994), Capra et al. (1994)
and Barca (1996).
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law was important in two respects. First, by introducing norms which protected
minority shareholders in the soon-to-be privatised companies, reformists were free
to experiment without any particular resistance from the blockholders of existing
private companies. Second, it created a contrast between privatised companies and
other listed firms which did not conform with a transparent governance structure
(Enriques, 2009, 7).
Concrete action towards a comprehensive reform of corporate governance was
taken in 1996, when the Parliament delegated to the executive the power to transfer
several EU directives into the Italian legislation.178 Besides importing the Capital
Adequacy Directive and the Investment Services Directive, the Parliament gave the
government also the task to consolidate financial market regulation into a single
law.179 According to the provision, the government had to “amend the laws on
listed corporations with specific regard to the board of internal auditors, minor-
ity shareholder rights, shareholder voting agreements and intra-group transactions,
with a view to strengthen the protection of savings and minority shareholders” (En-
riques, 2009, 9). Hence, in order to undertake this task, the Treasury established a
technical committee under the leadership of Director-General Draghi. This decision
was certainly controversial. In fact, influential voices criticised the fact that such
an important reform was being implemented behind closed doors and away from a
wider political debate (Scalfari, 1997). Hence, an enquiry was opened at the lower
house of the Parliament in October 1997 (Lonardi, 1997). The ‘Draghi’ reform – as
it was soon nicknamed – met the opposition of the centre-right and Confindustria,
the major business association. In particular, the issue of mandatory takeover bids
was the most controversial point (Repubblica, 1998; Puledda, 1998a; Scalfari, 1998).
However, in spite of such resistance, the reform was eventually passed in late Febru-
ary 1998 and came to be known as the consolidated law on finance (Testo Unico
della Finanza, TUF).180
TUF envisioned a new regime of corporate governance in favour of shareholder
value. It was an “omnibus law that aggregated, reformulated and renewed virtually
all civil and criminal rules pertaining to capital markets, securities management,
178Cf. law no. 52, February 6, 1996.
179Cf. law no. 52, February 6, 1996, titolo II, art. 21, 4. The Capital Adequacy Directive (Directive
93/6/EEC, March 15, 1993) and the Investment Service Directive (Directive 93/22/EEC May 10,
1993) were imported into Italian law through the law decree no. 415, July 23, 1996.
180See TUF (1998). Cf. law decree no. 58, February 24, 1998.
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institutional investors, brokerage services, public o↵erings and rules for listed joint
stock corporations” (Deeg, 2005b, 534). Amongst the key points, the following ones
were particularly significant.181 First, the reform increased the protection of minority
shareholders through a tighter regulation of shareholder agreements. The latter had
to be notified publicly; they could not exceed three years; they were no longer valid
in the case of takeover bids (Amatori and Colli, 2001, 43). These measures hit the
core of those cross-shareholding practices which blockholders traditionally used to
consolidate their relations of mutual trust (McCann, 2000, 51-52). Furthermore,
mandatory takeover bids became compulsory once exceeding 30 per cent of the
total capital (Puledda, 1998b). Second, minority shareholders – identified according
to a minimum ownership ranging from 1 to 10 per cent of the outstanding shares
– obtained more governance rights. Third, representation of minority shareholders
was mandatory at the audit board, the internal body in charge of auditing activities.
Finally, the reform reinforced the power of Commissione Nazionale per la Societa`
e la Borsa (CONSOB), the national stock market authority. CONSOB was put in
charge of supervising investor protection, the e ciency and transparency of the stock
market, and the e↵ective functioning of the market for corporate control. CONSOB
could now request ad-hoc information and undertake on-site inspections concerning
shareholder agreements and blockholding practices.
Needless to say, the Draghi reform emphasised the importance of the stock mar-
ket in a country where equity finance had traditionally played a marginal role.182 In
fact, whilst the Draghi committee was drafting the reform of corporate governance,
the various national stock exchanges merged in the Milan-based Borsa which was
then privatised and began to operate as Borsa Italiana in January 1998.183 In a
context where declining interest rates made government securities a less attractive
form of investment for the wider public – obviously, this was not the case for global
arbitrageurs – people looked at the stock market with enthusiasm (Betts, 1997). In
particular, the flotation of the recently privatised Telecom Italia mirrored the frenzy
for the dot-com bubble in the United States (Rampini, 1997).
181Unless otherwise referenced, the following summary of the ‘Draghi’ reform is based on Enriques
(2009, 9-11).
182It is important to note that when the ‘Draghi’ reform was enacted, shareholder value had
become a major objective also in Europe. About the market-oriented transformation of European
corporate control, see Van Appeldoorn and Horn (2007). This dimension was embedded in the
wider process of European financial market integration (Bieling, 2006; Mu¨gge, 2008).
183For a summary about the privatisation of Borsa Italiana, see BorsaItaliana (1999).
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4.3.2 How to hedge the risk of ownership dilution: FIAT
and equity swaps
How far did corporate governance reforms transform Italian capitalism into a share-
holder democracy? How did the oligarchies react to such a di↵erent regulatory en-
vironment? It is now time to look at a unique case of market manipulation which
shows how the new corporate governance regime did not simply constrain business
oligarchies, but also enabled them to use the new institutions and discourses in
a strategic sense. This case concerns the car-manufacturer FIAT and its founding
family, the Agnellis.184
In a context of dramatic crisis, FIAT entered a three-year convertible bond of d3
billions with a consortium of eight banks in 2002. As a hybrid of debt and equity,
this instrument allowed the holder to convert the bond into the issuing company’s
stocks – or cash of equal value – at an agreed-upon price. The FIAT’s convertible
bond had a maturity date that was set for September 2005. More importantly, in
the case of insolvency, the bond was to be converted into FIAT shares at a price of
d10.3. This conversion implied dramatic consequences for the ownership structure
of FIAT. In fact, the 30.6% ownership of the holding Ifil Investments in FIAT – Ifil
was controlled by IFI (62%), which was in turn entirely owned by the Agnelli family
through the partnership Giovanni Agnelli & Co. S.a.p.a. – would have been diluted
of roughly one third in favour of the banks.
In fact, the worst happened. FIAT announced on April 26, 2005 – less than
five months before maturity – that the convertible bond was going to be converted
into shares. In other words, the Agnelli empire was on the verge of collapse after a
century of oligarchic control over FIAT. However, the family found an astute strat-
egy to remain in the ‘driving seat’ (Economist, 2005). The very same day when
the bond conversion was announced, Exor Group – a Luxembourg-based financial
holding which was controlled by the Agnelli family via IFI – entered into an equity
swap contract with Merrill Lynch International on d90 millions of FIAT ordinary
shares.185 An equity swap would normally be settled in cash. However, the con-
tract between Exor Group and Merrill Lynch included a clause which allowed also
184Unless otherwise referenced, the following analysis is based on De Nova et al. (2010, 9-11).
185Exor Group merged with Ifil and IFI in February 2009, forming Exor S.p.A. Today, Exor is
the key investment holding which controls FIAT S.p.A. and FIAT Industrial.
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the physical settlement. Neither the investing public nor CONSOB were informed
about this operation, except for a communique´ on August 24, 2005 in which Ifil
and Giovanni Agnelli & Co. told CONSOB that no particular manoeuvre on FIAT
shares was taking place. In this dispatch, Ifil and Giovanni Agnelli & Co. nonetheless
stated that they intended to keep control of FIAT (Bo↵ano and Griseri, 2010).
How does an equity swap specifically work? This is a derivative contract in
which future cash flows are agreed to be exchanged between two counterparties –
respectively known as the equity amount payer and the equity amount receiver – at
specific interim dates or in a single maturity date in the future. The equity amount
payer transfers to the equity amount receiver the positive di↵erence between i) the
spot value of the equity and ii) the initial reference price agreed on the contract.
On the contrary, the equity amount receiver pays any potentially negative di↵erence
between these two elements. On top of this dimension which is typical of an equity
future, the two parties enter into a further reciprocal obligation that is the swap
element: the payer transfers to the receiver also the dividends generated by the
equities in question, whilst receiving an interest rate (e.g. LIBOR or EURIBOR) on
the notional capital equal to the value of equities at the moment of the agreement.
In our case, the equity amount payer Merrill Lynch would have paid the eq-
uity amount receiver Exor Group the positive performance in relation to the initial
reference price of the underlying equity plus the dividends. Merrill Lynch would
have instead received from Exor Group the negative performance together with an
interest rate on the notional capital – which is equal to the initial reference price
multiplied by the number of underlying shares. After this agreement was signed,
Merrill Lynch started to hedge by buying the underlying shares. In line with this
hedging strategy, Merrill Lynch bought shares on the stock market from April to
June 2005, accounting for the 15% of daily trading and 10% of FIAT’s voting cap-
ital. Accordingly, FIAT share price went up from d4.8 to d6. In accordance with
the Italian regulation on takeover, Merrill Lynch communicated that its ownership
has reached the 2% threshold but never up to 5%.186 How is it possible to hide the
remaining share of FIAT’s voting capital owned by Merrill Lynch?
The investment bank never exceeded the 5% level by ‘swapping out’ – that is,
entering a reverse contract compared to the one with Exor Group – with two other
186Cf. articles 102-112 of the 1998 consolidate law on finance. see TUF (1998, 88-97).
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counterparts, ING bank and Cater Allen International, for a total of 6.5% of FIAT’s
voting shares. Being in this case the equity amount receiver, Merrill Lynch entered
these secondary equity swaps with ING and Cater Allen by transferring to the latter
the underlying shares as credit risk collaterals.187 Hence, both banks also declared
they went beyond the 2% threshold. In other words, this is all the market and
CONSOB perceived during the period between April and September: three global
investment banks merely exceeded the 2% threshold in FIAT’s ownership.
In September 2005, when FIAT’s convertible bond finally expired, Merrill Lynch
had already settled in cash the secondary equity swaps with ING and Cater Allen.
At this point, the investment bank bought back the collaterals that were then trans-
ferred to Exor Group. Indeed, as already mentioned, the equity swap contained the
clause of physical settlement. Eventually, Exor Group bilaterally sold these shares
to Ifil, of which participation in FIAT’s ownership went simultaneously down to the
30% threshold – due to the convertible bond’s agreement – and up the same level
as a result of the shares received by Merrill Lynch and its complex equity-swap
strategy.
At that time, few voices denounced the Agnelli’s abuse of the most basic rules
of shareholder democracy (Bragantini, 2005; Penati, 2005). In fact, the authorities
intervened very late and the case gained momentum only in the early 2007, when
the Milan court began investigating the a↵air and CONSOB imposed sanctions on
the top management of IFI and Ifil – Gianluigi Gabetti, Franzo Grande Stevens
and Virgilio Marrone (Repubblica, 2007). The main issue at stake concerned the
communique´ that Ifil and Giovanni Agnelli & Co. released in late August 2005.
Indeed, the latter did not disclose information about the equity swap between Exor
Group and Merrill Lynch, therefore constituting an infringement of the current
regulation on market communication and market manipulation.188 In the end, the
187Let us explain this aspect of collaterals more in details. Each participant in an equity swap
is subject to a credit risk exposure to the counterpart. If the underlying share rises in price, the
equity payer is required to make a payment in relation to the increase. Conversely, if the underlying
share falls, the equity payer is entitled to receive a payment. In the case of these secondary equity
swaps with ING and Cater Allen, Merrill Lynch was in the position of equity swap receiver, rather
than the payer as it occurred with the principal swap with Exor Group. This means that, when
the stock price fell, there was credit risk to the equity payer (ING and Cater Allen) and vice versa.
Hence, both ING and Cater Allen mitigated such credit risk by asking the underlying shares as
collateral in line with their price movements. For this reason, Merrill Lynch regularly lodged FIAT
shares with ING and Cater Allen.
188Cf. articles 114 (par. 7) and 187-ter of the 1998 consolidated law on finance. See TUF (1998,
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investigation was transferred to the court of Turin, the city where the Agnelli family
is based. Here, Gabetti, Grande Stevens and Marrone were acquitted in December
2010 (Bo↵ano and Griseri, 2010). After this, the case was brought to court again
in June 2012. But, the accusations – this time only towards Gabetti and Grande
Stevens – are to be invalidated by prescription in February 2013 (Bo↵ano and Griseri,
2012).189
To recapitulate, this section has shown how the Olive Tree coalition implemented
the shareholder-oriented modernisation of Italian finance. This comprehensive re-
form aimed at challenging the oligarchic structure of Italian business. Yet, as the
case of FIAT has demonstrated, the construction of this new regime of corporate
governance did not simply restrain corporate oligarchies. It also multiplied the pos-
sibilities to adopt the newly available resources in a strategic sense, ultimately ma-
nipulating the very same constraints oligarchs such as the Agnellis were initially
subjected to. The next section explores the events concerning municipalities and
their use of interest rate swaps. Similarly to the FIAT a↵air, the case of municipal-
ities shows how the development of new institutions and discourses enabled actors
to make use of the newly available structures in tactical terms. In fact, local ad-
ministrations entered into swaps contracts as part and parcel of a highly politicised
move: to circumvent the budget squeeze imposed by the European pact of stability
and growth.
4.4 From finanza derivata to derivatives finance:
how and why Italian municipalities got high
on swaps
The historical conditions for local authorities to approach over-the-counter deriva-
tives markets emerged in the mid-1990s. Two intertwined processes were decisive for
99, 143).
189The case sparked a debate within CONSOB about how to prevent bidders from accumu-
lating undisclosed equity positions through cash-settled derivatives. In September 2011, CON-
SOB modified the rules of transparency concerning potential shareholdings with cash settle-
ment. Investors are now obliged to communicate also their positions on cash-settled deriva-
tives. Cf. regulation no. 17919, September 9, 2011; http://www.consob.it/main/aree/novita/
consultazione emittenti 20110909 esiti.htm [accessed in December 30, 2012].
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municipalities to adopt interest rate swaps: i) the adherence of Italy to the Euro-
pean pact of stability and growth; ii) the decentralisation of fiscal and administrative
functions from the state to local governments (regions, provinces and municipalities).
As shown above, Italy faced the imperative to reduce public debt as an overall
aggregate over the course of the 1990s. In 1997, the stability and growth pact was
established to regulate the adherence of member states to the Maastricht conver-
gence criteria, in particular the maintenance of low budgetary deficits (Heipertz and
Verdun, 2005; Cafruny and Ryner, 2008). Inevitably, the path towards a low-deficit
regime exerted strong pressures on European countries – their central and local ad-
ministrative bodies – to reform their financing strategies. In fact, the Italian budget
law for the year 1999 included a comprehensive design for the coordination of public
finance known as the pact of internal stability (patto di stabilita` interno).190 The
latter fixed a maximum limit of annual expenditure for local authorities.
At the same time, as reformists transferred EU-imposed budget constraints to
the domestic context, they also advanced the benefits of a fiscal and administra-
tive decentralisation.191 The costs and benefits of decentralisation in Italy had been
debated since the 1980s, but the process gained momentum only with the first ‘Bas-
sanini’ law in 1997. It was eventually finalised with the consolidated law on local
authorities in 2000 and, eventually, the reform of the constitutional law in 2001.
The latter granted local authorities wider margins of autonomy in their revenue
and expenditure decisions.192 These reforms opened up new scenarios for local au-
thorities by dismantling the old system of sub-national finance that, up until then,
policy-makers had defined as finanza derivata (Deputati, 2010, 5).193 Here, as the
terminology implies, local authorities’ revenues derived from state transfers with
the exception of a small income that came from taxes which were levied at the local
level. Simply put, the state collected most part of the inland revenues and then
transferred funds to local authorities. Moreover, when state transfers were insu -
cient, local administrators financed their investments primarily through fixed-rate
190Cf. law no. 448, December 23, 1998. See also Deputati (2010).
191Centre-right forces were also in favour of decentralisation.
192Cf. law no. 59, March 15, 1997 (‘Bassanini’ law); law no. 127, May 15, 1997 (‘Bassanini’ bis);
law no. 191, June 16, 1998 (‘Bassanini’ ter); law no. 50, March 8, 1999 (‘Bassanini’ quater); law
decree no. 267, August 18, 2000; constitutional law no. 3, October 18, 2001. About the autonomy
of local authorities, cf. Constitution (1947, art. 119).
193Ironically, the very same Italian expression indicates today the use of financial derivatives in
their general features.
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loans of the public institutes Cassa DP and CREDIOP (Rosati, 2009, 4).
The dismantling of finanza derivata created a radically di↵erent scenario. Whilst
the level of state transfers began to decrease under EU-imposed budgetary limits,
local authorities gradually obtained more autonomy in their revenue and expendi-
ture management. In this context, they faced the necessity of approaching financial
markets, instruments and actors beyond the traditional public sphere (Saccomanni,
2007, 17). In a word, local authorities began to move within new institutions and dis-
courses of a financialised kind. Interest rate swaps emerged as fundamental practices
of this new environment. As a council member of a Southern-Italian municipality
explained in a bizarre comparison, “swaps became very fashionable... bank brokers
contacted budget assessori relentlessly... just like solar-panel companies are doing
today.”194
The construction of a regulatory framework concerning the use of swaps in local
finance mirrored the course of events. Regulation acknowledged swaps for the first
time in 1996. Local authorities were allowed to issue bonds since 1994 and, in this
regard, they were obliged to enter into currency swaps contracts when bonds were
denominated in foreign currencies.195 Besides currency swaps, there was no specific
regulation concerning the adoption of other types of swaps by local authorities up
until the period 2001-2004.196 It is only at this point that a specific regulatory frame-
work was put in place to discipline the growing use of interest rate swaps and other
derivatives in local finance.197 Although this regulation was updated in few occa-
sions, its basic pillars remained substantially unchanged until the summer of 2008,
when the government enacted the current moratorium on the use of derivatives by
194Interview, August 31, 2012, my translation. The interviewee agreed that the information given
to me was not be individually ascribed. Italian municipalities are governed by a mayor (sindaco),
a municipal executive (giunta comunale) and a municipal council (consiglio comunale) as the
legislative body. Cf. law decree no. 267, August 18, 2000. Members of the executive are called
assessori comunali. Each assessore has responsibility for a specific department such as budget,
urban a↵airs, sport and so on. Members of the council are known as consiglieri comunali.
195Law no. 724, December 23, 1994, art. 35 validated the use of bonds in local finance. For
what concerns the specific use of currency swaps, cf. ministerial decree no. 420, July 5, 1996.
The latter authorised the procedural aspects of law no. 724. For this and the following regulatory
steps concerning derivatives activities by local authorities, see http://www.dt.tesoro.it/it/debito
pubblico/enti locali/nota espl normativa enti territoriali.html [accessed on December 30, 2012].
196The use of derivatives by private actors was instead regulated by the 1998 consolidated law on
finance.
197Cf. law no. 448, December 28, 2001, art. 41; ministerial decree no. 389, December 1, 2003;
Treasury memorandum no. 128, May 27, 2004.
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local authorities.198 In particular, municipalities were allowed to use for hedging
purposes plain vanilla instruments such as: currency swaps, interest rate swaps, for-
ward rate agreements, amortising swaps and interest rate options (caps and collars).
What is more, they could implement operations of debt restructuring but not with
the objective of postponing the maturity of the initial debt. These operations could
not include an upfront sum above 1% of the notional amount and an ascending flow
of payments by the local authority over the duration of the contract (Franco, 2009,
18-22). Besides the internal controls at the municipal level, the Ministry of Economy
and Finance was in charge of monitoring derivatives activities by local authorities
and to transmit the data to the Supreme Audit Court on a regular basis. Although
the Bank of Italy and CONSOB had no specific supervisory role concerning public
finance, they were both in charge of controlling the operations of financial intermedi-
aries and their derivatives trading with local authorities and private actors (Rosati,
2009, 9-11, 15-18).
At this point, two central questions arise: why did municipalities adopt these
instruments? Why did the phenomenon become controversial? Under growing finan-
cial constraints, municipalities attempted to make a virtue of the newly available
practices. The common economic understanding shows that these actors aimed at
optimising the costs of the debt portfolio by restructuring the debt position. This
was done in the attempt to free part of those financial resources which were previ-
ously used to serve the debt, therefore generating more liquidity in the municipal
budget at a time in which the latter was drying up. For instance, in the case of a
municipality in the Apulia region, the operation of debt restructuring consisted of
closing over 60 fixed-rate loans – of the total value of over d10 millions – which were
contracted with Cassa DP in the period between 1997 and 2004.199 At the same
time, the municipality issued fixed-rate bonds (3.75%) for the same value and with
a 20-year maturity.200 A specialised bank assisted the issuing process in all its phases
198About the moratorium, cf. law no. 133, August 6, 2008, art. 62; modified by law no. 203,
December 22, 2008.
199The following case is based on two interviews (September 04-05, 2012) with the head of the
financial services of the municipality in question, as well as the o cial documents which were kindly
provided by the interviewee after an o cial request to the mayor. The interviewee agreed that the
information given to me was not be individually ascribed and the name of the municipality was
not to be mentioned – although the o cial documents concerning the specific swap operation are
publicly available via o cial request to the mayor.
200Municipal bonds are known as buoni ordinari comunali (BOC).
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and underwrote the entire lot of municipal bonds. In other words, the municipality
had the opportunity to extinguish its debt (loans) with Cassa DP and issued bonds
to “catch the opportunity arising from favourable levels of market rates” (interview,
September 04, 2012, my translation). The interest rate swap entered the picture in
2006. How did it work in practice?
The very same bank proposed the municipality to enter into a fixed-to-floating
interest rate swap. It is important to remember that the swap does not substitute the
previous commitments which the municipality had on the 20-year-maturity bond.
As already mentioned in the technical excursus of this thesis, the swap is a com-
pletely distinct contract that works like a bet. In the fixed-to-floating case of the
Southern Italian municipality, the bank was the fixed-rate payer whilst the munic-
ipality was the floating-rate payer. In this type of swap, the nature of the bet is
that the fixed-rate payer has a negative flow of funds towards the floating-rate payer
when the interest rate goes down and vice versa. In our case, due to the interest-
rate scenarios, the municipality had initially a positive flow of funds. In practical
terms, the municipality still paid a fixed-rate of 3.75% on its bonds, but this inter-
est was discounted of certain basis points in line with the funds which derived from
the swap bet in variable terms. The problem was that, as interest rates rose, the
initial positive flows turned negative for the municipality. Hence, the opportunity
was not as attractive as it had been in the beginning. This is the moment when the
phenomenon became controversial.
In general terms, many other municipalities across the country experienced the
same negative circumstances. In December 2005, 310 municipalities had a negative
exposure to derivatives for a market value of d343 millions. By December 2007, the
number went up to 619 municipalities for a negative market value of d686 millions.
In March 2009, after the 2008 moratorium, the number of municipalities went down
to 440 for a negative market value of d575 millions. It is important to note that
these data account for municipalities only. If we include other local authorities, the
negative market value goes up to over d1 billion in March 2009. What is more, these
data concern only the operations of financial intermediaries which operate in Italy.
However, bigger local authorities usually dealt with foreign operators the market
quota of which accounts for roughly 60%. In other words, the above-mentioned data
represent an approximation by defect of a much wider issue (Franco, 2009, table 9,
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26-29).
Apart for the common economic rationale behind the use of swaps by munic-
ipalities, there is another dimension of the story which takes us to the realm of
power relations. In fact, by looking at several specific cases, it becomes clear that
municipalities got high on swaps because of a key element of such instruments: the
upfront (Sanderson, Dinmore and Tett, 2010). This is a sum which the bank ad-
vanced to a given municipality to set the contract in a market-neutral position. It
happened when the swap was of a ‘non-par’ type, meaning that, when the two par-
ties entered into the contract, the swap presented a negative market value for one
of the two parties – in this case, the municipality. As a result, the bank brought
the contract to a par condition by advancing an upfront sum to the municipality
which should be equivalent to the negative market value the local government was
exposed to at the signing of the contract (Rosati, 2009, 1-2). This aspect presented
a crucial accountancy artifice. Municipalities considered the upfront as a revenue
rather than a debt. For this reason, they circumvented the budget constraint (15%
debt-to-revenue ratio) imposed by the pact of internal stability. In other words, they
increased artificially the revenue side of the ratio whilst leaving the debt-side un-
changed. Paradoxically, the upfront turned into a virtue to be used for purposes
of mass consensus (Carlini, 2010). Indeed, as Rachel Sanderson, Guy Dinmore and
Gillian Tett (2010, my italic) pointed out:
[i]n the revolving-door world of Italian local politics, each new admin-
istration wanted its own upfront, so asked their bankers to restructure
the deal to release more cash in advance. The terms of the swap tended
to become more restrictive each time. Some banks covered the cost of
the upfront fee by pricing the interest rate swap more aggressively, so
that only in unusual circumstances would the entity receive more each
period than it paid out [...] In other cases, upper and lower limits on the
movement of interest rates ensured the upside for the local authorities
was reduced and downside risks were magnified.
Banks jumped on such an easy profit opportunity by using a simple declaration form
in which the treasurer of a given municipality agreed to be considered as operatore
qualificato (professional investor), meaning that she was able to understand the
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maths of complex financial risks.201
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter has explored the distinct traits of derivatives-based risk management in
Italy. The study has claimed that Italian neoliberal reformists introduced derivatives
as fundamental tools which served their strategies against conservative forces. For
this reason, derivatives techniques acquired specific contours in relation to the unique
power struggles shaping the Italian society.
The first section has shown how technocrats imported derivatives as part and
parcel of the renovation of public-debt management in the early 1990s. As they
became impatient towards the inability of the partitocrazia system to reduce gov-
ernment deficit, technocrats pushed for the marketisation of public debt as a possible
solution to reduce the huge costs of debt servicing. This modernisation implied the
launch of new practices and technology on primary and secondary markets which the
Treasury used in order to manage public debt more actively. Derivatives practices
emerged as part and parcel of this public-debt marketisation. They were deemed to
make government bonds more attractive to investors.
After this, the chapter has examined the period 1992-1999 when the fight for Eu-
rope intensified. In this context, technocrats and centre-left politicians implemented
market-oriented reforms and austerity measures in order to conform with the Maas-
tricht convergence criteria. It is in this scenario that these actors engineered the
interest-rate convergence between the Italian and German bonds via arbitrageurs on
OTC markets (Dunbar, 2000, 149-162). Furthermore, in a very controversial move,
reformists arranged also a currency swap which window-dressed the 1997 budget
deficit (Piga, 2001, 122-129).
Finally, the chapter has concluded by looking at the modalities through which
other agents related to the market-oriented transformation launched by neoliberal
reformists. The study has emphasised the enabling character of institutional and
201Cf. CONSOB regulation no. 11522 (intermediaries) art. 31, July 1, 1998. See http://
www.consob.it/main/documenti/Regolamentazione/normativa/reg11522.htm [accessed on Decem-
ber 30, 2012]. Regulation no. 11522 was abrogated by Mifid in 2007 once the Italian jurisdiction
received the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Mifid) through the decree law no. 164,
September 17, 2007. About Mifid, cf. directive 2004/39/EC at http://eur-lex.europa.eu [accessed
on December 30, 2012].
188
discursive structures. In this regard, it has shown how the newly advanced insti-
tutions and discourses – the shareholder-oriented regime of corporate governance
and the dismantling of finanza derivata – allowed the Agnelli family and Italian
municipalities to adopt swaps in a strategic guise.
189
Conclusions
It is convenient for the popular discourse to condemn ill-defined external forces
rather than looking at one’s own closest reality. Unfortunately, by doing so, we often
fail to address problems in the most appropriate manner. This is what happened with
the controversy about derivatives frauds in Italy. People took for granted what the
most immediate evidence showed: Anglo-American finance and its complex practices
deceived local administrators who were performing their duty of managing the res
publica. To be sure, some local politician facilitated these deceitful episodes. Yet,
the common discourse preferred to blame the City and Wall Street. It could not
have been otherwise in a context where the American subprime crisis was spreading
the fear of contagion across the globe, making it incredibly di cult for people to
rationalise such critical events in a proper manner. Did anybody ever attempt to
problematise this simplistic view about derivatives frauds in Italy? Did anyone pierce
the veil of the conventional narrative to explore instead the historical reasons behind
the phenomena in question?
Only recently, Alessandro Penati (2012) – a professor of finance at the Catholic
University in Milan – has argued in favour of banning the use of derivatives by the
state. In March 2012, through the pages of La Repubblica, Penati has commented
on the striking news that Morgan Stanley has terminated a derivative contract with
the Italian Treasury at the mark-to-market price of $3.4 billions.202 The case is
simply mind-blowing as both the Parliament and the wider public knew nothing
about the existence of this contract. Whilst Italian newspapers have either ignored
or underplayed the importance of such event, Penati has broken instead the silence
by claiming that an important factor in every budget audit is the ‘principle of the
cockroach’: if you see one, it means that many others are moving around the house.
Thus, the Treasury should be more transparent in revealing its derivatives positions
202On the news, see also Dunbar and Martinuzzi (2012).
190
and counterparty risk. Furthermore, Penati has pointed out that derivatives might
be useful instruments for private actors. But, the state is in no way a private actor.
Hence, the Italian society should ban the use of the derivati di stato in the future
to come.
Penati’s perspective is certainly honest. However, in spite of his forthright piece,
he does not mention how and why the Italian Treasury entered into these derivatives
contracts to begin with. In other words, his comment takes no notice of the political-
economic dynamics which led Italian o cials to engage with derivatives markets. On
the contrary, this is what this thesis has tried to attain. It has aimed at exploring the
expansion of derivatives in the Italian context by looking at the agents populating
the country’s political-economic a↵airs. The work has shown that, although Anglo-
American finance certainly set in motion powerful dynamics, domestic actors played
a crucial role in appropriating the institutions and discourses of derivatives-based
risk management in Italy. Indeed, Italian neoliberal reformists adopted this innova-
tion as an essential constituent of their power strategies vis-a`-vis conservative forces.
They exploited derivatives as the most ruthless artifice which served the objectives
of joining EMU and overhauling the traditional traits of Italian capitalism.
Main findings of the thesis
The thesis has examined derivatives in Italy by engaging with the proble´matique
concerning the distinct trajectories of financialisation across societies. Several schol-
ars have recently begun to explore the important question of how and why the
practices of financialisation reach areas outside the Anglo-American economies –
where these phenomena originally manifested themselves (Engelen, Konings and
Fernandez, 2010; Gabor, 2010; Kaltenbrunner, 2010; Marois, 2011; Orsi and Solari,
2010; Painceira, 2010; Stockhammer, 2008). These studies represent an important
research avenue that aims at improving the analytical resources of a first generation
of works which – as shown in chapter one – was inattentive to the diverse nature of
financialisation. However, in undertaking this research task, it is crucial to under-
stand that such first generation of studies tends to reveal methodological deficiencies
which prevent the analysis from capturing the di↵erential traits of financialisation.
Hence, it is necessary to address these problems in order to articulate the complex
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interaction between local and global power relations in an appropriate manner.
What are these methodological flaws? How can they be tackled?
As this thesis has argued in chapter one, financialisation scholars are prone to con-
ceptualise the power of finance as consolidated in social structures, an exercise which
allows them to theorise the general dynamics of financialisation. Here, agency enters
the analytical picture in a passive way. It is seen as an act of resistance against struc-
tural power. In other words, although agency exists, it is nonetheless emptied of its
political-economic resources. It is not properly examined, but merely understood as
an opportunity which hardly ever occurs. In sum, power and agency oppose each
other (Knafo, 2010, 497-499). This view on agency in opposition to structural power
is the key problem which sets the financialisation debate on the wrong path. In fact,
once agency is deprived of its strategic capabilities, there is no analytical space to
capture the agents who construct and continuously manipulate the institutions and
discourses of financialisation in a di↵erential manner, across societies and depending
on context-specific power struggles. As a result of this structural bias, financialisation
ultimately appears as a replication of similar institutions and discourses everywhere
else. Hence, it is crucial to open up the dimension of agency in order to explore how
and why the practices of financialisation emerge across social spaces in distinct ways.
How is it possible to explore agency in a productive way?
In order to address this question, the thesis has advanced the agency-centred ap-
proach as a way to reconsider how we think of financialisation. From this vantage
point, the study has reinterpreted social reality as an environment where actors
interact with each other through mediating institutions and discourses that are con-
stantly subject to manipulation. The most important aspect of this method is that
power does no longer reside in the structures of society, but it is instead produced by
agents when they innovate extant institutions and discourses. They do so in the at-
tempt to leverage their own actions over others (Knafo, 2010; Konings, 2010b). The
thesis has demonstrated the relevance of the agency-centred approach in relation to
the case of derivatives in Italy. In particular, it has captured how and why Italian
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actors – through their power struggles as well as their institutional and discursive
manipulation – created distinct traits of derivatives-based risk management across
social spaces.
Where did derivatives come from?
In order to understand how and why these instruments were adopted in the Ital-
ian context, it has been necessary to explore first their origins and evolution in the
United States. In fact, as chapter two has shown, derivatives assumed their modern
features in the American context and, from here, these practices were then exported
to other societies. To be exact, derivatives-like contracts existed for a long time
before they appeared on US commodity markets (Swan, 1999). Yet, it is only here
that these tools were systematically disconnected from the final delivery of the un-
derlying commodity during the late nineteenth century. This innovation generated a
surge in speculative activities which clashed with the interests of the rising populist
movements. At this point, representatives of commodity exchanges recast deriva-
tives trading and its speculative practices as essential resources for the management
of business-risk. In the end, this idea was institutionalised in such terms (Levy,
2006). Hence, the institutions and discourses of derivatives-based risk management
consolidated.
Still, as long as the majority of contracts were traded on organised commodity
exchanges, derivatives-based techniques did not yet reveal their full potential. It
was only in the early 1970s – once American power relations turned in favour of
finance – that Chicago exchanges successfully lobbied for the introduction of financial
derivatives on their trading pits (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; MacKenzie, 2006). In
this regard, the discipline of financial economics provided scientific legitimacy by
describing derivatives as tools which protect investors from the risk of financial
market volatility (Wigan, 2009).
During the 1970s, derivatives trading expanded but several regulatory uncer-
tainties still remained. Once these issues were solved in the early 1980s, derivatives
grew in size and rate of innovation, becoming essential components of American
financial power in the global economy. Three markets were particularly remark-
able: index derivatives, asset-backed securities and, above all, swaps. According to
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the mainstream narrative, swaps emerged as useful instruments through which in-
vestors hedged their risk exposures to interest rates and exchange rates (Markham,
2002c, 192). That was true to a certain extent. But, at a non rhetorical level, swaps
were simply the perfect tools which companies and financial actors used to avoid
regulation and window-dress their books (Partnoy, 2009, 47). Over the course of the
1980s, as derivatives trading expanded, other societies began to adopt its practices
as well.
What made the Italian society adopt derivatives in distinct ways?
In Italy, it was once neoliberal-minded forces launched an attack on the country’s
conservative establishment that the institutions and discourses concerning the use of
derivatives emerged in their specific traits. As chapter three has explained, Italian
capitalism historically evolved through complex ownership synergies between pri-
vate business oligarchies and the expanding public enterprise (Segreto, 1998). This
private-public liaison produced incredibly dysfunctional dynamics during the 1980s,
the most emblematic symptoms of which were the huge growth of public debt and
the collusive expansion of the stock-market. It is at this historical juncture that
pro-market technocrats at the Bank of Italy and the Treasury Ministry advanced a
critique of Italian capitalism which praised public debt reduction, the privatisation
of the state-owned sector and, some years later, the modernisation of Italian finance
in line with the ideology of shareholder value. In so doing these actors aimed at
dismantling the pillars which secured the reproduction of conservative politics-cum-
business a↵airs.
Technocrats gained influence during the late 1980s at a time when the Euro-
pean single market and the project of monetary integration were launched. The
political-economic establishment and the popular discourse were very supportive of
Europe (Quaglia, 2011). Hence, taking advantage of this environment, they advised
politicians in favour of adopting market-oriented reforms such as the liberalisation
of capital movements, the transformation of public banks into joint-stock compa-
nies and the independence of the central bank. However, it was particularly during
the intergovernmental conference on EMU that technocrats obtained considerable
decision-making power over the policy contents of the negotiations. Here, by ad-
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hering to the Maastricht convergence criteria, they imposed an external constraint
on the ability of ruling elites to dissipate public finance (Dyson and Featherstone,
1996). At this point, whilst the bribery scandals of Tangentopoli brought the old
political regime to a total collapse, technocratic forces finally captured the executive
power and had the chance to implement neoliberal reforms systematically (Sbragia,
2001). Derivatives practices emerged in Italy under such circumstances.
As chapter four has examined, technocrats adopted derivatives as part and parcel
of the renovation of public-debt management. During the 1980s, as government debt
increased considerably, they looked at all possible strategies to reduce the costs
of debt servicing. Of course, they became impatient towards the inability of the
political class to reduce public expenditure. In this context, technocrats renovated
the management of debt in a market-oriented fashion. This transformation included
the introduction of new practices and technology on primary and secondary markets
which allowed the Treasury to manage its debt in an active manner. This aspect
was supposed to help save on the debt costs (Giovannini, 1997). Derivatives were
introduced together with this public-debt renovation. They were deemed to make
the market for government bonds more attractive to investors.
So far, nothing particularly controversial had emerged yet. But, once the fight
for Europe intensified, technocrats – soon joined by centre-left politicians – adopted
derivatives as essential elements of their strategies. These actors implemented dra-
conian austerity measures and reforms in line with the objective of joining EMU in
1999. In so doing, they also unfolded two derivatives-based tactics. First, the Trea-
sury and the Bank of Italy encouraged LTCM and other hedge funds to arbitrage
the interest-rate convergence between Italian and German bonds on OTC markets
(Dunbar, 2000, 153). Second, the Olive Tree coalition not only continued this battle
for interest-rate convergence, but it also entered into a currency swap which window-
dressed the budget deficit for the crucial year 1997 (Piga, 2001, 122-129).
How did actors other than neoliberal reformists relate to the market-oriented mod-
ernisation of Italian capitalism?
As the last part of chapter four has shown, the enabling qualities of institutional
and discursive structures allowed the Agnelli family and Italian municipalities to
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use themselves derivatives in a highly strategic manner. In fact, against a corporate
governance regime attuned to the ideology of shareholder value, the Agnellis made
use of equity swaps in order to hedge the risk of ownership dilution. Municipalities
joined instead the market for interest rate swaps en masse with the aim of avoiding
the budget restrictions which resulted from the European stability and growth pact.
Financialisation in Italy
This thesis has dealt with a crucial facet of financialisation in Italy: how and why
key actors used derivatives for political-strategic purposes. This dimension clearly
indicates that the Italian political economy actively embraces financial innovation.
Of course, although of the utmost importance, the tactical adoption of derivatives
is not the only aspect showing this process. There are also other events which would
deserve to be examined, but doing so exhaustively would lay beyond the scope of
this work.203 Nonetheless, it is beneficial in these concluding remarks to touch upon
a few data that can shed light on the general dynamics of financialisation in Italy.204
As it is shown, this phenomenon had an expansionary phase in the late 1990s and
early 2000s. After this period, it evolved in an attenuated form without nonetheless
sparing the country crisis-ridden episodes such as the case of derivatives.
From the late 1980s onwards, neoliberal-minded forces aimed at reforming the
traditional power structure of Italian capitalism. Dismantling the old practices of
state-led finance was a key factor in this project.205 The main financial reforms can
203For instance, it would be relevant to study how several centre-right administrations led by
Berlusconi adopted securitisation in the period 2001-2008. During these years, the Minister of
Economy and Finance Giulio Tremonti launched Europe-biggest disinvestment of state-owned real
estate by securitising these assets. This opaque operation – known by the acronym of SCIP (Societa`
Cartolarizzazione Immobili Pubblici) – was a populistic move set up to gain consensus on the basis
of deceitful macroeconomic data. It avoided raising taxes or cutting expenditure without breaching
the deficit ceiling of 3 per cent as imposed by European legislation (Munter, 2004; CorteConti,
2006, 34). In the end, the securitisation process resulted in a colossal failure which favoured urban
speculation to the detriment of state finances and the right to housing.
204In this regard, a caveat is necessary. Demonstrating Italy’s degree of financialisation in quan-
titative terms is a di cult task. To be sure, scholars deploy several metrics to gauge finance-led
dynamics. However, as this thesis has shown, financialisation is not a process to be appreciated
primarily in its quantitative proportions. The phenomenon rather requires to be explored as a
qualitative transformation driven by context-specific power relations.
205Following a classification given by John Zysman (1983), the Italian model of state-led finance
– as it developed since the 1930s – was characterised by four intertwined elements. First, firms’
external financing was based on loans from banks (short-term) and SCIs (long-term). As a result,
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be summarised in nine points.206 To begin with, banks and capital markets were
privatised and transformed into joint-stock companies. Second, the post-war sepa-
ration between short-term and long-term credit was removed. It became possible for
banks to engage in universal banking and to hold company shares in their portfolios.
Third, capital markets – equity and debt securities – were reorganised and deep-
ened in their activities and rate of innovation. Fourth, a new regime of corporate
governance was built in favour of shareholder-value ideology. Fifth, the central bank
was made independent of political authorities. Sixth, money markets were fully in-
tegrated at the European level. The functioning of segments such as treasury bills,
interbank funds and repos changed monetary policy into a mechanism aiming at
open-market operations instead of direct administrative policies. Seventh, innova-
tion spread also to the instruments and practices in use by market participants. In
this regard, derivatives markets and securitisation were the most emblematic cases.
Eighth, new actors such as mutual funds and pension funds entered the scene. Ninth,
the system of regulation was enhanced and shared amongst the Ministry of Economy
and Finance, the Bank of Italy and Consob as the securities markets authority.
In sum, Italian finance was renovated in a market-based fashion during the last
two decades.207 This transformation of the country’s financial system profoundly
shaped Italian capitalism as a whole by ‘hybridising’ its traditional traits with the
practices of Anglo-American financialisation.208 As already mentioned, this process
was at its peak in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, as of the mid-2000s – and
both equity and private bonds played a relatively marginal role in the economy. Second, state
ownership in banks and other financial institutions was very high. This aspect allowed political
authorities to determine the allocation of capital to specific purposes. Third, the regime of corporate
governance favoured ‘insiders’ (state, blockholders) and reduced the influence of ‘outsiders’ such as
institutional investors and minority shareholders. Fourth, central banking was highly dependent on
the Treasury. The neoliberal transformation of Italian finance entailed taking apart these traditional
mechanisms and replacing them with innovative market-oriented procedures.
206The following nine-point review is based on Ciocca (2005).
207It is important to note that these reforms fall short of giving Italy a high rank in the index of
financial development computed by the World Economic Forum. In the last years, Italy has fallen
from the 21st position to the 30th in the ranking. The index accounts for: a) factors, policies and
institutions (institutional environment, business environment, financial stability); b) the level of
financial intermediation (banking services, non-banking services, financial markets); c) the level of
financial access (commercial and retail users). See the reports at http://www.weforum.org/issues/
financial-development [accessed on December 31, 2012].
208Richard Deeg (2005a,b) has accurately explored how the modernisation of the domestic fi-
nancial system a↵ected the Italian model of capitalism as a whole. He claims that “[financial]
systems are at the core of each national economy and changing them has ripple or knock-on e↵ects
throughout” (Deeg, 2005b, 522).
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particularly after the 2007 subprime crisis – many of those elements which initially
signalled the expansion of financialisation in Italy eventually weakened. This current
situation is visible in the following indicators.
Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of the Italian financial markets from 1990 until
2010. In particular, the data concern the stock-market capitalisation, outstanding
domestic public and private debt. As it is clear, the stock market expanded dra-
matically during the 1990s under the influence of privatizations. However, it began
to shrink by the mid-2000s to then hit the same bottom level of 1990. The market
for public debt plays instead the dominant role amongst the three. Of course, this
is due to the significant size of the Italian government debt. Finally, the market for
private debt increased moderately throughout the period in consideration. Figure
4.3 compares the depth of Italian financial markets with other advanced economies.
The graph is for the year 2000 when the Italian stock market was at its peak.
Figure 4.4 shows the role of institutional investors in Italy during the last decade.
It is remarkable the drastic decline in mutual funds, whilst insurance companies
increased their assets. For what concerns pension funds, these are not major actors
in Italian finance because the country has a pay-as-you-go social security system.
These levels are far lower than what experienced in the US. Indeed, the assets owned
by American mutual funds have reached a value of 80 per cent of GDP in 2011. US
pension funds’ assets have stood instead at about 70 per cent of GDP.209
Besides the depth of financial markets and the role of institutional investors, the
increasing use of risky assets by households was an aspect where Italy experienced
a considerable growth. In this regard, household financial wealth shifted from bank
deposits to instruments the value of which is more exposed to volatility risk. Table
4.1 shows that – together with a remarkable increase in their financial wealth –
households expanded the use of products such as equities and mutual funds. Still,
it is important to consider that Italian households were still very prudent, revealing
a ratio of financial assets to debt of 6.6 in 2003 (Erturk et al., 2005, table 4).
Finally, as suggested by Engelen and Konings (2010, 614), let us look at secu-
ritisation as a ‘proxy’ for financial innovation in the Italian context. In this case,
the situation is di↵erent compared to the above-mentioned indicators. In fact, Italy
is amongst the major issuers of securitised assets in Europe. Table 4.2 shows this
209US data are based on World Bank Global Financial Development at http://data.worldbank.
org/data-catalog/global-financial-development [accessed on December 31, 2012].
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1987 1995 2000 2003
Deposits+cash 50.9 74.3 58.5 60.5
Bonds 39.9 48.8 43.7 49.3
Gov. bonds 36.2 40.8 16.5 15.2
Stocks 12.1 27.2 66.2 49.3
Quoted stocks - 5.5 16.5 10.5
Mutual funds 7.1 7.4 39.4 27.4
Insurance and pension funds 6.6 18.6 28.3 35.9
Total fin. assets 123.9 178.1 237.8 223.6
Fin. Liabilities 8.1 22.8 30.2 33.9
Net fin. wealth 115.9 155.2 207.6 189.7
Table 4.1: Household portfolios and financial wealth in Italy (% of GDP), 1987-2003.
Source: adapted from Erturk et al. (2005, table 1).
Italy UK Netherlands Spain
2006 110.9 431.8 113.9 143.6
2007 112 468.8 145.8 177.5
2008 161.3 615.5 202.5 229.2
2009 204.5 617.6 219.2 249.6
2010 222.1 632.2 321.3 297.4
2011 213.4 575.5 314.9 280.9
Table 4.2: European securitisation outstanding by country of collateral, 2006-2011
(dbillions).
Source: own elaboration from data by AFME Securitisation Data Report at
http://www.afme.eu/Divisions/Securitisation.aspx [accessed on December 31,
2012].
aspect by using data from the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME)
– a lobby group which has recently integrated the former European Securitisation
Forum.
Implications for future research
Whilst putting forward the significance of the agency-centred approach to the study
of derivatives in Italy, this work recognises some limitations which would necessitate
of more research. Let us mention three issues which are particularly relevant to this
thesis and worthy of note here.
202
First, in exploring the specificities of derivatives in Italy, the work focused pri-
marily on the neoliberal modernisation which occurred over the course of the 1990s.
This is the period when the institutions and discourses of derivatives-based risk
management acquired distinct traits in relation to the agential power of pro-market
reformists and their strategies. In this regard, more interviews with key market
participants and public o cials – as well as more research on authoritative docu-
ments (published or unpublished) and media sources – would be necessary in order
to gather data on the interaction between the Italian state and over-the-counter
derivatives markets in the 1990s. This is quite a hard task to accomplish considering
the opacity of OTC markets and the fact that, thus far, the Italian government is
not obliged to reveal its derivatives positions to the public.
Second, it would be important to examine how the scenario evolved after Italy
joined EMU. In particular, it would be useful to further investigate the derivatives
operations which both the state and the local authorities undertook. For what con-
cerns the latter, more research is needed with regard to the following points: the
specific reasons for which local authorities entered into derivatives contracts; the
details concerning the client-broker interaction; which banks played a pivotal role;
whether these actors built the contracts themselves or were conduits for other na-
tional or foreign banks; the accountability of administrators towards the public.
Third, more comparative work would be necessary in order to weigh the signifi-
cance of the Italian case vis-a`-vis other societies and their respective power struggles.
Italy certainly stood out amongst other European countries for the cunning ways
in which actors deployed derivatives-based strategies. Yet, similar episodes emerged
also amongst German and French municipalities (Dodd, 2010). Furthermore, for
what concerns the use of derivatives by the central state, Greece also adopted cur-
rency swaps to window-dress public finances (Rappeport, Braithwaite and Oakley,
2010).
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